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Moral judgment as reasoning by constraint satisfaction
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 September 2019
Abstract
May's careful examination of empirical evidence makes a compelling case against the primacy of emotion in driving moral judgments. At the same time, emotion certainly is involved in moral judgments. We argue that emotion interacts with beliefs, values, and moral principles through a process of coherence-based reasoning (operating at least partially below the level of conscious awareness) in generating moral judgments and decisions.
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Target article
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