Political scientists and pundits alike have marvelled at the extraordinary electoral successes of India's incumbent Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). In their target article, Sijilmassi et al. highlight the centrality of myths in contemporary coalition formation. We argue here that this approach can be fruitfully applied to elucidate political patterns in India today. This approach is particularly useful in understanding the BJP's successes in the context of the rising tide of Hindu nationalism and chauvinism (Hindutva, in contemporary parlance). Sijilmassi et al. supply a framework that can be used to analyse the centrality of myths in the rise of the BJP and its affiliate organizations, collectively known as the Sangh Parivar (Family of Organizations). The Sangh Parivar is headed by the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), and its subsidiaries, including the BJP, share the goal of creating a Hindu nation (Basu, Datta, Sarkar, Sarkar, & Sen, Reference Basu, Datta, Sarkar, Sarkar and Sen1993; Sarkar & Sarkar, Reference Sarkar and Sarkar2016).
Crucial to the BJP's political and cultural goals are (at least) two myths: The first centres on a millennium-long struggle between “invading” Muslims and “resisting” Hindus (Savarkar, Reference Savarkar1928/2003). This myth identifies Muslims as the “other,” ignores the possibility that Muslims are as “Indian” as Hindus, and calls upon Hindus to shake off their quiescence and rally against centuries of alleged oppression (Sarkar & Sarkar, Reference Sarkar and Sarkar2016; Thapar, Reference Thapar1989). The second myth is that Hindus comprise an undifferentiated social group that has descended from, or at least interacted with, glorious Aryan ancestors (Savarkar, Reference Savarkar1928/2003). This myth erases long-standing inequalities of caste, region, and sect that occur within this overly broad conception of Hinduism (Basu et al., Reference Basu, Datta, Sarkar, Sarkar and Sen1993; Sarkar & Sarkar, Reference Sarkar and Sarkar2016). Together, these myths have helped expand support for the BJP and Hindu nationalism beyond its core constituencies of upper castes and upper and middle classes.
The broad appeal of contemporary Hindu nationalism highlights the need to nuance the authors’ framework. Specifically, Sijilmassi et al. argue that individuals join coalitions not only because of the top-down efforts of elites, but because they consciously perceive gains to coalitional membership. Sijilmassi et al. point to the provision of public goods and the creation of just institutions as potential benefits of subscribers of such myth-based recruitment projects. While modern Hindu nationalism upholds a caste hierarchy with clear material benefits for the already privileged individuals belonging to upper caste and class backgrounds (Mannathukkaren, Reference Mannathukkaren2021), it is less clear if lower caste, lower class individuals who choose this ideology are expecting any such material benefits. Indeed, rather to the contrary, BJP-led governments have overseen significant reductions in the safety nets for the majority, including the slashing of funding for the world's largest work-for-welfare programme and repeated attempts to limit subsidies to farmers (Jaffrelot, Reference Jaffrelot2019). Inequality and unemployment have increased in the two terms of BJP rule (Chowdhury, Reference Chowdhury2023). Thus, it is difficult to make the argument that individuals of lower caste and class backgrounds are choosing Hindu nationalist politics exclusively because of genuine economic benefits.
Instead, the benefits that lower caste individuals might hope to secure may lie in a perceived improvement in social standing compared to a mythical “other,” or a sense of co-belonging with more prestigious social groups that are nominally related to one's own social group. Thus, applying the logic that Sijilmassi et al. articulate to contemporary Indian politics, we argue that belongingness benefits are just as important to consider as the economic and material benefits that Sijilmassi et al. highlight.
In this regard, understanding the psychological mechanisms driving the use of myths in Indian politics is of particular interest and importance. We propose that the success of these myths lies in drawing upon the evolved human capacity for prestige-based status. Humans possess an apparently unique form of social status that is based on respect, admiration, and freely conferred deference from others in the social group (in contrast to dominance, a form of social status that entails status derived from threatening and coercing others) (Henrich & Gil-White, Reference Henrich and Gil-White2001). In creating coalitions, high-ranking individuals possess a variety of strategies and mechanisms to recruit and control lower-ranking individuals in the service of competing with other groups (Sarkar & Wrangham, Reference Sarkar and Wrangham2023). These can reasonably be interpreted as entailing both dominance-oriented and prestige-oriented approaches. For instance, a dominance-oriented approach involves punishing lower-ranking individuals who refuse to participate in intergroup conflict or whose participation is deemed insufficient (Mathew & Boyd, Reference Mathew and Boyd2011). However, as Sijilmassi et al. point out, myths also serve as a useful recruitment strategy (and perhaps one that foments less conflict), and this use of myths appears to be a rather more prestige-oriented coalition-building strategy. A particular feature of prestige-based social status is the behavioural imitation of prestigious models. Part of the reason that the myths promulgated in Hindutva politics have contributed to the BJP's success is that they invite (if only in an illusory capacity) low-ranking members of society to participate in high-prestige practices. “Sanskritization” offers an example of how prestige-associated behavioural imitation operates in Indian politics. Sanskritization refers to a process in which lower caste individuals emulate and imitate higher caste practices in an attempt to improve their social standing (Srinivas, Reference Srinivas1956). While the process predates the BJP and the Sangh Parivar, their political ascendancy has dramatically raised the stakes of Sanskritization in modern India. Dalits (formerly referred to as “untouchables”) and other lower caste individuals who join the BJP and affiliate organizations often aspire to such status gains (Teltumbde, Reference Teltumbde2005/2020). Shared mythology, based on the dual myths articulated by the Sangh Parivar, could facilitate such perceptions.
These processes can be appreciated in interviews conducted with Dalits. For example, a Dalit man and former member of the RSS explained how recruits were reminded that they were all members of the ancient race of Aryans; that they and their blood were “the best” (Kumar, Reference Kumar2020). By participating in Hindutva politics, they could reclaim for themselves as well as for the nation of Hindus a lost glory. In other words, these individuals and groups can rise in prestige via affiliation with the mythology of a more prestigious social group. The participation of lower caste individuals in Hindu religious festivities – the choice and celebrations of which is in line with select upper caste Hindu traditions – affords a sense of cultural belonging (Kanungo, Reference Kanungo2007; Teltumbde, Reference Teltumbde2005/2020). Notably, these social benefits occur in the absence of appreciable material benefits. Through Sanskritization, the BJP and its affiliate organizations can actualize the myth of Hindu unity that is central to their cultural narrative. Those groups that are unable or unwilling to be assimilated because of their cultural distance from Hindutva's core, most notably Muslims, are identified as “others.” These groups consequently deserve the ire of the now significantly expanded “Hindu” fold. Thus, myths play an important role in contemporary Indian politics, but the coalitions they enable are based just as much, if not more, on symbolic benefits rooted in perceived belongingness as in material improvements.
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Political scientists and pundits alike have marvelled at the extraordinary electoral successes of India's incumbent Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). In their target article, Sijilmassi et al. highlight the centrality of myths in contemporary coalition formation. We argue here that this approach can be fruitfully applied to elucidate political patterns in India today. This approach is particularly useful in understanding the BJP's successes in the context of the rising tide of Hindu nationalism and chauvinism (Hindutva, in contemporary parlance). Sijilmassi et al. supply a framework that can be used to analyse the centrality of myths in the rise of the BJP and its affiliate organizations, collectively known as the Sangh Parivar (Family of Organizations). The Sangh Parivar is headed by the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), and its subsidiaries, including the BJP, share the goal of creating a Hindu nation (Basu, Datta, Sarkar, Sarkar, & Sen, Reference Basu, Datta, Sarkar, Sarkar and Sen1993; Sarkar & Sarkar, Reference Sarkar and Sarkar2016).
Crucial to the BJP's political and cultural goals are (at least) two myths: The first centres on a millennium-long struggle between “invading” Muslims and “resisting” Hindus (Savarkar, Reference Savarkar1928/2003). This myth identifies Muslims as the “other,” ignores the possibility that Muslims are as “Indian” as Hindus, and calls upon Hindus to shake off their quiescence and rally against centuries of alleged oppression (Sarkar & Sarkar, Reference Sarkar and Sarkar2016; Thapar, Reference Thapar1989). The second myth is that Hindus comprise an undifferentiated social group that has descended from, or at least interacted with, glorious Aryan ancestors (Savarkar, Reference Savarkar1928/2003). This myth erases long-standing inequalities of caste, region, and sect that occur within this overly broad conception of Hinduism (Basu et al., Reference Basu, Datta, Sarkar, Sarkar and Sen1993; Sarkar & Sarkar, Reference Sarkar and Sarkar2016). Together, these myths have helped expand support for the BJP and Hindu nationalism beyond its core constituencies of upper castes and upper and middle classes.
The broad appeal of contemporary Hindu nationalism highlights the need to nuance the authors’ framework. Specifically, Sijilmassi et al. argue that individuals join coalitions not only because of the top-down efforts of elites, but because they consciously perceive gains to coalitional membership. Sijilmassi et al. point to the provision of public goods and the creation of just institutions as potential benefits of subscribers of such myth-based recruitment projects. While modern Hindu nationalism upholds a caste hierarchy with clear material benefits for the already privileged individuals belonging to upper caste and class backgrounds (Mannathukkaren, Reference Mannathukkaren2021), it is less clear if lower caste, lower class individuals who choose this ideology are expecting any such material benefits. Indeed, rather to the contrary, BJP-led governments have overseen significant reductions in the safety nets for the majority, including the slashing of funding for the world's largest work-for-welfare programme and repeated attempts to limit subsidies to farmers (Jaffrelot, Reference Jaffrelot2019). Inequality and unemployment have increased in the two terms of BJP rule (Chowdhury, Reference Chowdhury2023). Thus, it is difficult to make the argument that individuals of lower caste and class backgrounds are choosing Hindu nationalist politics exclusively because of genuine economic benefits.
Instead, the benefits that lower caste individuals might hope to secure may lie in a perceived improvement in social standing compared to a mythical “other,” or a sense of co-belonging with more prestigious social groups that are nominally related to one's own social group. Thus, applying the logic that Sijilmassi et al. articulate to contemporary Indian politics, we argue that belongingness benefits are just as important to consider as the economic and material benefits that Sijilmassi et al. highlight.
In this regard, understanding the psychological mechanisms driving the use of myths in Indian politics is of particular interest and importance. We propose that the success of these myths lies in drawing upon the evolved human capacity for prestige-based status. Humans possess an apparently unique form of social status that is based on respect, admiration, and freely conferred deference from others in the social group (in contrast to dominance, a form of social status that entails status derived from threatening and coercing others) (Henrich & Gil-White, Reference Henrich and Gil-White2001). In creating coalitions, high-ranking individuals possess a variety of strategies and mechanisms to recruit and control lower-ranking individuals in the service of competing with other groups (Sarkar & Wrangham, Reference Sarkar and Wrangham2023). These can reasonably be interpreted as entailing both dominance-oriented and prestige-oriented approaches. For instance, a dominance-oriented approach involves punishing lower-ranking individuals who refuse to participate in intergroup conflict or whose participation is deemed insufficient (Mathew & Boyd, Reference Mathew and Boyd2011). However, as Sijilmassi et al. point out, myths also serve as a useful recruitment strategy (and perhaps one that foments less conflict), and this use of myths appears to be a rather more prestige-oriented coalition-building strategy. A particular feature of prestige-based social status is the behavioural imitation of prestigious models. Part of the reason that the myths promulgated in Hindutva politics have contributed to the BJP's success is that they invite (if only in an illusory capacity) low-ranking members of society to participate in high-prestige practices. “Sanskritization” offers an example of how prestige-associated behavioural imitation operates in Indian politics. Sanskritization refers to a process in which lower caste individuals emulate and imitate higher caste practices in an attempt to improve their social standing (Srinivas, Reference Srinivas1956). While the process predates the BJP and the Sangh Parivar, their political ascendancy has dramatically raised the stakes of Sanskritization in modern India. Dalits (formerly referred to as “untouchables”) and other lower caste individuals who join the BJP and affiliate organizations often aspire to such status gains (Teltumbde, Reference Teltumbde2005/2020). Shared mythology, based on the dual myths articulated by the Sangh Parivar, could facilitate such perceptions.
These processes can be appreciated in interviews conducted with Dalits. For example, a Dalit man and former member of the RSS explained how recruits were reminded that they were all members of the ancient race of Aryans; that they and their blood were “the best” (Kumar, Reference Kumar2020). By participating in Hindutva politics, they could reclaim for themselves as well as for the nation of Hindus a lost glory. In other words, these individuals and groups can rise in prestige via affiliation with the mythology of a more prestigious social group. The participation of lower caste individuals in Hindu religious festivities – the choice and celebrations of which is in line with select upper caste Hindu traditions – affords a sense of cultural belonging (Kanungo, Reference Kanungo2007; Teltumbde, Reference Teltumbde2005/2020). Notably, these social benefits occur in the absence of appreciable material benefits. Through Sanskritization, the BJP and its affiliate organizations can actualize the myth of Hindu unity that is central to their cultural narrative. Those groups that are unable or unwilling to be assimilated because of their cultural distance from Hindutva's core, most notably Muslims, are identified as “others.” These groups consequently deserve the ire of the now significantly expanded “Hindu” fold. Thus, myths play an important role in contemporary Indian politics, but the coalitions they enable are based just as much, if not more, on symbolic benefits rooted in perceived belongingness as in material improvements.
Acknowledgements
For helpful discussion, we thank Joseph Henrich and members of the Culture, Cognition, and Coevolution Laboratory at the Department of Human Evolutionary Biology at Harvard University.
Financial support
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.
Competing interests
None.