Sijilmassi et al. posit that national historical myths play a crucial role in rallying coalitional support for large-scale collective action, fostering social cohesion through coalitional recruitment. They also stress that historical myths, which are decisive in founding ethnic groups or nations, often emphasize common ancestral bonds and/or highlight significant events that have shaped the group. However, we claim that historical myths, also referred to as “group charters” (Liu & Hilton, Reference Liu and Hilton2005), can take a variety of forms. We focus here on two categories of myths: Those built on collective trauma and on cooperation. We claim that contrary to cooperative historical myths, myths based on trauma can undermine rather than establish within-group social cohesion.
Similarly to Sijilmassi et al., we define historical myths as shared collective memories that play a foundational role in a group's history, and that are based in most cases on significant collective experiences rather than fantasies. Examples of traumatic historical myths include the history of genocide in Armenian collective memory, the Katyń massacre in Polish collective memory, and Jim Crow in Black cultural memory in the USA. Cooperative myths include the Stonewall rebellion in LGBT+ memory, the civil rights movement in the USA, or the Solidarity movement in Poland. Both psychological and sociological evidence suggests that these two kinds of myths might have opposite consequences for social cohesion and coalitional recruitment.
Acts of genocide, colonial crimes, and exploitation destroy national cohesion and create everyday mistrust among the members of victimized groups. During mass traumatic events, hypervigilance and obsession with treason undermine societal cohesiveness (Haska, Reference Haska2011). Therefore, any reminders of past atrocities recall times when group cohesiveness was endangered. Studies conducted in Greece and Poland showed that reminders of historical trauma (such as the Katyń massacres or Nazi massacres of Greeks) deteriorate trust, and enhance paranoia and conspiracy theorizing among people highly identified with their nation (Pantazi, Gkinopoulos, Witkowska, Klein, & Bilewicz, Reference Pantazi, Gkinopoulos, Witkowska, Klein and Bilewicz2022). Traumatic national myths lead to large-scale divisions of societies during subsequent crises, a process known as “traumatic rift” (Bilewicz, Witkowska, Pantazi, Gkinopoulos, & Klein, Reference Bilewicz, Witkowska, Pantazi, Gkinopoulos and Klein2019). A cross-national study of WWII memories showed that people with higher levels of transgenerationally transmitted war-related trauma are more willing to believe in conspiracy theories (Bilewicz, Reference Bilewicz2022). A Polish study looking at the cognitive availability of historical trauma found that people focused on their traumatic national history have a greater tendency to believe in conspiracies (Skrodzka, Stefaniak, & Bilewicz, Reference Skrodzka, Stefaniak and Bilewicz2023), whereas a study in Hungary found that high availability of national trauma increases a belief in Jewish conspiracy – thereby undermining the cohesion between different ethnic groups living in the country (Skrodzka, Kende, Faragó, & Bilewicz, Reference Skrodzka, Kende, Faragó and Bilewicz2022). This process could be explained by the fact that historical myths evoke feelings of powerlessness and low control, key antecedents of conspiracy beliefs (Bilewicz, Reference Bilewicz2022; Bilewicz & Imhoff, Reference Bilewicz and Imhoff2022; Kofta, Soral, & Bilewicz, Reference Kofta, Soral and Bilewicz2020). Ultimately, traumatic historical myths would decrease trust toward fellow ingroup members and authorities (Bilewicz & Liu, Reference Bilewicz, Liu and Ray Vollhardt2020).
Conversely, myths of historical cooperativeness and collective agency could have a powerful role in coalitional recruitment and within-group cohesion, both in nations and in social movements. Such historical narratives play a distinct psychological role, allowing individuals to restore a sense of control and agency at a collective level (Bilewicz et al., Reference Bilewicz, Witkowska, Pantazi, Gkinopoulos and Klein2019). Cooperative historical myths motivate collective action by elevating key antecedents to collective action, such as awareness of perceived injustice, a sense of collective efficacy, and strong group identities (Freel & Bilali, Reference Freel and Bilali2022).
Research on historical moral exemplars reveals that people reminded about their ingroup members cooperating with the outgroup during past conflicts become more open to reconciliation and forgiveness (Čehajić-Clancy & Bilewicz, Reference Čehajić-Clancy and Bilewicz2020, Reference Čehajić-Clancy and Bilewicz2021). Moreover, such stories of cross-group cooperation can foster within-group social cohesion. A recent study in Rwanda demonstrated that awareness of individuals who rescued victims during times of genocide (as opposed to mere awareness of genocide trauma) strengthened Rwandan national identity over tribal identities (Atete & Bilewicz, Reference Atete and Bilewicz2023).
One of the emblematic examples of cooperative historical myths is the role of the Rochdale Pioneers myth in the international cooperative movement. The Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers was a group of weavers that established a cooperative store in the industrial city of Rochdale in 1844 (Fairbairn, Reference Fairbairn1994). This was not the first attempt to establish a consumer cooperative, and the shop was not the only endeavor of the Society (Hilson, Reference Hilson, Hilson, Neunsinger and Patmore2017). However, the establishment of the cooperative store became the founding myth of the cooperative movement. It was the Pioneers, according to that myth, who invented cooperation. This happened mainly because the Pioneers formulated a list of principles that were later used and developed by the International Cooperative Alliance (ICA, established in 1895), and became the Rochdale Principles that were obligatory for every cooperative. Today, the movement based on this historical myth includes more than 3 million cooperatives worldwide. According to Totomianz (Reference Totomianz, Błesznowski and Bilewicz2020), the movement of cooperative economy heavily relied on the “cooperative mystics” that allowed for maintaining a certain level of idealism needed for the movement to exist as an alternative form of economy. Without the continuous maintenance and renewal of this mythology, apathy and decline of idealism would endanger the existence of the social movement.
Historical cooperative myths are key motivators of collective action both in national groups, and in large-scale social movements. They might define group prototypes (the moral exemplars), but also establish specific principles that define the group and the rules of its conduct (the moral charter). The role of such myths is fundamentally different from traumatic historical myths that serve as mere reminders of insecurity and existential threats to group existence. Therefore, traumatic historical myths cannot play an equally constructive role in coalitional recruitment and collective action.
You have
Access
Sijilmassi et al. posit that national historical myths play a crucial role in rallying coalitional support for large-scale collective action, fostering social cohesion through coalitional recruitment. They also stress that historical myths, which are decisive in founding ethnic groups or nations, often emphasize common ancestral bonds and/or highlight significant events that have shaped the group. However, we claim that historical myths, also referred to as “group charters” (Liu & Hilton, Reference Liu and Hilton2005), can take a variety of forms. We focus here on two categories of myths: Those built on collective trauma and on cooperation. We claim that contrary to cooperative historical myths, myths based on trauma can undermine rather than establish within-group social cohesion.
Similarly to Sijilmassi et al., we define historical myths as shared collective memories that play a foundational role in a group's history, and that are based in most cases on significant collective experiences rather than fantasies. Examples of traumatic historical myths include the history of genocide in Armenian collective memory, the Katyń massacre in Polish collective memory, and Jim Crow in Black cultural memory in the USA. Cooperative myths include the Stonewall rebellion in LGBT+ memory, the civil rights movement in the USA, or the Solidarity movement in Poland. Both psychological and sociological evidence suggests that these two kinds of myths might have opposite consequences for social cohesion and coalitional recruitment.
Acts of genocide, colonial crimes, and exploitation destroy national cohesion and create everyday mistrust among the members of victimized groups. During mass traumatic events, hypervigilance and obsession with treason undermine societal cohesiveness (Haska, Reference Haska2011). Therefore, any reminders of past atrocities recall times when group cohesiveness was endangered. Studies conducted in Greece and Poland showed that reminders of historical trauma (such as the Katyń massacres or Nazi massacres of Greeks) deteriorate trust, and enhance paranoia and conspiracy theorizing among people highly identified with their nation (Pantazi, Gkinopoulos, Witkowska, Klein, & Bilewicz, Reference Pantazi, Gkinopoulos, Witkowska, Klein and Bilewicz2022). Traumatic national myths lead to large-scale divisions of societies during subsequent crises, a process known as “traumatic rift” (Bilewicz, Witkowska, Pantazi, Gkinopoulos, & Klein, Reference Bilewicz, Witkowska, Pantazi, Gkinopoulos and Klein2019). A cross-national study of WWII memories showed that people with higher levels of transgenerationally transmitted war-related trauma are more willing to believe in conspiracy theories (Bilewicz, Reference Bilewicz2022). A Polish study looking at the cognitive availability of historical trauma found that people focused on their traumatic national history have a greater tendency to believe in conspiracies (Skrodzka, Stefaniak, & Bilewicz, Reference Skrodzka, Stefaniak and Bilewicz2023), whereas a study in Hungary found that high availability of national trauma increases a belief in Jewish conspiracy – thereby undermining the cohesion between different ethnic groups living in the country (Skrodzka, Kende, Faragó, & Bilewicz, Reference Skrodzka, Kende, Faragó and Bilewicz2022). This process could be explained by the fact that historical myths evoke feelings of powerlessness and low control, key antecedents of conspiracy beliefs (Bilewicz, Reference Bilewicz2022; Bilewicz & Imhoff, Reference Bilewicz and Imhoff2022; Kofta, Soral, & Bilewicz, Reference Kofta, Soral and Bilewicz2020). Ultimately, traumatic historical myths would decrease trust toward fellow ingroup members and authorities (Bilewicz & Liu, Reference Bilewicz, Liu and Ray Vollhardt2020).
Conversely, myths of historical cooperativeness and collective agency could have a powerful role in coalitional recruitment and within-group cohesion, both in nations and in social movements. Such historical narratives play a distinct psychological role, allowing individuals to restore a sense of control and agency at a collective level (Bilewicz et al., Reference Bilewicz, Witkowska, Pantazi, Gkinopoulos and Klein2019). Cooperative historical myths motivate collective action by elevating key antecedents to collective action, such as awareness of perceived injustice, a sense of collective efficacy, and strong group identities (Freel & Bilali, Reference Freel and Bilali2022).
Research on historical moral exemplars reveals that people reminded about their ingroup members cooperating with the outgroup during past conflicts become more open to reconciliation and forgiveness (Čehajić-Clancy & Bilewicz, Reference Čehajić-Clancy and Bilewicz2020, Reference Čehajić-Clancy and Bilewicz2021). Moreover, such stories of cross-group cooperation can foster within-group social cohesion. A recent study in Rwanda demonstrated that awareness of individuals who rescued victims during times of genocide (as opposed to mere awareness of genocide trauma) strengthened Rwandan national identity over tribal identities (Atete & Bilewicz, Reference Atete and Bilewicz2023).
One of the emblematic examples of cooperative historical myths is the role of the Rochdale Pioneers myth in the international cooperative movement. The Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers was a group of weavers that established a cooperative store in the industrial city of Rochdale in 1844 (Fairbairn, Reference Fairbairn1994). This was not the first attempt to establish a consumer cooperative, and the shop was not the only endeavor of the Society (Hilson, Reference Hilson, Hilson, Neunsinger and Patmore2017). However, the establishment of the cooperative store became the founding myth of the cooperative movement. It was the Pioneers, according to that myth, who invented cooperation. This happened mainly because the Pioneers formulated a list of principles that were later used and developed by the International Cooperative Alliance (ICA, established in 1895), and became the Rochdale Principles that were obligatory for every cooperative. Today, the movement based on this historical myth includes more than 3 million cooperatives worldwide. According to Totomianz (Reference Totomianz, Błesznowski and Bilewicz2020), the movement of cooperative economy heavily relied on the “cooperative mystics” that allowed for maintaining a certain level of idealism needed for the movement to exist as an alternative form of economy. Without the continuous maintenance and renewal of this mythology, apathy and decline of idealism would endanger the existence of the social movement.
Historical cooperative myths are key motivators of collective action both in national groups, and in large-scale social movements. They might define group prototypes (the moral exemplars), but also establish specific principles that define the group and the rules of its conduct (the moral charter). The role of such myths is fundamentally different from traumatic historical myths that serve as mere reminders of insecurity and existential threats to group existence. Therefore, traumatic historical myths cannot play an equally constructive role in coalitional recruitment and collective action.
Finanacial support
This work was funded by NCN Opus grant (DEC-2023/49/B/HS6/01428) to the first author.
Competing interests
None.