If memory constraints were the only limitation on language processing, the best possible language would be one with only one word. But to explain the rich structure of language, we need to posit a second constraint: the pressure to communicate informatively. Many aspects of linguistic structure can be accounted for by appealing to equilibria that result from these two pressures.

We argue that i-frame interventions can and do increase support for systemic reforms, and s-frame interventions should be pursued in parallel to address key societal issues. Without accompanying i-frame interventions, s-frame interventions can fail. We offer an operant conditioning framework to generate positive spillover effects. Behavioral scientists should develop i-frame interventions that enhance, rather than compete with, s-frame interventions.

In conflating opposing meanings of the term ritual, arising from historical Western cultural conflicts regarding church and state, this target article begs fundamental questions. Its appeals to cognitive science concepts such as working memory are poorly informed and obfuscate what could have been a far more penetrating and less biased discussion of stereotyped human action.

The idea of the orderly output constraint is compared with recent findings about the representation of vowels in the auditory cortex of an animal model for human speech sound processing (Ohl & Scheich 1997). The comparison allows a critical consideration of the idea of neuronal “feature extractors,” which is of relevance to the noninvariance problem in speech perception.

Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) subjects can present temporary behaviors of acute agitation and aggressiveness, named problem behaviors. They have been shown to be consistent with the self-organized criticality (SOC), a model wherein occasionally occurring “catastrophic events” are necessary in order to maintain a self-organized “critical equilibrium.” The SOC can represent the psychopathology network structures and additionally suggests that they can be considered as self-organized systems.

We present a theoretical and an empirical challenge to Cushman's claim that rationalization is adaptive because it allows humans to extract more accurate beliefs from our non-rational motivations for behavior. Rationalization sometimes generates more adaptive decisions by making our beliefs about the world less accurate. We suggest that the most important adaptive advantage of rationalization is instead that it increases our predictability (and therefore attractiveness) as potential partners in cooperative social interactions.

The authors argue that children prefer fictions with imaginary worlds. But evidence from the developmental literature challenges this claim. Children's choices of stories and story events show that they often prefer realism. Further, work on the imagination's relation to counterfactual reasoning suggests that an attraction to unrealistic fiction would undermine the imagination's role in helping children understand reality.

Despite denials in the target article, the Distancing-Embracing model appeals to compensatory ideas in explaining the appeal of artworks that elicit negative affect. The model also appeals to the deflationary effects of psychological distancing. Having pointed to the famous rejection in the 1960s of the view that aesthetic experience involves psychological distancing, I suggest that “distance” functions here as a weak metaphor that cannot sustain the explanatory burden the theory demands of it.

Human engagement with imaginary worlds pervades history (e.g., Paleolithic cave paintings) and development (e.g., 18-month-olds pretend). In providing a safe environment, separate from the real world, fiction offers the opportunity for simulated exploration regardless of external circumstances. Thus, engagement with imaginary worlds in fiction may afford individuals opportunities to reap benefits and transfer these benefits back to the real world.

Gervais & Fessler assert that contempt is (a) not an emotion (or an attitude) but (b) a sentiment. Here, we challenge the validity and empirical basis of these two assertions, arguing that contempt, like many other emotions, can be both an emotion and a sentiment.

notwithstanding the many strengths of the dynamic developmental theory, there remain challenges to be overcome before it can be incorporated into a true causal model of attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (adhd). these include the development of reliable measures of reinforcement delay gradients, the validation of shortened reinforcement delay as an endophenotype, and the integration of this pathway with other potential pathways.

Autism often co-occurs with alexithymia, a condition characterized by no or diminished awareness of emotions that significantly impacts an individual's social relationships. We investigate how the social motivation of autistics would be eroded by comorbidity with alexithymia and why this diminished motivation would be difficult for non-autistic people to perceive and reciprocate.

Research on visual attention has uncovered significant anomalies, and some traditional methods may have inadvertently probed peripheral vision rather than attention. Vision science needs to rethink visual attention from the ground up. To facilitate this, for a year I banned the word “attention” in my lab. This constraint promoted a more precise discussion of attention-related phenomena, capacity limits, and mechanisms. The insights gained lead me to challenge attributing to “attention” those phenomena that can be better explained by perceptual processes, are predictable by an ideal observer model, or that otherwise may not require an additional mechanism. I enumerate a set of critical phenomena in need of explanation. Finally, I propose a unifying theory in which all perception results from performing a task, and tasks face a limit on complexity.

Interpreting heritability estimates through the lens of cultural evolution presents two broad and interlinking problems for educational behavior genetics. First, the problem of interpreting high heritability of educational phenotypes as indicators of the genetic basis of traits, when these findings also reflect cultural homogeneity. Second, the problem of extrapolating from genetic research findings in education to policy and practice recommendations.

What can we hope to learn about brains from the free energy principle? In adopting the “primordial soup” physical model, Bruineberg et al. perpetuate the unsupported notion that the free-energy principle has a meaningful physical – and neuronal – interpretation. We examine how minimization of free energy arises in physical contexts, and what this can and cannot tell us about brains.

Toward illuminating the structure of Llewellyn's dream theory, I compare it in formal terms to Freud's dream theory. An alternative to both of these dream machines, grounded in the distribution of cholinergic activation in the central nervous system, is presented. It is suggested that neither “high” nor “low” dream theory is sufficient to account for the properties of dreams.

Ivancovsky et al.'s Novelty-Seeking Model suggests several mechanisms that might underlie developmental change in creativity and curiosity. We discuss how these implications both do and do not align with extant developmental findings, suggest two further elements that can provide a more complete developmental account, and discuss current methodological barriers to formulating an integrated developmental model of curiosity and creativity.

Savage et al. include groove and dance among musical features which enhance social bonds and group coherence. I discuss groove as grounded in structure and performance, and relate musical performance to play in nonhuman animals and humans. The interplay of individuals' contributions with group action is proposed as the common link between music and play as contributors to social bonding.