The target article is plagued by imprecision, making it largely impossible to evaluate the authors' theory in a scientific manner.

Baumeister and colleagues underline that individual identification and differentiation of selves are important characteristics for group performance. They name specialization, moral responsibility, and efficiency as vital components of well-functioning groups. In my commentary, I transfer their framework to the group effort within resuscitation teams to discuss for the first time how these components determine teamwork during resuscitation.

We applaud the goal of reconciling the self and group literatures and agree that a differentiated self may sometimes improve group outcomes. Nevertheless, greater precision regarding the underlying mechanisms is needed. Specifically, differentiated selves improve outcomes by overriding selfishness when they allow for personal regulation (being personally recognized and valued) rather than social regulation (specialization of labor).

Baumeister et al. propose that role differentiation is critical for group functioning. We propose that effective groups require rank differentiation in addition to role differentiation. We suggest that rank differentiation supports division of labor by incentivizing group members, satisfying fundamental human needs, and organizing and integrating the contributions of differentiated group members.

The target article proposed that differentiation of selves is a crucial moderator of group outcomes, such that differentiation of selves contributes to beneficial outcomes of groups while limiting undesirable outcomes. In this response, we aim to complement the target article by refining and expanding several aspects of the theory. We address our conceptualization of optimal group functioning, clarify the term differentiation of selves, comment on the two-step nature of our model, offer theoretical connections and extensions, and discuss applications and opportunities for future research.

What is the primary function of consciousness in the nervous system? The answer to this question remains enigmatic, not so much because of a lack of relevant data, but because of the lack of a conceptual framework with which to interpret the data. To this end, we have developed Passive Frame Theory, an internally coherent framework that, from an action-based perspective, synthesizes empirically supported hypotheses from diverse fields of investigation. The theory proposes that the primary function of consciousness is well-circumscribed, serving the somatic nervous system. For this system, consciousness serves as a frame that constrains and directs skeletal muscle output, thereby yielding adaptive behavior. The mechanism by which consciousness achieves this is more counterintuitive, passive, and “low level” than the kinds of functions that theorists have previously attributed to consciousness. Passive frame theory begins to illuminate (a) what consciousness contributes to nervous function, (b) how consciousness achieves this function, and (c) the neuroanatomical substrates of conscious processes. Our untraditional, action-based perspective focuses on olfaction instead of on vision and is descriptive (describing the products of nature as they evolved to be) rather than normative (construing processes in terms of how they should function). Passive frame theory begins to isolate the neuroanatomical, cognitive-mechanistic, and representational (e.g., conscious contents) processes associated with consciousness.

Morsella et al. claim that consciousness functions to integrate incompatible skeletal muscle intentions. Their primary cases of conscious skeletomotor integration involve action suppression, such as holding one's breath underwater, which requires suppressing the urge to inhale. This indicates that the authors seem to think action inhibition counts as the relevant kind of integration. I suggest that there is reason to think this kind of inhibition can occur unconsciously via unconscious inhibitory mechanisms. Unconscious inhibition therefore potentially undermines the authors' thesis. If cases of unconscious inhibition are not instances of integration, then the authors should clarify exactly what counts as integration.

Although the passive frame theory (PST) seems to be very plausible, the encapsulation of content generation deserves further elaboration. Many concepts and data considering the capacity theory, perception, and higher cognitive processes seem to contradict this principle. In general, PST can be suitable in many cases, but it needs to be completed by other mechanisms.

An implicitly dualist or Cartesian materialist theory of consciousness is proposed without citing the many well-known problems with such theories. A function for consciousness is proposed with no reference to the possibility that “consciousness itself” has no function of its own. The theory builds on proposed “subset consensus” and “integration consensus” when in the literature there is no such consensus on these issues.

During saccadic eye movements, the job of the nervous system is not to perceive a change in stimulation from the receptors, but to prevent a change from reaching consciousness. These movements occupy an intermediate range between actions that are almost always conscious, such as finger movements, and those that are never conscious, such as the smooth-muscle actions of the digestive system. Consciousness in this context requires attention to the consequences of an action.

We expand upon Morsella et al.'s synthesis in the direction of what Gibson (1979) called an ecological approach to perception. Morsella et al. describe consciousness as a director of voluntary action, but they understate the role of the environment in its evolution as well as in directing behavior. We elaborate these roles in the context of the concept of affordances.

Human newborns can resolve some response conflicts in order to adapt their behaviour, suggesting that the newborn has consciousness according to Morsella et al.'s framework. However, we pose a range of developmental questions regarding Morsella et al.'s account, especially concerning the role of consciousness in the development of action.

Morsella et al. present a novel theory of consciousness which is more “low-level, circumscribed, counterintuitive, and passive” than previous accounts. There is much to like about this approach. However, what are the explanatory costs associated with these characteristics? In particular, how does this low-level and passive theory accommodate evidence for top-down attention being necessary (but not sufficient) for visual consciousness?

The interesting target article by Morsella et al. addresses critical issues that impact our understanding of consciousness. It is surprising, however, to see no treatment of the relationship between attention and consciousness, particularly given available models. Whether olfaction is most suitable as a model system to study consciousness for action also seems questionable. These issues are elaborated in the present commentary.

The domain of emotions corresponds to the consciousness model proposed by Morsella et al. The action schemata unconsciously activated by spontaneous emotions are indeed automatically selected from a small number of innate operative patterns, whereas behavioral responses selected at the cognitive level of emotional processing consist of strategic plans, leading to a conscious integration of goal-directed actions.

Taste research in rodents supports the relevance of memory in order to determine the content of consciousness by modifying both taste perception and later action. Associated with this issue is the fact that taste and visual modalities share anatomical circuits traditionally related to conscious memory. This challenges the view of taste memory as a type of non-declarative unconscious memory.

Low-level consciousness is fundamental to our understanding of the world. Within the conscious field, the constantly changing external visual information is transformed into stable, object-based percepts. Remarkably, holistic objects are perceived while we are cognizant of all of the spatial details comprising the objects and of the relationship between individual elements. This parallel conscious association is unique to the brain. Conscious contributions to motor activity come after our understanding of the world has been established.

Passive frame theory is compatible with modern complexity theory and the idea that conflict drives the emergence of a novel structural organization. After describing new developmental data, we suggest that this conflict needs to be expanded to include not only conflict between action options, but also between action and perception.

While applauding Morsella et al. for linking consciousness to action control, we ask what their theory implies regarding the exact functionality of consciousness and the timescale at which it operates. Does consciousness operate on, and resolve the conflict it emerges from (despite its slowness), or does it operate on future conflicts that it might resolve by externalizing/socializing cognitive control?

Morsella et al. assert that the function of consciousness is to determine which of many competing action options is expressed through the skeletomuscular system at any given moment. The present commentary addresses this issue from the first-person perspective and agrees with Morsella and colleagues, yet further proposes that the option-selection function of consciousness plays out in cognition as well.