We compare and contrast the 60 commentaries by 109 authors on the pair of target articles by Mehr et al. and ourselves. The commentators largely reject Mehr et al.'s fundamental definition of music and their attempts to refute (1) our social bonding hypothesis, (2) byproduct hypotheses, and (3) sexual selection hypotheses for the evolution of musicality. Instead, the commentators generally support our more inclusive proposal that social bonding and credible signaling mechanisms complement one another in explaining cooperation within and competition between groups in a coevolutionary framework (albeit with some confusion regarding terminologies such as “byproduct” and “exaptation”). We discuss the proposed criticisms and extensions, with a focus on moving beyond adaptation/byproduct dichotomies and toward testing of cross-species, cross-cultural, and other empirical predictions.

We discuss approaches to the study of the evolution of music (sect. R1); challenges to each of the two theories of the origins of music presented in the companion target articles (sect. R2); future directions for testing them (sect. R3); and priorities for better understanding the nature of music (sect. R4).

Why do we run toward people we love, but only walk toward others? Why do people in New York seem to walk faster than other cities? Why do our eyes linger longer on things we value more? There is a link between how the brain assigns value to things, and how it controls our movements. This link is an ancient one, developed through shared neural circuits that on one hand teach us how to value things, and on the other hand control the vigor with which we move. As a result, when there is damage to systems that signal reward, like dopamine and serotonin, that damage not only affects our mood and patterns of decision-making, but how we move. In this book, we first ask why, in principle, evolution should have developed a shared system of control between valuation and vigor. We then focus on the neural basis of vigor, synthesizing results from experiments that have measured activity in various brain structures and neuromodulators, during tasks in which animals decide how patiently they should wait for reward, and how vigorously they should move to acquire it. Thus, the way we move unmasks one of our well-guarded secrets: how much we value the thing we are moving toward.

Why do we run toward people we love, but only walk toward others? One reason is to let them know we love them. In this commentary, we elaborate on how subjective utility information encoded in vigor is read out by others. We consider the potential implications for understanding and modeling the link between movements and decisions in social environments.

The book under review tries to link the economic concept of “reward,” or, more accurately, “capture rate,” to the experimental literature of various neuroscientific quantities dealing with motor control. But this reviewer argues that such a linkage requires a richer language of quantification than the book actually affords: a language not just of “greater” or “less,” but of how much greater or less. Without such a methodology, the arguments here cannot be persuasive.

Shadmehr and Ahmed cogently argue that vigor of appetitive movements is positively correlated with their value, and that value can therefore be inferred by measuring vigor. Here, we highlight three points to consider when interpreting this account: (1) The correlation between vigor and value is not obligatory, (2) the vigor effect also arises in frameworks other than optimal foraging, and (3) the term vigor can be misinterpreted, thereby affecting rigor.

Quantum decision theory corrects categorical and propositional logic pathologies common to classic statistical goal-oriented reasoning, such as rational neuroeconomics-based optimal foraging. Within this ecosalient framework, motivation, perception, learning, deliberation, brain computation, and conjunctive risk-order errors may be understood for subjective utility judgments underlying either rational or irrational canonical decisions-actions used to choose, procure, and consume rewarding nutrition with variable fitness.

We feel exhausted after working mentally hard even while just sitting on a chair, suggesting the concept of cognitive vigor. Do movement vigor and cognitive vigor share control mechanisms? Functions of the basal ganglia-cortical circuits, which are regulated by the midbrain dopaminergic system, appear to underlie both movement vigor and cognitive vigor.

In this contribution, we criticize the demanding assumption of vigor that economic agents are maximizers. We discuss the link between vigor and subjective value through the alternative notion of aspiration levels, arguing that vigor can help articulate the ecological balance – central in bounded and ecological rationality – between minimum expected reward (aspiration level) and the efforts made for its attainment.

Neuroeconomics is still “under construction.” To be a leading discipline, it needs firm ecological rationale and neurobiological bases. “Vigor” supplies this infrastructure through the mathematics of the foraging theory and system-neuroscience evidence on utility and motor control. It will prepare us for the future neuroeconomics, if studied appropriately in the light of evolution.

In active agents, sensory and motor processes form an inevitable bond. This wedding is particularly striking for saccadic eye movements – the prime target of Shadmehr and Ahmed's thesis – which impose frequent changes on the retinal image. Changes in movement vigor (latency and speed), therefore, will need to be accompanied by changes in visual and attentional processes. We argue that the mechanisms that control movement vigor may also enable vision to attune to changes in movement kinematics.

A compelling ecological theory of movement and vigor must explain why humans and other animals spend so much time not moving. When we rest, our somatic maintenance systems continue to work. When our somatic maintenance requirements increase, we place greater subjective value on resting. To explain variation in movement and vigor, we must account for the subjective value of resting.

Shadmehr and Ahmed's book is a welcome extension of optimal foraging theory and neuroeconomics, achieved by integrating both with parameters relating to effort and rate of movement. Their most persuasive and prolific data come from saccades, where times before and after decision are reasonably determinate. Skeletal movements are less likely to exhibit such tidy temporal organization.

I explore a distinct perspective from that brought in the book by arguing that in postural control our organism selects the vigor of reactive responses guided by an optimization rule considering first the required postural response for balance recovery as indicated by afferent information from a myriad of sensory receptors, and second the history of previous responses to similar perturbations.

Movement vigor provides a window on action valuation. But what is vigor, and how to measure it in the first place? Strikingly, many different co-varying vigor-related metrics can be found in the literature. I believe this is because vigor, just like the neural circuits that determine it, is an integrated, low-dimensional parameter. As such, it can only be roughly estimated.

We describe a neural monitor of environmental and physiological resources that informs effort expenditure. Depending on resources and environmental stability, serotonergic and dopaminergic neuromodulations favor different behavioral controls that are organized in corticostriatal loops. This broader perspective produces some suggestions and questions that may not be covered by the foraging approach to vigor of Shadmehr and Ahmed (2020).

We offer thoughts on Shadmehr and Ahmed's foundational assumption that behavioral intensity (vigor) is proportional to the perceived value of outcomes driving behavior (incentives). The assumption is reasonable considering classical motivational thought and scholarship in related literatures but called into question by an influential contemporary theory of motivation by Brehm. Brehm's theory suggests that the assumption is warranted in some, but not all, performance circumstances. Furthermore, proportionality between vigor and value might be generated through a deliberative goal-setting process rather than through intrinsic neural linkages.

In science, as in life, one can only hope to both inform others, and be informed by them. The commentaries associated with our book Vigor have highlighted the many ways in which the theory that we proposed can be improved. For example, there are a myriad of factors that need to be considered in a fully encompassing objective function. The neural mechanisms underlying the links between movement and decision-making have yet to be unraveled. The implications of a two-way interaction between movement and decisions at both the individual and social levels remain to be understood. The commentaries outline future questions, and encouragingly highlight the diversity of science communities that may be linked via the concept of vigor.

Research on the capacity to understand others' minds has tended to focus on representations of beliefs, which are widely taken to be among the most central and basic theory of mind representations. Representations of knowledge, by contrast, have received comparatively little attention and have often been understood as depending on prior representations of belief. After all, how could one represent someone as knowing something if one does not even represent them as believing it? Drawing on a wide range of methods across cognitive science, we ask whether belief or knowledge is the more basic kind of representation. The evidence indicates that nonhuman primates attribute knowledge but not belief, that knowledge representations arise earlier in human development than belief representations, that the capacity to represent knowledge may remain intact in patient populations even when belief representation is disrupted, that knowledge (but not belief) attributions are likely automatic, and that explicit knowledge attributions are made more quickly than equivalent belief attributions. Critically, the theory of mind representations uncovered by these various methods exhibits a set of signature features clearly indicative of knowledge: they are not modality-specific, they are factive, they are not just true belief, and they allow for representations of egocentric ignorance. We argue that these signature features elucidate the primary function of knowledge representation: facilitating learning from others about the external world. This suggests a new way of understanding theory of mind – one that is focused on understanding others' minds in relation to the actual world, rather than independent from it.