Lewis neglects cross-cultural data in his dynamic systems model of emotion, probably because appraisal theory disregards behavior and because anthropologists have not engaged discussions of neural plasticity in the brain sciences. Considering cultural variation in emotion-related behavior, such as grieving, indigenous descriptions of emotions, and alternative developmental regimens, such as sport, opens up avenues to test dynamic systems models.

Sunstein’s characterization of moral blunders jointly indicts an intuitive process and the structure of heuristics. But intuitions need not lead to error, and the problems with moral heuristics apply also to moral principles. Accordingly, moral development may well involve more, rather than less, intuitive responsiveness. This suggests a novel trajectory for future research into the development of appropriate moral judgments.

We argue that by neglecting the fact that procedural memory may also have episodic qualities, and by considering only a systems approach to memory, Walker's account of consolidation of learning during subsequent sleep ignores alternative accounts of how sleep stages may be interdependent. We also question the proposition that sleep-based consolidation largely bypasses hippocampal structures.

We discuss the implications of the findings reported in the target article for moral theory, and argue that they represent a clear and genuine case of fundamental moral disagreement. As such, the findings support a moderate form of moral anti-realism – the position that, for some moral issues, there is no fact of the matter about what is right and wrong.

Tomasello et al. argue that cultural cognition derives from humans' unique motivation to share psychological states. We suggest that what underlies this motivation is children's propensity to seek out the underlying causes of behavior. This propensity, combined with children's competence at it, makes them especially skillful at acquiring the intentional, conventional, and reliable forms that constitute culture.

are color categories the evolutionary product of their usefulness in communication, or is this an accidental benefit they give us? it is argued here that embodiment constraints on color categorization suggest that communication is an add-on at best. thus, the steels & belpaeme (s&b) model may be important in explaining coordination, but only at the margin. furthermore, the concentration on discrimination is questionable: coclassification is at least as important.

Sunstein is right that poorly informed heuristics can influence moral judgment. His case could be strengthened by tightening neurobiologically plausible working definitions regarding what a heuristic is, considering a background moral theory that has more strength in wide reflective equilibrium than “weak consequentialism,” and systematically examining what naturalized virtue theory has to say about the role of heuristics in moral reasoning.

Lewis's dynamical systems emotion theory continues a tradition including Merleau-Ponty, von Bertallanfy, and Aristotle. Understandably for a young theory, Lewis's new predictions do not follow strictly from the theory; thus their failure would not disconfirm the theory, nor their success confirm it – especially given that other self-organizational approaches to emotion (e.g., those of Ellis and of Newton) may not be inconsistent with these same predictions.

recent computer simulations of evolving neural networks have shown that population-level behavioral asymmetries can arise without social interactions. although these models are quite limited at present, they support the hypothesis that social pressures can be sufficient but are not necessary for population lateralization to occur, and they provide a framework for further theoretical investigation of this issue.

Fully interpreted, Lewis's dynamic systems modeling of emotion encompasses psychological-adaptation thinking and individual and group differences in normal and abnormal behavior. It weakens the categorical perspective in evolutionary psychology and the clinical sciences; and suggests continuity between “normal” or “abnormal” behavior in whatever way this is self and culturally constituted, although culture/linguistic factors and selfhood are neglected. Application of a dynamic systems model could improve formulation of clinical problems.

This commentary explores the use of interaction between moral heuristics and emotional intelligence (EI). The main insight presented is that the quality of moral decisions is very sensitive to emotions, and hence this may lead us to a better understanding of the role of emotional abilities in moral choices. In doing so, we consider how individual differences (specifically, EI) are related to moral decisions. We summarize evidence bearing on some of the ways in which EI might moderate framing effects in different moral tasks such as “the Asian disease problem” and other more real-life problems like “a divorce decision.”

The progressive multistage stabilization of memory (consolidation) relies on post-acquisition neural reorganization. We hypothesize that two processes subserve procedural memory consolidation and are reflected in delayed post-acquisition performance gains: (1) synaptic consolidation, which is classical Hebbian, and (2) in some tasks, concurrently or consequently, “system consolidation,” which might in some skills be sleep-dependent. Behavioral interference may affect either type of consolidation.

Tests of economic theory often focus on choice outcomes and find significant individual differences in these outcomes. This variability may mask universal psychological processes that lead to different choices because of differences across cultures in the information people have available when making decisions. On this view, decision making research within and across cultures must focus on the processes underlying choice.

Research on the affective and neurodevelopmental correlates of infant joint attention skills support several of the hypotheses raised by Tomasello et al. regarding the development of the capacity to share intention with others. In addition, research and theory suggests that self-awareness and self-regulatory processes may play a role in the development of this vital human ability domain.

The “dynamic developmental theory” is based on hypofunctioning dopamine systems that follow an early overactivity phase. The theory does not consider recent experimental evidences from different attentiondeficit/ hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) models and the heterogeneity of the disorder. Alternatives are proposed that integrate available information gathered from clinical and experimental studies, with theoretical constructs.

emphasizing that agents gain from culture-based patterns, i consider the etiology of meaning. since the simulations show that “shared categories” are not based in learning, i challenge steels & belpaeme's (s&b's) folk view of language. instead, i stress that meaning uses indexicals to set off a replicator process. finally, i suggest that memetic patterns – not words – are the grounding of language.

The target article summarizes important research demonstrating that the canonical model of selfish, economic man is not empirically supported outside competitive settings, and that experimental research conducted in university settings should not be discounted because undergraduates were the subjects. Assuming that individuals are capable of reciprocity and trust provides a firmer foundation for the study of institutions, incentives, and outcomes.

major contributions emanating from sagvolden et al.'s theory include elucidation of the role in attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (adhd) of temporal information processing, social learning, and response extinction learning. key issues include a need for clearer explanation of the relative role of impulsivity versus response suppression/inhibition in the dual process model, and delineation of genotype-environment correlations versus interactions in the social and experiential mechanisms posited.

This commentary reviews electrophysiological research suggesting that oscillatory electrical potentials recorded by the EEG could have function at cellular and DNA levels. Evidence supporting the potential functional significance of sleep-state-specific frequencies includes psychoactive neurochemical alteration of CNS electrophysiology, and sleep-state-specific alteration of dreaming. As Walker proposes, physiologic electrical fields are likely to have a functional role in the consolidation of memory.

Evidence for infants' sensitivity to behavior being goal oriented leaves it open as to whether they see such behavior as being designed to lead to an external goal or whether they see it, in addition, as being directed by an internal representation of the goal. We point out the difficulty of finding possible criteria for how infants or children view this matter.