There are both negative and positive stereotypes about public sector workers. Most studies focus on negative stereotypes, like the idea that public servants are lazy. We, however, do the opposite. We focus on a positive stereotype: public sector workers are seen as caring and helpful. We test the effects of positive stereotypes on the quality of public service delivery. Using a pre-registered audit experiment in elderly care in the Netherlands and Belgium, we find that activating a pro-social stereotype does not affect the outcome of public service quality in terms of response rate and information provision. However, it does improve the bureaucratic process: public sector workers are friendlier toward citizens. They say around 12% more ‘thank you’ in their replies. Moreover, the citizens’ gender affects the response rate: female citizens receive around 10% more replies. Concluding, we show that positive stereotyping can improve parts of the quality of public service delivery but not all.

While in his early years, Kahneman followed the world of classic utilitarianism in which smart individuals base decisions on how they will truly feel each moment in the future, Kahneman in Mandel (2018) adopted a very different position, namely that what matters is the story people tell of their lives. He thus grappled with evolving stories of both the future and the past, and the presence of different decision-supporting evaluations for the short-run and the long-run.

In March 2024, Daniel Kahneman – the man who did perhaps more than anyone else to shape the field of behavioural public policy – died. He is among a small handful of scholars who have had a huge effect on my own career, and in this essay – the first in a series of essays in a special section of the Journal that honour him – I reflect on how his work inspired much of my own.

To improve public health and promote environmental sustainability, widespread dietary changes are necessary in high-income countries. However, adopting and maintaining dietary goals is challenging and requires repeated self-regulation. Effective public policies can facilitate healthy food choices and reduce the likelihood of goal failure. This study examines the relationship between individuals’ dietary goal failures and their acceptance of public food policies, using data from an experience-sampling study (Ni = 409 and Nobs = 6,447). Regression analyses revealed that participants who experienced more frequent dietary goal failures were generally less accepting of health-promoting food policies and perceived them as less effective. Additionally, perceived policy effectiveness positively predicted policy acceptance. Exploratory analyses showed that the negative relationship between dietary goal failure and food policy acceptance varied depending on the type of intervention (pull policies vs push policies) and the location of food selections (home vs out-of-home). Notably, we found a positive relationship between dietary goal failure and acceptance of pull policies for food selections made out-of-home. These findings highlight the importance of better understanding the complex interplay between public policy attitudes, the food environment and adherence to dietary goals.

Many moral judgments are rooted in the outrage heuristic. In making such judgments about certain personal injury cases, people's judgments are both predictable and widely shared. With respect to outrage (on a bounded scale of one to six) and punitive intent (also on a bounded scale of one to six), the judgments of one group of six people, or 12 people, nicely predict the judgements of other groups of six people, or 12 people. Moreover, outrage judgments are highly predictive of punitive intentions. Because of their use of the outrage heuristic, people are intuitive retributivists. People care about deterrence, but they do not think in terms of optimal deterrence. Because outrage is category-specific, those who use the outrage heuristic are likely to produce patterns that they would themselves reject, if only they were to see them. Because people are intuitive retributivists, they reject some of the most common and central understandings in economic and utilitarian theory. To the extent that a system of criminal justice depends on the moral psychology of ordinary people, it is likely to operate on the basis of the outrage heuristic and will, from the utilitarian point of view, end up making serious and systematic errors.

To what extent can the harms of misinformation be mitigated by relying on nudges? Prior research has demonstrated that non-intrusive ‘accuracy nudges’ can reduce the sharing of misinformation. We investigate an alternative approach. Rather than subtly reminding people about accuracy, our intervention, indebted to research on the bystander effect, explicitly appeals to individuals' capacity to help solve the misinformation challenge. Our results are mixed. On the one hand, our intervention reduces the willingness to share and believe in misinformation fact-checked as false. On the other hand, it also reduces participants' willingness to share information that has been fact-checked as true and innocuous, as well as non-fact-checked information. Experiment 1 offers proof of concept; Experiment 2 tests our intervention with a more realistic mix of true and false social media posts; Experiment 3 tests our interventions alongside an accuracy nudge. The effectiveness of our intervention at reducing willingness to share misinformation remains consistent across experiments; meta-analysis reveals that our treatment reduced willingness to share false content across experiments by 20% of a scale point on a six-point scale. We do not observe the accuracy nudge reducing willingness to share false content. Taken together, these results highlight the advantages and disadvantages of accuracy nudges and our more confrontational approach.

The heart of prospect theory is the value function, proposing that the carriers of value are positive or negative changes from a reference point. Daniel Kahneman observed that if prospect theory had a flag, the value function would be drawn on it. The function is nonlinear, reflecting diminishing sensitivity to magnitude. When describing how human lives are valued, the function exposes profound incoherence. An individual life is highly valued and thus vigorously protected if it is the only life at risk. But that life loses its value when it is one of many endangered by a larger tragedy. Beyond this insensitivity, the function may actually decline when many lives at risk become mere numbers. The more who die, the less we care. Implications of this deadly ‘arithmetic of compassion’ for understanding and managing the risk from nuclear weapons are briefly discussed.

Daniel Kahneman's legacy is best understood in light of developments in economic theory in the early-mid-20th century, when economists were eager to put utility functions on a firm mathematical foundation. The axiomatic system that provided this foundation was not originally intended to be normative in a prescriptive sense but later came to be seen that way. Kahneman took the axioms seriously, tested them for descriptive accuracy, and found them wanting. He did not view the axioms as necessarily prescriptive. Nevertheless, in the research program he conceived, factual discoveries about real decision-making were stated as deviations from the axioms and thus deemed ‘errors’. This was an unfortunate turn that needs to be corrected for the psychological enrichment of economics to proceed in a productive direction.

This paper examines Daniel Kahneman's concept of experienced utility and its roots in Bentham's hedonic utilitarianism. It focuses on Kahneman's call for a ‘separate value judgement’ to determine when experienced utility can be used to evaluate temporally extended outcomes (TEOs). Two potential judgements are proposed: comprehensiveness and personal independence. Comprehensiveness means that the measurement of utility captures all relevant aspects of instant utility. Personal independence means that the TEO is fully independent of other TEOs with which it might be combined (or ‘concatenated’). I argue that identifying TEOs meeting these criteria may be challenging, possibly restricting the applicability of experienced utility. I conclude by considering the implications for behavioural science's quest for an unambiguous, measurable operationalisation of utility.

Kahneman and Tversky's ‘Prospect Theory’ paper famously demolishes expected utility theory as a predictive device. However, it presents deviations from that theory as ‘normatively unacceptable’ and argues that decision-makers would normally correct them when possible. In a later paper, Kahneman rejects a similar argument (the ‘discovered preference’ hypothesis) advanced by Plott. Later still, Kahneman endorses Sunstein and Thaler's ‘libertarian paternalism’, which aims to help people avoid deviating from their ‘true’ preferences. I report an email correspondence between Kahneman and me in which we debated whether his position on libertarian paternalism was consistent with his critique of Plott's hypothesis.

Kahneman's criticism of neoclassical rationality was central to his research programme. He argued that rationality understood as temporal consistency among preferences and beliefs is inapt as a descriptive and prescriptive standard of decision-making. Descriptively, consistency ignores high decision costs and biases, such as framing effects. Prescriptively, it is problematic since it neglects the processual nature of choice and the crucial role of regret. Instead, Kahneman argued in favour of using reasonableness as a standard, though he did not fully develop the concept in his work.

This article serves as a commentary on Michael Hallsworth's 2023 piece, ‘A manifesto for applying behavioural science,’ featured in Nature Human Behaviour. The manifesto was prompted by methodological, practical and normative critiques directed at behavioural science and its role in public policy. In this commentary, I argue that the manifesto presents numerous insightful and constructive reform proposals regarding the scope, methods and values in behavioural science, which can help advance the field of behavioural public policy. While there is much to agree with, I contend in this commentary that applied behavioural science can and should delve deeper into the study of socially and culturally embedded processes of goal formation. Additionally, it should explore the institutional conditions necessary for individuals to formulate their goals competently and in a self-determined manner.

This study empirically examines gender inequality in tolerance for women's opinions and identifies how the provision of normative gender-egalitarian message can mitigate this inequality by conducting online randomized experiments in Japan. In this experiment, I asked the participants to evaluate the agreement score for 10 anonymous statements and implemented two types of random interventions: disclosing the gender of the statement poster and providing normative statement for gender equality. The results of both cross-sectional and panel data analyses showed that people significantly reduced the agreement score for women's opinions compared with men's and non-gender disclosure opinions. Meanwhile, the negative impact of female gender disclosure was neutralized when participants were provided with a normative message.

Phishing emails cost companies millions. In the absence of technology to perfectly block phishing emails, the responsibility falls on employees to identify and appropriately respond to phishing attempts and on employers to train them to do so. We report results from an experiment with around 11,000 employees of a large U.S. corporation, testing the efficacy of just-in-time feedback delivered at a teachable moment – immediately after succumbing to a phishing email – to reduce susceptibility to phishing emails. Employees in the study were sent an initial pseudo-phishing email, and those who either ignored or fell victim to the phishing email were randomized to receive or not receive feedback about their response. Just-in-time feedback for employees who fell victim to or ignored the initial pseudo-phishing email reduced susceptibility to a second pseudo-phishing email sent by the research team. Additionally, for employees who ignored the initial email, feedback also increased reporting rates.

Many decisions are curated, incentivised or nudged by a third party. Despite this, only a handful of studies have looked at paternalistic decision-makers and the psychological processes by which they arrive at their decisions. The role of affect, in particular, has been ignored so far, and yet restricting agency on a potentially large group of people might be highly unpleasant. We are the first to propose a conceptual framework of affective paternalism which explicitly accounts for the role of affect in paternalistic decision-making, identifying all entry points through which affect may create systematic deviations in decision outcomes. We shed light on some of these phenomena by using a novel survey experiment in which we let participants make paternalistic decisions whilst also asking them about their motivations behind their choices, including cognitive reasons and affect. Our findings suggest that affect may play a significant role in paternalistic decision-making and lead to systematically different decision outcomes. To the extent that these that could result in inefficient, undesirable or unfair consequences, our framework may help more accurately predict a paternalist's decision and suggest entry points for where and possibly how to intervene in the paternalistic decision-making process.

Showering is one of the most water-intensive behaviours in urban households, accounting for 20–30% of water use. Real-time feedback from smart devices has been proven to significantly reduce water consumption in showers. Still, it is not known whether these devices have spillover effects on other water use behaviours. For the first time, we provide empirical evidence for a significant and negative within-domain spillover effect from the use of such devices, showing an increase in water use in other activities by 2.5% per day per household. Up to one-third of conservation effects are eroded by such spillovers, resulting in a two steps forward, one step back situation. Overall, however, net water use is still reduced by 4.7% in the 385 households that were observed. This study points out an important behavioural limit on the use of such smart shower devices and suggests that such use be accompanied by informational or other campaigns to reduce the large negative spillovers.

Counter-serious and organised crime (SOC) strategies often include an awareness-raising element. Such messaging aims to build support for counter-SOC efforts, and intolerance for organised criminal activity. However, a growing body of research suggests that raising awareness to ‘social bads’ like SOC may risk backfiring by encouraging pessimistic attitudes about whether they can be controlled and could even nudge people to agree with populist narratives which argue that political outsiders represent the only hope for tackling systemic problems. A nationally representative survey experiment in Albania was conducted to test, for the first time, the impact of messages about SOC. Typical of counter-SOC messaging in practice, the first message emphasised the harms SOC causes. The second was more positive, highlighting high levels of social disapproval of SOC, a theme that social norms research suggests may be effective. We find that the first message backfires by reducing confidence in law enforcement and encouraging support for populist ideas. The second message is unexpectedly found to also encourage support for a populist sentiment, while having no positive impact on attitudes about law enforcement. This suggests that even positive messaging about ‘social bads’ can risk triggering unwanted responses.