The law concerning limitation periods has long been recognised to be unsatisfactory. One area which poses particular problems concerns whether a limitation period can apply to equitable claims “by analogy” under section 36 of the Limitation Act 1980. This article considers three relatively recent decisions of the Court of Appeal – P & O Nedlloyd BV v Arab Metals Co. (The UB Tiger) [2006] EWCA Civ 1717, [2007] 1 W.L.R. 2288, The Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs v IGE USA Investments Ltd. [2021] EWCA Civ 534, [2021] Ch. 423 and The Claimants in the Royal Mail Group Litigation v Royal Mail Group Limited [2021] EWCA Civ 1173 – which illustrate that very different approaches have been taken. It is argued that The UB Tiger was wrongly decided, or at least should be limited to specific performance, and revives calls for legislative reform.

Amid the growing calls for the complete prohibition of the use by law enforcement authorities of live facial recognition (LFR) technology in public spaces, this article advocates for an incremental approach to regulating the use of the technology. By analysing legislative instruments, judicial decisions, deployment practices of UK law enforcement authorities, various procedural and policy documents, as well as available safeguards, the article suggests incremental adjustments to the existing legal framework instead of sweeping regulatory change. The proposed approach calls for adopting national legal rules governing watch lists and introducing spatial, temporal and contextual limitations on the deployment of technology based on the assessment of proportionality and necessity. To enhance the effectiveness of overt surveillance using LFR, the article recommends adopting a transparency procedure that promotes accountability without undermining the objectives of law enforcement. Alternatively, the overt use of the technology should be limited to deterring the commission of crimes and safeguarding public safety, where transparency does not undermine its effectiveness. Limiting the scope of overt use of LFR technology entails that law enforcement agencies primarily utilise covert surveillance, with prior judicial approval, except in urgent cases, as this would improve effective criminal investigation and public safety. The legal adjustments proposed in this article can be implemented through flexible secondary legislation or local policies, rather than rigid statutory rules.

This paper argues that in platform-based digitalisation of international trade processes, the use of blockchain instead of a central database system does not by itself adequately address the platform provider’s potential to engage in opportunistic behaviour. Digital transformation of international trade is, thus, constrained by hold-up problems. This requires embedding governance mechanisms in platform rulebooks designed to establish trust and commonality of interests. The article proposes a governance mechanism to promote widespread digital adoption through contract design choices based on guiding principles that can establish legally enforceable behavioural standards which align with the relational characteristics of digital trade networks.

Administrative decisions are unlawful if they are unreasonable, in the sense that Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v Wednesbury Corporation made famous. What is Wednesbury unreasonableness, precisely? Courts have not clearly said, and existing academic answers are flawed. Here I propose a new answer. My claim, roughly, is that a Wednesbury unreasonable decision is one that a court is entitled, given the evidence before it, to conclude was wrong, given the evidence before the authority when it made the decision. In a slogan: Wednesbury unreasonableness is demonstrable wrongness.

The criminal law doctrine of “transferred malice” has been much discussed. What has gone comparatively unnoticed is the phenomenon of “recycled malice”. For example, those who endorse transferred malice would hold that, if D tries to shoot V, and the shot misses and hits T, D’s intention to hit V is “transferred” to T, and a completed offence against T is constructed. But many legal systems that endorse transferred malice also allow D to be convicted of an attempted offence against V. In other words, D’s intention to hit V can apparently be used multiple times. Once this phenomenon is noticed, a question arises over its justification and limits. This article argues that no convincing justification for recycling mens rea exists.

The new UK internal market, as embodied in the UK Internal Market Act 2020 and the common frameworks, is the latest example of market integration, but it is far from being the only one. A myriad of composite market structures exists across the world, including in Australia, Canada, Germany, Spain, Switzerland, the US and the EU. This article investigates how the UK internal market compares to other internal markets: to what extent does it follow pre-existing paths, to what extent does it depart from them? It is argued that the UK has diverged from international blueprints in several important aspects. Despite drawing on methods that are frequently employed for achieving economic integration, it reinterprets and combines these in a unique way. The result is an internal market which is defined by an unusual degree of centralisation, strong trade rights and a high potential for deregulation.