The judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Kadi is of defining constitutional importance. The Court understood the EU Treaties (at the time, the EC Treaty) as establishing their own constitutional space, asserted the autonomy of EU law vis-à-vis international law and held that responses to emergencies should be handled through, rather than outside, the bounds of the EU Treaties. The judgment is predicated on liberal democratic ideals and views respect for legality as a sine qua non in times of emergency. This chapter seeks to discuss selected case law developments after Kadi. It focuses on the effect of invalidity of sanctions on third parties, issues pertaining to the validity and interpretation of Council Regulation 881/2002/EC, economic sanctions against nuclear proliferation and corresponding developments in the case law of the UK Supreme Court. It does not deal exhaustively with post-Kadi case law. Section I provides a brief introduction to the judgment in Kadi. Section II explores the effect of the ruling on third parties. Section III discusses a selection of recent case law of the Court of Justice and the General Court, and section IV explores in some detail the judgment of the UK Supreme Court in Jabar Ahmed.

This chapter aims to explore some challenges that are likely to arise in the context of the UK’s present and future relationships with the EU. Three aspects come under scrutiny, namely the global opt-out available for the UK in the field of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (Protocol 36 to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)), the 2014 referendum on Scottish independence and the contemplated 2017 referendum on whether the UK should remain an EU Member State. The chapter stresses not only the importance of restoring objectivity in the debates surrounding these issues, but also the necessity of taking due account of the uncertainties that these processes unavoidably entail as to their end results for both the UK and Scotland.

“The European Union continues to be strongly committed to the stabilisation and development of South-Eastern Europe. The Union’s strategy is to draw the countries of the region closer to the prospect of European integration.” This confident statement opens the joint Report on EU action in support of the Stability Pact and South-Eastern Europe (SEE) presented by the Finnish Presidency and the European Commission to the European Council at Helsinki in December 1999. It contains three ideas which are key to the EU’s policy towards the region: stabilisation, development and integration. The Stability Pact seeks to provide a framework for the coordination of effort towards these objectives: greater political stability, security and democratisation; economic reconstruction and development; political, economic and legal integration both within the region and between the countries of SEE and the EU.

This article examines counter-terrorism efforts in the EU as it matures as a field of law. It sets out three critiques of EU counter-terrorism law: that of ineffectiveness, of anti-constitutionalism, and of contrariness to human rights and the rule of law. It considers these critiques in light of the development of policies and legal initiatives—against foreign terrorist fighters and against radicalisation. It concludes that there are both persistent problems, and some improvements, in the law. The EU's capacity to meet the challenges posed by terrorism and the counter-terrorism imperative, and how it does so, has global impact. The article concludes with an argument for better law-making in the EU to ensure it serves as a better exemplar of transnational law.

Governments are increasingly turning to the market to provide public goods, works and (perhaps most controversially) services. Markets, and market values, have come to govern our lives as never before and the financial crisis appears to have done little to dampen governments’ faiths in markets. The public procurement rules define some of the parameters within which governments must engage with the market but the ideology of these rules, particularly how much ‘space’ they afford Member States to pursue non-commercial policies in their procurement decision-making, is deeply contested. This chapter argues that there is a missing empirical dimension to these ideological discussions. It seeks to partially redress this by presenting findings from an ethnographic study of a competitive tendering exercise at a British prison, from which it is argued that a more complex ideological picture emerges than appears from doctrinal analyses of the rules.

Building on the theory of democratic constitutionalism, I assess the political implications of the constitutional space formed by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and national constitutional courts in Europe. Democratic constitutionalism helps situate the role of constitutional courts in stimulating a degree of consensus, necessary for governance of heterogeneous communities such as the United States and the European Union. Questions of legitimacy and confidence in the judiciary come to the fore. I examine a mechanism used by the US Supreme Court, the CJEU and the ECtHR alike to foster democratic constitutionalism: in order to confront challenges to judicial legitimacy and remain responsive to the extra-judicial environment, these courts rely on majoritarian trends, or consensus, inspired by, but not limited to, the constitutional law of federal states and member countries.

The above quotation from the Confederation of British Industry’s (CBI) response to the European Commission’s (hereinafter, ‘the Commission’) Green Paper on the reform of the EC Merger Regulation in 2002 still summarises quite aptly the criticism expressed in recent years by members of the business and legal community about what the critics perceive as a serious shortcoming in the current system of EC merger control: the lack of effective, meaningful in practical terms, judicial control over the administration’s decisions in this area.

The binding legal force that the Charter acquired with the Treaty of Lisbon has led some national constitutional courts to adopt an entirely new approach to EU fundamental rights. Most notably, the Austrian Constitutional Court, the Italian Constitutional Court, and the German Federal Constitutional Court have explicitly made the Charter a yardstick of constitutional review. This article compares and contrasts the approaches of these three courts to the Charter. It shows that the strategies of the Austrian and German Constitutional Courts have many characteristics in common, including that national constitutional rights are treated as a primary source and the Charter as a mere secondary benchmark in the majority of cases. The most distinctive feature of the Italian Constitutional Court's strategy is that it mainly aims to prevent ordinary courts from circumventing constitutionality refences by directly applying the Charter. The article concludes by arguing that it has many advantages when national constitutional courts adopt the Charter as a yardstick of constitutional review. It is for the constitutional courts and the CJEU to ensure that these benefits are not outweighed by some serious drawbacks of constitutional review in light of the Charter.

In multi-panelled higher jurisdictions, a larger, extended formation of judges tends to be established within the court. It bears various names: the grand chamber, the extended chamber, the expanded composition, the reunion of several chambers, a court sitting en banc, an extended section or a division of a court. In larger but not too large jurisdictions, the same role is adopted by the plenary. For ease of reference, I shall refer to all such extended judicial formations with the generic name ‘grand chamber’.

To bear the same name does not necessarily mean to perform the same function. As a Czech lawyer, I have always intuitively assumed that the role of such a body within an apex court is to unify the case law. In the Czech Republic, as well as in a number of other supreme continental jurisdictions for that matter, there tends to be only one reason for the presence of a grand chamber within a supreme court: to unify the diverging lines of case law and to set a clear line of precedent. However, that has never really been the job description, least of all the practice, of the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘Court’). This begs the question: what may then be other structural reasons for the existence of such a body within an apex jurisdiction? What is the specific role, function, and ensuing justification for the Grand Chamber of the Court?

This article offers some personal reflections on that question. It is structured as follows: it begins with a short comparative overview of some of the grand chambers within European (national) courts, overseas in the common law world, as well as at the European Court of Human Rights, in order to tease out the functional rationale for various types of extended judicial compositions within those systems (Part I). Next, two types of such functional justifications for grand chambers in the form of ideal models are identified (Part II). Finally, those justifications are then considered in light of the legislative design and the current practice of the Grand Chamber of the Court, before concluding with two modest suggestions (Part III).

This article maps out the channels at the disposal of private parties for challenging the legality of EC measures, and attempts some predictions of the future shape and content of this plank of the EU’s judicial architecture. This area of the law is in a state of flux, particularly in the light of rulings such as UEAPME v. Council, Masterfoods Limited v. HB Ice Cream, Fresh Marine Company AS v. Commission, Laboratoires Pharmaceutiques Bergaderm SA, in liquidation, and Jean-Jacques Goupil v. Commission, Bocchi Food Trade International GmbH v. Commission, and most recently, and significantly, Jégo Quéré and Cie SA v. Commission. In this latter ruling the Court of First Instance prescribed a major change to the rules on locus standi under Article 230(4) of the EC Treaty, a hitherto much maligned aspect of the case law, by relaxing the requirement of ‘individual concern’ laid down in that article.

The aim of this Article is to show that the enforcement of Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (‘TEU’) values vis-à-vis Member States could benefit from the application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (‘CFR’) also in instances where the current interpretation of Article 51(1) CFR prevents this. This would be the case if the CFR were also applicable to purely domestic cases, eg—but not only—with regard to fundamental rights-relevant violations related to the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU. In this case, the European Court of Justice, which has already partly taken this path recently, could prevent the violation of core EU values. The most important historical challenge to those values in Europe today is the systematic dismantling of the rule of law and democracy in certain Member States. It is the very purpose of fundamental rights to provide answers to such dangers. When one speaks of the rule of law and democracy, one necessarily also means fundamental rights. This Article thus advocates an EU which perceives itself as a complete fundamental rights union. While the traditional interpretation of Article 51(1) CFR had a balanced division of competence between the EU and its Member States in mind, the disregard of Article 2 TEU values triggers a clausula rebus sic stantibus: the neat federal balance can only be upheld if both ends stick to the original promise made. It demonstrates two ways of completing the European fundamental rights union: treaty revision, on the one hand, and reinterpretation of Article 51 CFR, on the other hand. Both ways have in common that only a complete fundamental rights union can establish a system of fundamental rights protection that is uniform and thus equality-preserving in cases where national fundamental rights fail to provide sufficient protection.

This chapter examines the recent decision by the European Court of Justice in Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation. It is a response to criticism that the ECJ’s judgment, in providing for the review of EC measures implementing UN Security Council resolutions, undermines the authority of public international law. Instead of committing itself to international law and institutions at all cost, the ECJ concerns itself with the constitutional repercussions from national constitutional courts (in the case of failure to protect fundamental rights). Important as the relationship between EC law and international law is, there is a clear sense that the ECJ is responsible to, and will ultimately be held to account by, the courts and constitutions of the Member States of the European Union.

The draft treaty agreed at the Nice Intergovernmental Conference (“IGC”) has had a very mixed press throughout the European Union, even if not all of the criticisms have been entirely justified. Its rejection by voters in the Irish Republic in the referendum on 7 June 2001 appears, according to most commentators, to have been motivated by a wide range of concerns, only some of which relate directly to what was actually agreed at Nice. Whilst this rejection has certainly added to the impression that the Nice Treaty itself is inherently flawed, there are however some aspects of the Treaty of Nice which are undoubtedly very positive, and which should be relatively uncontroversial, even to those most sensitive to the development of the Union. Not the least of these are the provisions that will create the possibility of far-reaching improvements to the present system of Community courts in Luxembourg, and to the Court of First Instance of the European Communities (“CFI”) in particular.

Cooperation with third countries on readmission has occupied an increasingly prominent place in the EU's migration management strategy. The EU and its Member States have progressively concluded an extensive set of bilateral and multilateral, binding and non-binding, cooperation instruments on readmission. This proliferation questions the field's coherence with the principle of sincere cooperation, governing the interplay between the Union's and Member States’ action. By taking this principle as a benchmark, the article highlights the ineffective nature of the current ‘unprincipled’ pursuit of readmission goals. It also demonstrates that sincere cooperation—if read together with subsidiarity—does not necessarily favour the Union's international action, to the detriment of the Member States’. Rather, it requires a good faith effort to identify, and stand by, the most effective level of action.

The chapter will consider what a margin squeeze is, whether it is appropriate for a competition authority to try and prevent margin squeezes using competition law rules and, if so, what tests can be used to identify an unlawful margin squeeze and to distinguish it from legitimate competition on the merits.

This chapter examines the choice of legal basis in EU external relations post-Lisbon in the light of the judgment of the Court of Justice in the Legal Basis for Restrictive Measures case. Before reaching the conclusion that the regulation at issue there was rightly based on Article 215(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and rejecting the European Parliament’s argument that the measure ought to have been taken on the basis of Article 75 TFEU, the Court made a number of important observations on the principles to be followed when choosing a legal basis and recalled some of its earlier case law, in particular Titanium Dioxide and its progeny. This chapter reflects upon the application of those principles in a post-Lisbon framework.

Freedom of information is an idea which has been high on the political agenda of western democratic societies for many years. It has been cultivated, propagated and sometimes misused in self-interested fashion by the media. Its meaning, always imprecise, has fluctuated. It has been recycled under the American terms of “openness” and “Government in the Sunshine”. Recently it has been once more recycled under the fashionable term “transparency”. In the European context, this imprecision has been detrimental to the development of logical and sturdy principles concerning transparency and access to information. What has emerged from the conceptual confusion has been a reliance on the more restricted administrative law rights of access to information in contexts where a constitutional right to transparency would have been more appropriate, with a consequential impoverishment of the transparency concept in EC law.

In important recent cases dealing with labour law issues, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) relied on a combination of international, European and domestic sources to justify their decisions. In Viking and Laval, the ECJ recognised that the right to take collective action as a fundamental right protected by EU law. In Demir and Baykara v Turkey, the ECtHR decided, for the first time, that the right to bargain collectively is an essential elements the right to form and to join trade unions covered by Article 11 of the European Convention for the protection of Human Rights. This chapter considers the reliance on multiple sources of law in this series of cases and questions the ‘combination method’ used by European courts to identify or interpret human right provisions. It argues that globalisation of legal sources in the area of labour law does not necessarily lead to ‘globalisation’ of labour law, allowing common solutions or, at least, harmonised solutions to come to life. The outcome of normative interaction is not universal labour law but instead largely depends on which court decides the case. Therefore, litigation strategies in the field of labour law should make use of the potential of normative interactions without ignoring the opportunities offered by the diversity of courts.

The purpose of this article is to consider the effect of the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe on the European Court of Justice (ECJ). At the time of writing, the future of the draft Constitution is somewhat uncertain. Having been finalised by the Convention on the Future of Europe in the summer of 2003 and submitted to the then President of the European Council, it formed the basis for discussion at an intergovernmental conference (IGC) which opened in October 2003. Hopes that the text might be finalised by the end of the year were dashed when a meeting of the IGC in Brussels in December 2003 ended prematurely amid disagreement over the weighting of votes in the Council. However, it seems likely that a treaty equipping the European Union with a Constitution based on the Convention’s draft will in due course be adopted and that the provisions of the draft dealing with the ECJ will not be changed significantly. Even if either assumption proves misplaced, those provisions will remain of interest as reflecting one view of the position the ECJ might occupy in a constitutional order of the Union.