During the last decade and more there has appeared a vast literature on economic growth, especially with reference to underdeveloped countries. This literature ranges from the sophisticated models of the mathematically inclined to the very practical down-to-earth reflections of the less erudite technical assistance expert with experience in the field. The literature demonstrates that there are many approaches to the problem of economic development and also that there are still areas of controversy to be resolved. In fact, while we have learned much about economic growth and much more about underdeveloped countries it seems that we are still feeling our way towards devising a satisfactory analytical framework for economic growth.

There has been waste of manpower and capital not only because the processes of economic growth are imperfectly understood, but also because governments of recipient countries have a propensity to ask either for the wrong things or the right things in the wrong order of priority. Waste also results from the failure of assistance agencies, even within the framework of the United Nations, to co-ordinate their activities, from competition amongst the departments of government in the recipient countries for preferred treatment in the matter of aid, and competition amongst assisting countries, agencies, and organizations in giving aid for political and prestige reasons.

Be he economist, educator, or politician, the man who will say of any industrially advanced country today that it provides an excess of education is rare indeed. It is not that education is viewed as a good thing in itself, so good that it is virtually impossible to have too much of it. The pronouncements in favour of ever more education are supported above all by assertions concerning the economic value of education. Never before has there been so much education. Yet never before has there been so much talk of the shortages of trained people or of the need to expand education as an investment in the formation of human capital. In an Alice-in-Wonderland sort of way it seems that the more we have the greater the shortage. Shortage is “in,” along with the “affluent society.”

The staple approach to the study of economic history is primarily a Canadian innovation; indeed, it is Canada's most distinctive contribution to political economy. It is undeveloped in any explicit form in most countries where the export sector of the economy is or was dominant. The specific terminology—staple or staples approach, or theory, or thesis—is Canadian, and the persistence with which the theory has been applied by Canadian social scientists and historians is unique.

The leading innovator was the late Harold Innis in his brilliant pioneering historical studies, notably of the cod fisheries and the fur trade; others tilled the same vineyard3 but it is his work that has stamped the “school.” His concern was with the general impact on the economy and society of staple production. His method was to cast the net widely. The staple approach became a unifying theme of diffuse application rather than an analytic tool fashioned for specific uses. There was little attempt to limit its application by the use of an explicit framework. Methodologically, Innis' staple approach was more technological history writ large than a theory of economic growth in the conventional sense.

The expected behaviour of aggregate corporate saving is an unsettled problem that has received considerably less attention in economic research than personal saving behaviour. In part this has reflected the rather uncertain status of the corporation as a separate behavioural entity in much of economic analysis. Keynes in the General Theory emphasized personal saving behaviour, and in a brief discussion of saving by corporations, governments, and other institutions he suggested rather obscurely that their motives for saving were “largely analogous to, but not identical with, those actuating individuals.’ Keynes's neglect of corporate saving was not new in the development of economic analysis, and H. G. Johnson has argued that it “reflects Marshall's inability to integrate the modern corporation into his system of economic analysis.”

An attempt to sort out some of the significant determinants of corporate saving is particularly important for two broad questions in economics. First, is the cyclical behaviour of corporate saving an important stabilizer? This question involves a study not only of the marginal relationship between changes in planned corporate saving and corporate income but also of the interdependence between planned corporate saving and planned corporate investment. Secondly, does the behaviour of corporate saving in our society adversely affect the allocation of economic resources? This question is important for the position one takes on whether or not government policy should be designed to increase the distribution of corporate income and thus to increase the channelling of new corporate funds through the capital market.

In the recently recovered Preface to the French edition of The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money Keynes refers to Montesquieu (1689–1755) as the greatest French economist. Addressing the French public Keynes writes that “Montesquieu was the real French equivalent of Adam Smith. The greatest of your economists, head and shoulders above the physiocrats in penetration, clear-headedness and good sense (which are the qualities an economist should have).” The admiration that Keynes expressed for Montesquieu in that document led me to undertake an investigation of Montesquieu's works. This research has made it possible to show that Montesquieu, though never fancying himself as an economist, had been creatively concerned with a crucial economic problem: the comparative statics of economic welfare.

Keynes was conscious mainly of Montesquieu's interest theory. He admired this theory in passing in the French Preface, but mentioned in no other of his works the influence that Montesquieu had on him. Nowhere did Keynes undertake to elaborate on or indeed justify any of his extraordinary remarks about Montesquieu. There is no reference to Montesquieu in the text proper of either the English or the French edition of the General Theory, or in any other of Keynes's works. As it stands, Keynes's sudden conviction that Montesquieu was the greatest French economist is hardly convincing. In this essay on attempt has been made to collect some of the evidence necessary for us to appraise the economic work of Montesquieu. I hope to vindicate the introduction of Montesquieu as an economist to the Anglo-Saxon world and to put Keynes's extraordinary contentions into proper perspective.

Communist experience in the field of investment policy for economic development is particularly instructive in connection with such problems as the determination of the rate of investment which results in the highest possible rate of growth; balanced versus unbalanced development; and the role of the rate of interest in the efficient allocation of investment funds. Our purpose is to examine this experience in relation to the first of the above problems. Since the three problems overlap, however, the paper relates to some extent to the other two.

It is suggested that the investment experience of Communist countries is relevant for developing countries in general. Although the results of various policies have been conditioned by the specific institutional framework of the Communist countries, they seem to depend also on the logic of the process of economic growth and of the basic economic problem of allocating scarce resources. Communist economists have been forced to admit that some aspects of economic development are as difficult under socialism as they are under capitalism, although until recently this fact was consistently denied. It is also possible, as has been suggested by Professor T. Haavelmo, that the process of economic growth can be seen most clearly when it is studied in a centrally planned economy, where major complications of a market economy are absent. Moreover, some features of the Communist system reflect the leaders' desire to achieve fast economic growth, and such measures as a high rate of forced saving and a large volume of public investment may be found in any country trying to accelerate its development.

Problems of economic development have inevitably stimulated interest in human motivation as it pertains to economic action. In this regard, frequent allusion has been made to Max Weber's The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. This paper argues that understanding of Weber's thesis concerning both the Protestant ethic and capitalism has been frequently erroneous or incomplete, and that when his thought concerning the metaphysical foundations of economic rationality is seen in an adequate context its implications for economic motivation and development problems are more important than has been generally acknowledged. More specifically, the present analysis holds that Weber's basic ideas concerning the practical economic effects of the economic actor's value orientation are valid within the framework of any given economic system.

The first two sections attempt to clarify Weber's thought concerning the nature of the Protestant ethic and its relation to capitalism. The remainder of the article deals with the contemporary significance of Weber's insight for economic development in Soviet Russia and in the newly-developing countries.

In his widely discussed stage theory of economic growth Professor W. W. Rostow has attempted to reach a level of historical generalization somewhat similar to that essayed by the pioneers in the discipline of economic history. Herbert Heaton observed that early economic historians were interested in a search for “the laws of social development” and for conclusions “as to the character and sequence of stages through which the economic life of society has actually moved.” Their valiant attempts to put historical generalization in the place of economic theory, concluded Heaton, were not successful. One purpose of this paper is to show that Rostow's analysis, while relying more on economic theory than its predecessors, is no more successful in understanding specific cases of economic development and, more widely, contains many difficulties as a general theory of development.

Technological progress and investment are considered generally to be among the crucial determinants of economic growth; both have been prominent accompaniments of experienced growth. It seems likely that they are closely related, and a way of seeing this relationship is desirable. This paper seeks to develop a theoretical framework to help examine their roles in the growth of output, to show how they influence the paths which output and other economic variables trace out through time and to lead towards a more general theory of growth. However, no such general theory is developed. Many factors relevant to the course of economic growth are not considered, especially those concerned with what would happen if the economy moved away from full employment. Consequently, the analysis is not intended to be immediately relevant to actual conditions, but merely to throw some light on the relationships between technological progress and investment.

The analysis is related closely to the work of Nicolas Kaldor. However, the model contains a more flexible treatment of the effects of technological progress and the willingness to invest, in order that we may be better able to examine, in a less rigid framework, the effects of past courses of investment and technological progress on present developments in the economy. The variables of the model consist of a few aggregates expressed in real terms and we shall not be concerned with the method of their measurement.

In a world beset by problems of accelerated development and structural adjustment, influencing the level and direction of investment has become a major governmental preoccupation. Investment is the key to economic growth and transformation; hence there is concern over where it will go. In this connection investment control in post-war Britain provides a fairly good but neglected case study. Although generalization must hurdle many obstacles of time, place, institutional framework, and history, British experience affords some insights into the nature and workings of investment control, its limitations, and its possibilities.

Partly because there is at present so much concern with problems of economic growth and partly because much has already been done to account for the years before the First World War, interest is now quickening in the process and magnitude of capital formation in Canada between Confederation and the end of the nineteenth century. An important part of Canadian capital formation has been in housing, and a historical series on housing investment, covering the years 1926–1941, was presented in an official publication prepared by Firestone and Urquhart in 1945. This series was superseded by revised estimates (which still form the basis for the historical figures in the National Accounts) made by Firestone in 1951; Buckley, partly on the basis of Firestone's later estimates, produced a series going back to 1896; and Firestone has recently returned to the problem. A consistent series from Confederation to the turn of the century is, however, still lacking.

The main purpose of this paper is to derive and present annual estimates of residential capital formation for the years 1871–1921. It is in three parts: the first presents annual estimates of the number of dwellings completed; the second considers the problem of securing annual average values and presents the final estimates of residential capital formation; and the third compares the new estimates with those published earlier, discusses the estimates and their limitations, and makes suggestions for their improvement. An effort has been made to present the material in such a way that the reader could go a long way towards reproducing the results. Inadequate data invite endless ingenuity: but unbridled wit can sometimes be dangerous and an effort has been made to keep the paper within the bounds of the plausible.

Most literature on juvenile delinquency describes it as essentially a product of the lower socio-economic classes. While there has been some speculation over the incidence and quality of middle-class delinquency, what evidence exists is largely impressionistic. Nevertheless, the prevailing view is that delinquency among middle-class youth has increased in recent years. The present paper seeks a sociological and theoretical perspective to help account for the dominant forms of juvenile delinquency among middle-class youth. It attempts also to explain the emergence and the particular qualities of middle-class delinquency as a consequence of structural changes taking place in the larger society.

Accounting for middle-class delinquency in North America requires an understanding of the dominant culture of middle-class youth. Structural changes in society over the last half-century have produced opportunities for extensive adolescent peer-group participation and the emergence of a mass youth culture. During the growth of this youth culture, in which the majority of middle-class teenagers participate, there have emerged, jointly, both delinquent and non-delinquent patterns of behaviour. It is the thesis of this paper that the bulk of middle-class delinquency occurs in the course of customary, non-delinquent activities and falls within the limits of adolescent group norms. Moreover the knowledge of both delinquent and non-delinquent patterns in the youth culture is widely shared among middle-class teenagers. Thus, in order to account for middle-class delinquency one need not look for a separate “delinquent subculture.”

The world is still a closed economy, but its regions and countries are becoming increasingly open. The trend, which has been manifested in both freer movement of goods and increased mobility of capital, has been stimulated by the dismantling of trade and exchange controls in Europe, the gradual erosion of the real burden of tariff protection, and the stability, unparalleled since 1914, of the exchange rates. The international economic climate has changed in the direction of financial integration and this has important implications for economic policy.

My paper concerns the theoretical and practical implications of the increased mobility of capital. In order to present my conclusions in the simplest possible way, and to bring the implications for policy into sharpest relief, I assume the extreme degree of mobility that prevails when a country cannot maintain an interest rate different from the general level prevailing abroad. This assumption will overstate the case but it has the merit of posing a stereotype towards which international financial relations seem to be heading. At the same time it might be argued that the assumption is not far from the truth in those financial centres, of which Zurich, Amsterdam, and Brussels may be taken as examples, where the authorities already recognize their lessening ability to dominate money market conditions and insulate them from foreign influences. It should also have a high degree of relevance to a country like Canada whose financial markets are dominated to a great degree by the vast New York market.

Political parties have come to be accepted as at least a partial solution to the problem posed for the political system by the gap between society on the one hand and the state, the locus of decision-making authority, on the other. Generally, such questions as the social basis of party affiliation and the extent of participation of party supporters have been approached, at least by the major and best known studies of popular political participation in the United States, from the electoral side: a sample survey of a single community or a national electorate is made while an election campaign is in progress. Through such surveys, a substantial amount of information has been accumulated. In Canada few surveys have been conducted, and apart from the efforts of the Gallup poll no national sampling of the political community has been attempted for public consumption.

No one questions the power of Parliament to approve or condemn the actions of the Queen's ministers. But has it or has it not also the power to advise, to ask the Crown to take or not to take some particular action? May says that the British Parliament, at any rate, has: “An Address to Her Majesty is the form ordinarily employed by both Houses of Parliament for making their desires and opinions known to the Crown.” The subjects of such Addresses “have comprised every matter of foreign or domestic policy; … the administration of justice; … and, in short, representations upon all points connected with the government and welfare of the country.”

Edward Blake was equally clear and emphatic that the Canadian Parliament also possessed this power. Replying on April 30, 1890, to Sir John Thompson's contention that it would be unconstitutional for the Government to disallow a provincial Act after announcing that it would not disallow, Blake said flatly that this was wrong, because Thompson's doctrine might

An amending procedure is integral to a scheme of free and responsible government. Liberal constitutions are not formed on the naive assumption that they are immune from obsolescence. Their architects, unlike the Emperor Justinian, are never confident that their legal handiwork can endure for all time. They accept the necessity for change as self-evident and provide the means for achieving it.

In a liberal federation, however, the devising of a satisfactory procedure for amendment is rarely easy and seldom gives satisfaction, mainly because in such a state constitutional rigidity no less than flexibility has a raison d'être. The communities associated in the federation want a measure of security, a guarantee that their individual identity and integrity will never be lightly sacrificed in the process of change. This was illustrated long ago in the most influential federal union in history. The men who deliberated at Philadelphia in 1787 agreed that amendments must be sanctioned by a special majority in Congress and ratified by three-fourths of the states. They were confident that they had thus made change difficult, but not difficult enough to prevent it when necessary. Actually, for many reasons, it proved more difficult than they could have envisaged. Since the first ten amendments were little more than supplements to an unfinished document, there remain only twelve effected in 170 years, and of these three were obtained under very abnormal circumstances when the South was under the heel of the North. Important as some of them have been, most of the crucial adjustments and changes in the federation have been achieved in other ways, by judicial interpretation, usages, conventions, and a network of agreements.

In February, 1959, the Minister of Public Works, the Honourable Howard Green, said in the House of Commons that “the government went into the home financing field to such a large extent in the last two years for one reason, to provide employment.” He went on to say that “this was done deliberately as the best means of creating jobs.” The Honourable D. J. Walker, after he took over the Public Works portfolio later that year, presented estimates to the House of the actual labour content of residential construction. On November 22, 1960, he said that “at this time every house that is built gives six months' employment to two men on the job and two men off the job, and also another man who is employed getting the sewers, and so on ready.” A year later, when introducing yet another amendment to the National Housing Act, the Minister stated that “if each new dwelling unit financed under the National Housing Act involves 2½ man years of employment on and off site, the N.H.A. mortgage lending for eight months of this year has contributed to more than 112,000 man-years of employment and of these, direct federal lending has been responsible for 46,000 man-years.” In the light of the statements by two ministers of Public Works, this paper attempts to present more precise estimates of the labour income that is generated by an expenditure for residential construction.