What benefits do inclusive institutions offer authoritarian rulers? Previous research has studied delegate behaviour in authoritarian institutions but has been less well-equipped to assess government reactions to it. Analysing the case of one People's Political Consultative Conference in China, I argue that an overlooked key benefit of inclusive institutions is their provision of expertise. Drawing on novel data comprising more than 9,000 policy suggestions submitted by delegates, delegates' biographies and the corresponding government responses, I illustrate that the government generally values suggestions that signal expertise. While this is especially true for departments of a more technocratic nature, I also find that members of the institutional leadership are systematically favoured. These findings provide an important addition to our understanding of the role of authoritarian institutions in policymaking processes.

In response to its severe environmental problems, China's government is pursuing a national goal to “build an ecological civilization.” One approach used to theorize about China's environmental governance is environmental authoritarianism (EA). Drawing on work in political steering theory and the governmentality tradition, this paper addresses the “soft” side of EA by analysing the eco-civilization discourse on food and eating in policy documents and consumer guidebooks. It argues that China's EA works not only through coercion but also through citizen responsibilization. The emerging discourse of eco-civilization outlines a cultural nationalist programme focused on virtue and vice, in which consumer behaviour is morally charged. Consumers are expected to cultivate themselves into models of ecological morality to fulfil their civic duty and support the state's goal of building an ecological civilization.

This paper explores the international higher education (IHE) fever gripping China's middle-class families. Drawing on data gathered from 69 qualitative interviews with Chinese middle-class international students whose education is financially supported by their families, the paper points out that the desire for IHE is influenced by the pursuit of the “normative biography,” a term conceptualized by the authors to refer to the societal expectations that prescribe the specific life milestones and sequences that young middle-class adults should follow on their life trajectories. IHE is perceived as an important pathway to help such young adults meet these social expectations. Moreover, parental support for IHE is not only an educational investment but also assists offspring in conforming to the normative biography. This paper enriches the understanding of how educational practices are influenced by broader sociocultural contexts in contemporary China.

Access challenges for China researchers have increased, including for online research. This paper focuses on one subset of such challenges: policy documents. As no studies have to date analysed variation in data availability over time, researchers studying official documents risk conflating variation in transparency with actual policy change. This paper analyses missingness and finds that publication of policy documents under China's “open government information” initiative increased until the mid-late 2010s but then began to decrease. A key determinant of policy transparency is whether a document is related to citizens’ daily lives, as opposed to national security. Furthermore, nearly 20 per cent of policy documents become unavailable two years after their publication. The paper concludes with a discussion on how to mitigate these challenges.

In China, both governments and civil institutions play important roles in non-profit regulation. However, with various regulatory instruments available, it remains unclear which has the strongest public support and most effectively promotes civic engagement. This study compared the impact of different non-profit regulatory instruments addressing information disclosure on two aspects of civic engagement intention: willingness to donate and willingness to volunteer. A survey experiment was conducted to analyse the perspectives of 939 Chinese participants on four types of regulation: no regulation, civil regulation, accommodative government regulation and deterrent government regulation. Results showed that regulation was preferred to no regulation and deterrent government regulation was preferred to accommodative government regulation, which was preferred to civil regulation. Additionally, public trust in non-profits significantly mediated the relationship between regulation and civic engagement intention. These findings suggest that government regulation, particularly the deterrent approach, garners strong public support and may be prioritized within the Chinese context.

This research challenges the conventional wisdom that value-driven protests in China are exceedingly rare and face harsh state repression. Drawing on a hand-coded, multi-source dataset of over 3,100 protests in three Chinese megacities from 2014 to 2016, we identify 67 protests that reveal a hitherto unknown underbelly of everyday, value-driven contention. Qualitatively, we identify three main forms of contentious performances. Quantitatively, we show how value-driven protesters combine non-disruptive tactics with ambitious targets and virtually never extract concessions. Surprisingly, we find that such protests are less often policed and repressed than other protests. They are also never met with violence from non-state actors. We provide three interpretations for the counter-intuitive finding on repression. This study shows that the Chinese state coexists with a non-negligible amount of explicitly regime-critical contention. It adopts a containment strategy, tolerating a certain extent of value-driven performances when the risk of spill-over into wider society is limited.

Described in the Chinese Communist Party's orthodox historiography as a dark and repressive period and part of the “century of humiliation,” the Republican era has in recent decades undergone a significant reassessment in the People's Republic of China (PRC). In books, newspaper articles, documentaries and dramas, Republican China has sometimes been portrayed as a vibrant society making remarkable progress in modernization in the face of severe external challenges. This article explores the origins of this surprising rehabilitation and examines in detail how the Republican-era economic legacies have been reassessed in the reform era. It finds that while the post-Mao regime continues to use the negative view of China's pre-communist history to maintain its historical legitimacy, it has also been promoting a positive view of aspects of the same period in order to support its post-1978 priorities of modernization and nationalism, a trend that has persisted under Xi Jinping despite his tightened ideological control. The selective revival of Republican legacies, although conducive to the Party's current political objectives, has given rise to revisionist narratives that damage the hegemony of its orthodox historical discourses, on which its legitimacy still relies.

The Digital Silk Road (DSR) is usually described as the digital component of the Belt and Road Initiative that is reshaping the digital world order. Most existing research is concerned with the possible long-term consequences of the DSR rather than on what the DSR encompasses, how it developed and how it has changed since it was announced in 2015. We address this gap by reconstructing the origins of the DSR within China, with a focus on both rhetoric and concrete plans as they developed between central and provincial actors. We collected and analysed a corpus of 31 national and 130 provincial DSR-related plans. In contrast to prevailing views of the DSR as a unified, outward-facing strategy, we show that after an initial surge of related documents, the central government ceased to discuss the DSR in a meaningful way. Provincial governments then appropriated its rhetoric to legitimize their own digitization agendas, including upgrading infrastructure in poorer provinces and remaining plugged into export markets for those with an IT industry. Rather than reshaping the digital world order, the DSR has been appropriated by some provincial governments to attempt, mostly unsuccessfully, to shore up their own digital ambitions.

In 2015, President Xi Jinping proclaimed the principle of the Sinicization of religions. Since then, it has become the Communist Party's guiding thought in religious governance. However, so far little is known about how it is perceived by everyday religious practitioners, especially Christians. Based on textual analysis of speeches and writings by leaders of the Catholic Church in China, and 50 in-depth interviews with Catholic practitioners from the mainland and Hong Kong, this paper examines how Catholics (en)counter the public transcript created by the state. Church leaders at the national level publicly embrace Sinicization and appropriate the Church's teaching on inculturation, another transcript, as its justification. However, the everyday practitioners interviewed for this study refused to embrace this discourse. Instead, they adopted one of three discursive strategies: rejection, evasion and empathy. All fell short of endorsing the state's discourse. The findings suggest that the Church's transcript enables Catholic practitioners to critically (en)counter the state's transcript.

Decentralization is believed to ensure better environmental governance. However, recent studies have shown that some governments recentralize local enforcement to increase the effectiveness of policy implementation. Under what conditions is recentralization the better option for environmental enforcement? This study attempts to differentiate two possible mechanisms through which recentralization can deliver better environmental outcomes: curbing elite capture and enhancing local resources. In the context of recentralization reform and with a unique dataset of local investigations into China's environmental enforcement, we demonstrate that although decentralization has been successful from many perspectives, recentralizing local environmental enforcement can produce better outcomes for pollution reduction in China, by curbing local protectionism rather than enhancing local resources. Further qualitative analysis reveals why recentralization cannot necessarily enhance local resources and capacity, even though it is designed to do so.

In the context of China's “Constructing ecological civilization” initiative, Tibetan environmentalists are proactively incorporating ecological science into their wildlife conservation efforts. This ethnographic study explores the logics, rationales and motivations behind this approach among Tibetans in Qinghai province. The article contends that Tibetan environmentalists adopt ecological science to gain legibility in the eyes of both the state and the wider environmental conservation community, thereby enhancing their political legitimacy and social recognition. On one hand, this practice counters the stigmatizing narratives that depict Tibetan pastoralists as backward. By embracing scientific discourses and practices, they challenge such derogatory views and position themselves as forward-thinking conservationists. On the other hand, this strategy indirectly preserves the traditional knowledge of pastoralists. Through their involvement with ecological science, they merge traditional insights with scientific methodologies, ensuring the protection of their cultural heritage while adapting to the sociopolitical landscape of contemporary conservation dynamics in China.

China has constructed a rigorous state apparatus to control its online social content. To date, research has largely focused on the central government's cyber control, but the less studied local cyberspace administrative forces are also important. Our fieldwork and interviews at a county-level cyberspace administration office (CAO) in east China reveal that the local CAO had been rendered a “toothless tiger” with insufficient technology, power and labour. However, it has made up for these deficiencies by utilizing systems such as outsourced surveillance, organized mass reporting and personnel secondment. We contend that these practices, which we label “extra-institutional governance” (EIG), emerge when bureaucracies with limited resources face external pressures. The findings shed light on how censorship machines operate in local governments in China and reveal the general dynamics of how bureaucratic organizations adapt to environmental pressures.