In a political environment that remains (at best) officially sceptical about the enterprise, representative surveys on Chinese politics have nevertheless grown substantially in number in the past two decades: political scientists trained and based outside mainland China conducted a mere two such surveys in the 1980s, but the number increased more than tenfold in the 1990s and continues to rise steadily.

Using data from a 2004 national survey, we examine the recent trends in the conditions of migrant workers in China. Our discussion engages the debate in the existing literature between the migrant workers as victims of China's economic growth and as a newly emerging political force with growing bargaining power. The study focuses on three dimensions of migrant workers' status: their socio-economic conditions, relations with rural and urban residents, and conflict resolution behaviour. The findings indicate that while migrant workers continue to occupy more blue-collar and service jobs than urban residents, their economic, social and political status has improved. In some areas, migrant workers show even more political activism than both rural and urban residents. Migrant workers' growing social influence is a positive development in China's political diversification.

This article examines the intensity and sources of Chinese private entrepreneurs' support for the current political system. The study presented here is based on data from a representative sample of private entrepreneurs collected from five coastal provinces in late 2006 and early 2007. In general, China's private entrepreneurs tend to support the current party-state and to be in favour of the status quo. Subjective values are far more important than CCP membership and relationship to the state in determining which capitalists are regime supporters. Among all the factors analysed in this study, democratic values, life satisfaction, evaluation of government policy performance and perception of official corruption play the most decisive roles in shaping private entrepreneurs' support for the incumbent regime. Only red capitalists who are former cadres are likely to be reliable supporters of the regime when subjective values are also considered; other ties to the state do not create support for the regime. The degree of regime support also exhibits considerable regional variation. These findings have important implications for the survival of the regime and for the role of private entrepreneurs in a potential political change towards democracy.

Despite the general consensus on problems with official income statistics, quantitative data on the falsification of income statistics have been scarce. This article draws on original survey data from 2001 to provide estimates of the extent and magnitude of income data falsification by village cadres and uses statistical analysis to identify factors that are correlated with the inflation of village income per capita. Evidence from survey data as well as village case studies suggests that village cadres were less likely to inflate village income per capita when they were cadre-entrepreneurs, when they were located in villages with well implemented elections, when they were embedded in village-wide solidary groups such as temples and lineages, when they experienced less direct supervision from township officials, and when they relied less on revenue from village levies.

One of the most important, but under-researched and least well understood, instruments of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is the extensive national network of Party schools (approximately 2,700). They serve as the key institution of mid-career training and indoctrination for all Party cadres, many government cadres, some military officers and selected businessmen. In addition to its training and indoctrination functions, the Party school system (particularly the Central Party School in Beijing) is also an important generator of policy initiatives. Not all Party schools are stalwart institutions, with some being involved in corruption scandals, but on the whole they have come to play an increasingly important role in the CCP's rebuilding efforts in recent years.

Since the mid-1990s trade union leaders in Zhejiang, Guangdong, Shandong and other coastal provinces have been quietly introducing direct elections for grassroots trade union cadres, in order to nurture a stratum of grassroots trade union cadres who prioritize workers' interests. Yet these elections have not been generalized across the country, been institutionalized through legislation or drawn droves of international observers in the way that village elections did in the 1980s and 1990s. What might have promised to be China's “second silent revolution” has failed to take off. This article explores the political, structural and institutional reasons behind the piecemeal and slow spread of direct basic union elections in China. In doing so it analyses the parameters constraining the reform of the All-China Federation of Trades Unions in the direction of a more effective, worker-oriented organization.

Venerable Hong Choon (1907–90) made eight visits to China between 1982 and 1990. During these visits, the Venerable met national and religious leaders, made pilgrimages to sacred Buddhist sites, helped to restore the monasteries associated with his master Venerable Hui Quan, and officiated at religious ceremonies. This study aims to examine the diplomatic significance of Venerable Hong Choon's visits to China. It positions these religious exchanges within the broader context of Singapore–China relations since the reopening of China in the late 1970s, and argues that Buddhism played a role in fostering international relations between the two countries in the period prior to the official establishment of diplomatic ties. In the absence of formal diplomatic channels between Singapore and China, Venerable Hong Choon's religious visits could thus be seen as a form of informal diplomacy with the aim of confidence building.

Mao's confidence in military confrontations with more powerful adversaries continues to inspire Chinese strategists more than half a century later. This article explores the origins and development of Mao's thinking in this regard, focusing particularly on his years in Yan'an. Drawing on newly available sources, the analysis stresses the importance of experience, as opposed to ideology, in the development of Mao's martial confidence. For much of his time in Yan'an Mao was relatively circumspect in his military ambitions. Yet towards the end of this period his confidence rose considerably after successes against the KMT offensive in 1946. In short, Mao's martial confidence did not spring fully formed from his ideological convictions but emerged over time.

This article sets out a framework for conceptualizing and researching an increasingly important element of electoral competition in Taiwan. Analysing the tone and content of television and newspaper advertising across three presidential campaigns, it provides empirical estimates that challenge some common stereotypes about advertising in Taiwan.