The following fragment of a papyrus-roll, written in a hand which may be assigned to the second or third century a.d., was bought by Professor O. Guéraud from the antiquary Nahman on behalf of the Société Fouad de Papyrologie (P. Fouad Inv. no. 239). With singular generosity Professor Guéraud has resigned to us the right to publish the text, which we now present with the help of photographs and a transcript, with notes, made by Professor Guéraud. We gratefully acknowledge an obligation to Mr. D. S. Crawford also for assistance in obtaining the photographs.

The story of Orpheus and Eurydice has in recent years received attention from Heurgon, Norden, Guthrie, Linforth, and Ziegler, who have in different ways supplemented the admirable article by Gruppe in Roscher's Lexikon published fifty years ago. Unless new texts or new monuments are found, it does not seem likely that fresh evidence will be forthcoming to solve old problems, and our task is rather to make a constructive use of what evidence we have. This paper attempts to consider only one part of the whole question, the versions of the story which lie behind the familiar form. Much said here is not new, but perhaps the attempt to sort out some points is worth making, especially as the experts disagree on several important matters.

Anyone who reads the opening chapters of Thucydides’ history consecutively will soon find it difficult to follow the thread of the argument. If he turns to a summary of the subjects chapter by chapter, he will not be greatly enlightened. In this paper the question is asked: why did Thucydides arrange his subjects as he did? In Part I the conclusion is reached that in the arrangement of his subject-matter he was following a clear-cut system. In Part II the implications of this conclusion are considered.

‘As regards the exegetai three (in number) let the four tribes nominate four (men) each (man) from their own personnel, and let them (i.e. the State) scrutinize whichever three gain most votes and send nine to Delphi to appoint one from each group of three; the scrutiny and the age-qualification shall be the same for them as for the priests. Let these be exegetai for life; as regards a vacancy let the preliminary election be made by the four tribes in which the vacancy may occur.’

An investigation into the prosopography of Libanius shows a confusion of identity in the following cases. The textual references are to Foerster's Teubner edition, of which the index compiled by Richtsteig (vol. xii) is to be handled with caution.

My chief object in these notes is to provide evidence for tracing the ancestry of certain themes, situations, and characters which appear in New Comedy; I hope, however, that they may also be useful for the study of Middle Comedy itself. I am therefore chiefly concerned with the period from 400 b.c. to 320 b.c., when Menander had begun to write; I have, however, given some dates after 320 which were necessary to complete my story, but I have left out many plays by poets of New Comedy which can be dated in the decade 320–310 b.c. I have also omitted the originals of Plautus Amphitruo, Persa, and Menaechmi, although I am convinced that they all belong to Middle Comedy and hope to consider the problem more fully elsewhere; the tactics of the battle in the Amphitruo (242 f.) are possible for Epameinondas and Philip as well as for Alexander, but the clash of two kings seems to limit the reference to Alexander and Dareios as depicted in the famous mosaic, and the limits are 330–320 (there is very little evidence of mythological comedy after 320); the original of the Persa must have been written before Alexander's conquests and the limits seem to be 345–338; Hueffher's late dating of the original of the Menaechmi has been successfully countered by Fraenkel and the whole feel of the play suggests Middle rather than New Comedy. The following list is arranged in decades, except where it has proved necessary to use a longer period. I have tabulated first the plays or victories dated by inscriptional or other firm evidence; among these I have included the plays dated by Geissler, without comment except where I disagree with him.

Mr. Alan Ker in Class. Quart., vol. xliv, 1950, pp. 12–24, discusses a number of Martial passages which appear to him to be in need of elucidation or textual amendment. That some of these passages require elucidation seems indeed clear, but few require any treatment of the kind prescribed by Mr. Ker. In so many cases does he seem to me needlessly to alter the epigrammatist's carefully chosen words and ascribe to him others which he would never have used that it seems but proper to call attention to some instances. The following notes are intended to show that Martial was a more able writer and the transmitters of his work more competent than Mr. Ker's paper would suggest; the conclusions accord with Heraeus' observation (p. vii) ‘coniecturis omnino non multum loci est in Martiale, minimum, ubi αβγ conspirant’.

There is in the British Museum a twelfth-century manuscript, Egerton 3055, of Suetonius' De Vita Caesarum which has not previously been noticed by editors or in the reports of manuscripts of Suetonius made by Professor C. L. Smith and Professor A. A. Howard, though summarily classified by E. G. Millar.

I Assume that in Latin there was a stress accent which, in the time of Lucretius, was governed by the well-known ‘law of the penultimate’; also that in Latin poetry, although the metre is determined by the quantity of the syllable, nevertheless the stress accent must not be ignored. In fact, the inter-relation of the ictus of the quantitative metre with the stress accent is a most important factor in determining the rhythm of the verse. It is well known that in the Latin hexameter special importance was attached to the coincidence of ictus and accent in the fifth and sixth feet, so as to secure a characteristic and definite ending to the line. But the coincidence or clash of ictus and accent has its effect in every foot, although to a less extent. Particularly in the fourth foot is it important. There is an obvious difference between a line in which stress accent reinforces the ictus in the fourth, fifth, and sixth feet, and a line in which conflict occurs between ictus and accent in the fourth foot. W. F. J . Knight refers to these lines as homodyned and heterodyned. Each foot of the hexameter could be examined for the effect of homodyne and heterodyne; I am limiting this discussion to the fourth foot. In classifying fourth feet as homodyned or heterodyned, I have described as homodyned a foot in which a stress accent coincides with the ictus; all other feet are heterodyned. It must be realized, however, that there are possible varieties of homodyned fourth feet. They may be spondaic or dactylic; they may be caused by the overlap of the last two (or three) syllables of a polysyllabic word, or they may consist of a single word or two words. There is a great difference of metrical effect. Heterodyned lines may again be differentiated between those which contain a stress accent clashing with the ictus, and those in which there is no stress accent at all.

It is important to recognize that the problem dealt with by Plato in the central part of the Sophist (232 b–264 d) is one which arises from the use of certain Greek phrases, and has no necessary or direct connexion with metaphysics (although the solution of it which Plato offers has an important bearing on the defence of his own metaphysical theory against one particular kind of attack). We tend to obscure this fact if we use English terms such as ‘Being’, ‘Reality’, ‘Existence’, etc., in discussing the dialogue, and indeed make it almost impossible to understand what Plato is trying to do. It is the way in which die Greek terms ỗν and μή ỗν and other such terms are used by the ‘sophists’ which gives rise to the problem.

The present study of the manuscripts of the Knights arose out of the preparation of a text of the scholia for a forthcoming edition. The completion of a collation of all the manuscripts for the scholia seemed a suitable occasion for extending the inquiry and re-examining our manuscript tradition in both text and scholia, especially as the scholia in a manuscript, provided they come from the same source as the text, can often reveal facts that might escape an investigator who confined himself to the text. The scholia are far greater in bulk than the text, and scribes are often less careful and so more self-revealing in scholia; so that both from the quantitative and qualitative points of view scholia are important for the student of the tradition.

The Athenian expedition led against Macedonia by Archestratos, son of Lykomedes, early in 432 was not diverted from its destination by the revolt of Poteidaia. Archestratos had received additional instructions to enforce the Poteidaia ultimatum if he could, but, this being already impossible, he continued with the real object of his mission, the attack on Perdikkas II of Macedon. The widespread revolt among the Chalkidians had deprived the Athenians of the bases for this attack on which they might have reckoned, and Archestratos had at the outset to make good this loss by recapturing Therme, at the head of the gulf to which it gave its name. Therme, or Serme, had been a tributary member of the Delian League since 450/449:2 it need not necessarily be said that it lay within Macedonia, as Poppo and Bergk inferred from Thucydides 1. 61. 2, but it is at least likely that it lay on the boundary, as it was handed over to Perdikkas under the agreement of 431 (Thuc. 2.29.6).3 However, that the Athenians could include in their Empire a city within Macedonian territory is shown from the position of Berge (tributary since 452/451), and is likely in other cases, e.g. Haison. From Therme, Archestratos moved on to Pydna, presumably by sea, and laid siege to it. Here he was joined by substantial reinforcements, while at the same time the situation in Chalkidike became increasingly embarrassing, so that a peace and a reinsurance alliance were seen by both sides to be ‘imperative’ (Thuc. 1. 61. 3). When these had been concluded, the Athenians moved against Poteidaia.

For horribilesque we need something better than Haupt's horribile aequor (so Postgate, Merrill, Kroll, Schuster); and Mr. E. L. B. Meurig Davies (Class. Quart, xliv, 1950, p. 31) comes near the truth, I think, with his proposal horribilem niue. A noun in the ablative indicating cold to define horribilem is just what we require. That noun does not seem to me, however, likely to be niue. Read rather horribilem gelu; cf. Luc. 2. 570 ‘(Caesar) Rheni gelidis … fugit ab undis’, Claud. Rapt. 3. 321 ‘non Rheni glacies, non me Rhipaea tenebunt’, Paneg. 7(6). 6 ‘duratus gelu Rhenus’.

The revival of the optative by authors of the Second Sophistic is the most striking example of their endeavour to return to Attic usage. Criticisms of it are generally of two kinds: first, that the optative was not current in the spoken language of the period, and secondly, that having reintroduced the optative they used it incorrectly. The first of these faults, if it is a fault, only carries farther the normal tendency of artistic writers to archaism; for all literature goes to some extent by precedent, and it is natural for its admirers to regard changes in the language with suspicion. Lucian has received a full share of harsh words for his use of the optative, and it is true that by Attic standards there are mistakes. It is, however, hazardous to generalize too freely about the language of so versatile a writer, especially in view of his penchant for parody, and it will be more convenient to consider one particular construction.

In the dialogues earlier than the Republic, Plato indicates in many ways his lack of confidence that any method of ethical analysis will lead to a discovery of the truth. The doubts which he expresses or implies have not always been given the attention which they deserve, and there has often been a reluctance to accept them as an expression of Plato's genuine conviction. There is, admittedly, some justification for this reluctance. Plato does not always seem to be consistent. In his attitude towards the results attainable by the use of a method of joint inquiry, he is sometimes extremely optimistic, at other times sceptical; and it seems a not unreasonable explanation of his scepticism to ascribe it to his desire to preserve a consistent portrait of the ‘ignorant’ Socrates. Thus the hesitation and reserve with which Plato immediately qualifies his dogmatic presentation of the theory of ⋯ν⋯μνησις in the Meno is explicable as a concession to dramatic realism. His reference to the method discussed in the Phaedo as a δε⋯τερος πλο⋯ς may be dismissed as ‘ironical’, as ‘the habitual playful selfdepreciation of Socrates’. The purpose of this paper is to suggest that the development of Plato's views on method in the dialogues as far as the Republic can be traced more consistently if we accept Plato's doubts, as well as his optimism, about ethical analysis, as the expression of his genuine conviction.

There are many passages in ancient literature which depict an imaginary existence different from the hardships of real life-an existence blessed with Nature's bounty, untroubled by strife or want. Naturally this happy state is always placed somewhere or sometime outside normal human experience, whether ‘off the map’ in some remote quarter of the world, or in Elysium after death, or in the dim future or the distant past. Such an imaginary time of bliss in the past or the future has become known as the ‘golden age’. This is the name which modern scholars generally give to the ancient belief. The phrase is often echoed by modern poets. The same language has been transferred from the unknown to the known, and it has become a commonplace to describe an outstanding period of history or literature as a ‘golden age’.

Mr. G. S. Kirk's interesting and illuminating treatment of this curious fragment in CQ,. xliv (1950), pp. 149–57, prompts me to offer some further conjectures (i) on the reading and interpretation of lines 15–23, (ii) on the character of the fragment as a whole. I am indebted for valuable help both to Mr. Kirk himself and to Mr. C. H. Roberts.

One cannot but notice Plato's interest in prophecy and divination. He speaks disparagingly of the art and of those who practised it, yet it seems to have held some fascination for him. Moreover, he frequently uses the language of prophecy in a metaphorical sense, and it is this which I am to examine. Often, of course, this use is facetious, especially with the nouns ‘prophet’ and ‘prophecy’: he is ridiculing obscurity or playfully lending dignity to an obvious inference. But I suggest that this facetious usage is common enough to be in itself evidence for the familiarity of Plato with this way of thinking.