In the analysis of ethnic separatism and secession, two approaches can be distinguished. One is to ask what forces are responsbile for the general upsurge in secessionist movements, from Burma te-Biafra and Bangladesh, from Corsica to Quebec, and from Eritrea to the Southern Philippines. Another approach is to ask what moves certain territorially discrete ethnic groups to attempt to leave the states of which they are a part (or at least to secure substantial territorial autonomy), whereas other groups, also regionally concentrated, make no such attempts. The first question calls for a general explanation of aggregate trends; it aims to compare the present with some period in the past. The second calls for an explanation that can discriminate among classes of cases; it entails comparison not across time, but across space.

Linguistic conflict between French and English-speaking Canadians has been an enduring feature of Canadian society since the British conquest of New France (Quebec) in 1759. This conflict has taken a variety of forms and revolved around a number of issues in the past two hundred years, ranging from the question of religious and linguistic civil rights to economic inequality and economic dominance. The latest and most significant manifestation of English-French conflict has been the emergence in the mid-1960s of a viable movement for political independence for the predominantly French-speaking province of Quebec.

Although there has been a dramatic broadening of the definition of social protest in recent years to include collective behavior that was once dismissed as criminal, irrational, or insignificant, our attention has continued to be focused on movements involving direct, often violent, confrontations between the wielders of power and dissident groups. Avoidance protest, by which dissatisfied groups seek to attenuate their hardships and express their discontent through flight, sectarian withdrawal, or other activities that minimize challenges to or clashes with those whom they view as their oppressors, has at best remained a secondary concern of students of social protest. Although specific forms of avoidance protest, such as the flight of slaves in the plantation zones of the Americas or the migration or serfs to the towns of medieval Europe and peasants to the frontiers of Tsarist Russia, have merited a prominent place in the historical literature on some societies and time periods, avoidance protest has rarely been systematically analyzed as a phenomenon in itself. There have been few detailed studies of the diverse forms which avoidance protest may take and the ways in which these are shaped by the sociopolitical contexts in which they develop. This neglect is serious because in many societies and time periods (perhaps in most in the preindustrial era), modes of protest oriented to avoidance rather than confrontation have been the preferred and most frequently adopted means of resisting oppression and expressing dissatisfaction.

The Route nationale 116 runs west from Perpignan, away from the Mediterranean and up the valley of the Tet River towards the heights of the Pyrenees. For about thirty kilometres, the road follows the river through a district known as the Riberal, a densely populated area of substantial villages and bourgs surrounded by river flats which for centuries have nourished up to six crops of vegetables annually. Just past the peach-growing town of Ille-sur-Têt, the valley narrows to no more than a gorge, and the road has to diverge to skirt a rugged granite bluff and cross over a pass called the Col de Ternère. As the road swings back around the other side of the bluff to rejoin the river and begin its steep climb through the conflent to the highlands, it passes a large cluster of ochre and white houses, with their characteristically southern orange-brown tiles, clinging to the lower part of the hill.

In the April 1979 issue of CSSH, Karen Leonard has advanced a new explanation for the decline and eventual collapse of the Mughal empire in India. She argues that “indigenous banking firms were indispensable allies of the Mughal state” (p. 152), and that the great nobles and imperial officers “were more than likely to be directly dependent upon these banking firms.” (p. 165) Thus, when in the period 1650–1750 these banking firms began “the redirection of [their] economic and political support” (p. 164) toward nascent regional polities and rulers, including the British East India Company in Bengal, this led to bankruptcy, the ensuing series of political crises and the “downfall of the empire” (p. 152). On first consideration, this theory does offer a plausible means to explain some of the more puzzling aspects of the period of Mughal decline, circa 1690 to 1720. Certainly the faltering, after more than a century of steady increase, of the flow of resources toward the imperial center in the last decade of the seventeenth century, and the inability of the empire to pay its highest ranking cadre of officers, the amirs or nobles, and their followers are manifest. A coterminous erosion of authority, the loss of morale and confidence of badly isolated imperial officers stationed throughout the subcontinent, and the loss of fighting spirit amongst imperial armies bogged down in an interminable war against the Marathas in the Deccan are also well known.

In the April 1979 issue of CSSH I proposed a theory: The financial services of leading indigenous banking firms were indispensable to the Mughal state, and the diversion by these firms of resources, both credit and trade, from the Mughals to other political powers in the Indian subcontinent contributed to the downfall of the Mughal empire (p. 152). John F. Richards's article in the present issue takes exception to that theory, challenging the evidentiary basis for my assertions. While stating that further research was admittedly necessary to test and fully substantiate the theory, I certainly offered evidence that these banking firms supplied working capital to the empire and its officials for military campaigns, trade, construction, karkhanah (workshop) production, and personal loans. I also discussed the bankers' regulation of the valuation, exchange, and circulation of currency, and particularly the hundi system of bills of exchange. The political potential of these financial services – of their performance or nonperformance, and on what terms – is obvious. Indeed, I cited instances of political interactions between bankers and officials.