Latin America as an area would yield to few if any other regions of the world in its devotion to what it considers the constitutional process and, indeed, the supremacy of constitutions in establishing and ordering the political life of the several states. If the mere number of excursions into the practical exercise of constitution-making were to be considered significant—which it probably is at most only in a limited way—it might lead to the conclusion that the Latins were affected by some form of legpmania. A compilation of Latin America constitutions published a little more than a decade ago indicated that as of the beginning of 1948 the twenty states had written a total of 200 basic laws since their respective achievements of independence. Several additional ones have since been drafted.

Events of the last two hundred years have led many scholars to divide the societies of the world into contrasting pairs, such as developed—under-developed, advanced—backward, traditional—modern. Central to these concepts are not only ideas about the level of technological development, but the very character of the societies and cultures which are compared and contrasted as well. Professor Edward Shils has recently remarked that the traditional society is one in which, among other things, there is a strong attachment to the past, by which behavior is determined and validated. Solutions to problems old and new are determined by the past of the society, and modernization quickens when ties to the past begin to be cut and new criteria for determining and validating behavior are invoked.

The expansion of Europe has been a much-discussed process. Unfortunately the publicists' and historians' interest has commonly been limited to surface aspects of power, to political, economic, and intellectual penetration. Yet a closer acquaintance reveals the existence of a yet deeper layer of hostile infiltration, a subtler and more subversive onslaught on native values and traditions. The “underground” portions of western expansion have hitherto rather escaped notice, let alone analysis, although among their victims their force was felt deeply if confusedly. Thus an anonymous journalist writing in Russia late in 1896 pointed to that melting away of native guideposts under the western impact when he lamented that “under the influence of historical conditions and progress many phenomena which distinguished Russian nationality are now changing and therefore prove no longer to be genuine and unchangeable…” No hallowed custom, no authority remained unimpaired, even though the surface structure of society and government was preserved and the sovereignty of the state untouched. The termites of western influence were eating away the substance and left only facades. And the invisible portion of western power, its ability to serve as a universal model, proved in the long run even more devastating than armies, battleships, or stocks and bonds.

The natural condition of history is the paradox. The half century of upheavals which saw the devolution of colonial empires and the humbling of the West's hybris, also witnessed the culminating impact of Western culture upon non-European nations. Toynbee even suggests that this development points to the eventual evolution of a universal civilization, geared to the Westernized rhythm of an industrial society.

One of the recent attempts to formulate a general theory of nationalism has been Deutsch's approach to the question. This aims to show that a correlation exists between changes in the process of social communications and the rise of national consciousness. A considerable number of studies based on this approach to nationalism will have to be carried out before its contribution to the identification of the elusive “essence” of nationalism can be evaluated with any amount of fairness. In the meantime one tentative procedure which might be used to assess its usefulness is to try to fit this model to the evolution of social communications in a number of countries which the author has not included among his illustrations.

The rise of the nations of Asia and, as one ought to add, Africa, and the invention of atomic weapons are two developments which threaten to shake the way of life the Western World has developed. Is there a way to ban these dangers and to provide for the world an harmonious order? These are the momentous questions to which the author of The Meeting of East and West has addressed himself in his new book. Although of the thirty-two chapters of this work, thirty are adaptations of articles published at earlier dates, the book constitutes a coherent whole and an impressive testimony to the consistency of the thought of the author as it has developed during his incumbency of the philosopher's chair at the Yale Law School. As the title of the book indicates, the author is concerned with human experience, i.e. epistemology in general, and more particularly, the relations between epistemology and man's ways of social order as expressed in ethics and law.

In his account of the revolt of Thomas the Slavonian (820) against the Emperor Michael II (820–829) the Byzantine historian Genesius lists a variety of peoples from whom the armies of the rebel had been drawn: Saracens, Indians, Egyptians, Assyrians, Medes, Abasgians, Zichs, Vandals, Getae, Alans, Chaldoi, Armenians, adherents of the heretical sects of the Paulicians and the Athenganoi. Some of these peoples are well known; the identity of others, despite efforts made to determine it, is by no means certain. But in any case, their listing by the Byzantine historian illustrates vividly the multi-racial character of the Byzantine Empire. This was in the ninth century, but the situation was no different for the period before, and it would not be different for the period after. The Byzantine Empire was never in its long history a true national state with an ethnically homogeneous population. If by virtue of its civilization it may be called Greek, it was never, except perhaps during the very last years of its existence, an empire of Greeks.

This paper describes the landmarks of Western education in India, the content of this education, the nature of social and political changes which resulted or were furthered by this education, the groups that imparted and the groups that received this education, and finally it compares the Indian with the Chinese and to some extent with the Japanese experience.

The society built up by Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia has always been remarkable for its wealth of voluntary associations. In the various historical and sociological studies of Southeast Asian Chinese which have appeared the importance of associations has been duly stressed, although in respect of only two settlements have we been given full treatment of their structure and significance. In this paper I shall consider the associations which Singapore Chinese created and modified in the course of the nineteenth century. Studying this earlier period of Singapore history we can see how the Chinese members of the colonial society adapted their social organization to the conditions of a trading settlement in which, while they often amassed great riches, they were not their own political masters. At the end of the paper I shall consider the Singapore evidence within the wider setting of Southeast Asia and put forward certain general conclusions which may be taken up in other papers on the same theme.

As in all Asian countries, modernization in China was a result of Western impact. The year 1860 was a turning point in Chinese history. Prior to that year tradition reigned supreme, and all foreign nations were considered as distant uncivilized peoples whose best fortune lay in becoming vassals of the Middle Kingdom. A preliminary sign of change came in 1839–1842, when China suffered defeat in the Opium War with Great Britain. The defeat, humiliating as it was at the time, proved insufficient to shake China's inertia and was soon almost forgotten. The age of change had, however, arrived. Internal rebellion flashed up in the fifties. In addition, a new war with France and Britain started in 1856. In 1860, the emperor was a fugitive at Jehol; his summer palace was burned down by the invaders; a humiliating “unequal” treaty was concluded. The wound was too deep to be ignored, and the ground for reform was prepared.

An interesting question raised by the foregoing study is the extent to which pre-Kemalist Turkey offered a status quo. Did the Ottoman dynasty and its associated bureaucracy seek to maintain a stasis throughout its domains and to resist the inroads of change from without? If so, there is then the contrast, following the suggestions made by Deutsch, with the Kemalist revolution where an avid quest for innovation became the keynote. It is of course true that one tends to be so impressed by the social revolution engineered by Kemal Atatiirk, one of the most dramatic figures of modern political history, that the antecedents of the radical changes in Turkey following World War I are all but forgotten. Clearly, if Atatiirk was successful in changing the face of Turkey, it was on the basis of what had gone before.

When the Habsburg dynasty had finally driven back the Turks, repopulation of the Alföld (the Great Hungarian Plain) began. The policies that were adopted reshaped the whole ethnic structure of the region. Under Turkish rule the Hungarians had become not only impoverished but greatly depleted in numbers. In Slavonia there were no Hungarians left at all and very few were left in the southern hahf of de Bácska, between the Franz Joseph Canal and the Danube, or in the Bánát, or in the counties of Tolna and Baranya in Transdanubia, or in the north.

The economic activities of Buddhist monasteries have frequently been noted. In regard to Tibetan Lamaist monasteries some writers have assumed that these activities indicate the “corruption” or “degeneration” of pure Buddhist ideals. On the other hand many have expressed wonder at the generosity with which Lamaist laymen will give, sometimes impoverishing themselves, to support their religion. Attention too seldom has been drawn to the means by which gifts are translated into religious merit for the donors, whether these be monks or laymen. It is the mechanism of translation that explains the universal economic success of Buddhist monasticism.

The thesis underlying this essay may be summarized as follows: The modern European concepts frontier, state and nation are interdependent but they are not necessarily applicable to all state-like political organisations everywhere. In default of adequate documentary materials most historians of South-East Asia have tended to assume that the states with which they have to deal were Nation-States occupied by named “Peoples” and separated from each other by precise political frontiers. The inferences that have been made on the basis of these initial assumptions sometimes conflict with sociological common sense. It is not the anthropologist's task to write history, but if history is to be elaborated with the aid of inspired guesses then the special knowledge of the anthropologist becomes relevant so as to point up the probabilities.

Les Chinois de Madagascar ont une vie sociale particulière et très caractéristique. Ils ont adapté et transformé leurs coutumes, adopté des habitudes qui leur étaient étrangères en les modifiant à leur gré, ce qui en fait une communauté spéciale, curieuse et intéressante. Pour citer quelques exemples, les Chinois continuent à manger de la cuisine chinoise exclusivement, mais ils ont presque totalement abandonné l'usage des chop-sticks; ils utilisent la cuiller et la fourchette, mais pas de couteau, la cuisine chinoise étant présentée découpée dans les plats. Hommes et femmes s'habillent à l'européenne, et ce n'est que très rarement, lors de certaines fêtes, que quelques jeunes filles portent la robe chinoise fendue sur les cotés (ch'i-p'ao).

Professor Miller adds more information to help build up a knowledge of how Lamaist monasteries have functioned in the recent past. Such monasteries performed (and in some cases still perform) not only religious and social functions but political and economic ones. As regards their internal financial systems, they seem to have had similar organizations all of which varied somewhat according to local environments. But Professor Miller comments on one common thread: the uisa system, and appraises its significance for the original spread of Inner Asian monasticism, for the fluctuations in fortunes of individual monasteries, and for the economy as a whole.

In this paper an attempt is made to study the marriage customs and family relationships of the titular peerage and the 500 or so leading county families who together formed the dominant political and social grouping of Tudor and Stuart England. Generalisations here made apply only to this restricted class and not necessarily to those below it. When it comes to be investigated, the behaviour of the lesser gentry, the yeomanry, the peasantry and the merchants may well show significant differences from the model set by their betters.

It is only human perhaps to approach a problem from the point of view of a discipline one knows and to find this approach illuminating and the approach from any other discipline obfuscating. Nevertheless some scholars have been able to utilize without confusion the results of other disciplines. Still others have wisely admitted their incompetence to control the results of the other disciplines and have ignored them entirely and proceeded to deal with their problem in their own way.

The majority of Singapore Chinese originate from the rural areas of Kwangtung and Fukien provinces. They had already started to immigrate in relatively large numbers by the late nineteenth century, that is before the traditional society of the countryside had been greatly disturbed by new political events and ideas. The social systems Chinese developed in Singapore therefore have been considerably influenced by those existing in “traditional” times in the homeland. Yet they have also been very much modified by the new social environment of Singapore. Overseas Chinese have been free to associate according to a number of principles not open to them in their home villages. New alignments have resulted from the immigration of a body of people of diverse origins and from the heterogenous structure of urban occupations. They become manifest in organisations set up for a number of different kinds of activity.