Je me propose de discuter la question du réalisme du point de vue de la reformulation sémantique qu'en a donnée Michael Dummett. Si l'on accepte au départ avec Dummett que la question du réalisme soit une question sémantique au sens où elle trouverait éventuellement sa résolution dans la forme que devrait prendre une theorie systématique de la signification, et si l'on admet également avec Dummett que c'est la notion de vérité et non celle de référence qui est au coeur de la question du réalisme, la conclusion qui suit, aussi etonnante qu'elle puisse paraître du point de vue de la tradition philosophique, est que le nominalisme est une forme de réalisme dans la mesure où il partagerait avec le réalisme la même conception de la vérité.

Charles Taylor begins his essay “Kant's Theory of Freedom” by stating that in the last three centuries people have sought recognition, equality and justice as corollaries of “liberation”. The process, he says, “has been punctuated, and partly shaped, by paradigm statements by major thinkers …. Among these statements, Kant's has been very important. It marked a crucial step on the way.” Similar sentiments are expressed by Hayek, Rawls and others.

In every search for knowledge one presupposes that there is more to the phenomenal field one studies than what meets the eye. A play between those phenomena that present themselves to an observer and absent entities or phenomena, and the orders, structures or laws that govern these, lies at the heart of any search for empirical knowledge. On the basis of this play of presence and absence read by a particular discourse into (or out of) a more or less defined phenomenal field, phenomena are constituted qua signs for that discourse's participants.

It is nearly ten years since Quebec held its referendum on Sovereignty Association and time, perhaps, for a retrospective. There were winners and losers in 1980, but the real winner may have been the idea that sovereignty may be established democratically. Governments, of course, are quick to agree that people have the right to determine their sovereignty democratically—so long as this takes place in the State of Nature invented by Hobbes for just such august occasions. Only thrice to my knowledge, however, have governments actually allowed anything even remotely close to a social contract, once in Norway in 1905, once in Wales in 1979 and again in Quebec in 1980.

In his thoughtful paper, “The Liberal Tradition, Kant, and the Pox”, Rolf George joins the venerable argument about whether Kant should be accounted friend or foe of liberals. But this is not just a rehearsal of the debate over the compatibility of the Old Jacobin's defense of civil liberties and government by consent with his notoriously unpleasant doctrines of the absolute duty to obey the law or his ruthlessly retributive view of punishment. George advances the debate by suggesting that elements of Kant's moral theory are deeply incompatible with liberalism. And this is particularly striking when liberals like John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin and Robert Nozick are quick to invoke Kant's name in defense of their own views. The attraction of Kant for these modern (and American) liberals is clear, for they hold individualistic moral theories and they reject utilitarianism. But, if George is right, there are aspects of Kant's thought which make him an unsuitable mascot.

Dans son article nécrologique sur Abraham Robinson, Simon Kochen consignait une impression de Gödel qui ne manquera pas d'intéresser un grand nombre de spécialistes de Leibniz. Gödel, dont il faut rappeler l'intérêt particulier pour les travaux philosophiques de Leibniz, pensait en effet que, de tous les logiciens modernes, Abraham Robinson était celui qui avait le mieux réalisé l'idéal leibnizien d'une logique constituée en ars inveniendi pour les mathématiques. Nous voudrions examiner ici à quel aspect de l' ars inveniendi selon Leibniz ce jugement rend justice et quelle caractéristique de la logique contemporaine il fait ressortir. S'agissant des travaux d'Abraham Robinson, nous nous intéresserons surtout au secteur de la théorie des modèles, bien que celui-ci n'ait pas l'exclusivité de mettre en oeuvre l'idée que les résultats logiques sont propres à faciliter la découverte mathématique.

In two separate studies, published some four years apart, Robert McRae has argued the provocative thesis that the idea of extension is not to be numbered among the ideas accounted innate by Descartes, but among the adventitious. He has defended this view despite explicit statements to the contrary by Descartes both in the Correspondence and in the second part of the Principles of Philosophy. Against such evidence McRae has urged the overriding importance of the sixth Meditation, where, he alleges, Descartes asserts “unequivocally… that the idea of extension is produced in us by bodies and is therefore not innate” (147; my emphasis). It is only in the later of the two studies that McRae's reasons for regarding the testimony of the sixth Meditation as authoritative are fully spelt out. Express statements to the contrary “must give away”, he writes, “for the proof of the existence of body by the adventitious idea of it is absolutely crucial to the Meditations” (L 100; my emphasis). In this paper I propose to challenge McRae's interpretation of the extension of the concept “innate idea”, while acknowledging his signal contribution to the clearing up of the intensional meaning, or rather meanings, of the concept of innateness. My thesis is that “extension” is an innate idea, though constraints of time will allow me to do little more than try to show that McRae's stated reasons for rejecting this view are not compelling.

Dans les Recherches philosophiques, Wittgenstein consacre une série importante de remarques au problème du «langage privé». Un langage privé, d'après la définition qu'il donne dans ces passages, est un langage dont les mots sont censés se référer «à ce dont seul celui qui parle peut avoir connaissance; à ses sensations immédiates et privées […]» (243). Le résultat bien connu de sa discussion est que non seulement il n'y a pas en fait, mais il n'est pas possible qu'il existe un tel langage; pour lui, un langage doit être nécessairement «public», c'est-à-dire parlé par plusieurs locuteurs. De l'avis de tous les commentateurs, ces remarques sur le thème du langage privé occupent une place centrale dans les Recherches, mais les opinions diffèrent sur la façon dont on devrait les interpréter. Dans ce qui suit, je défends l'interprétation d'après laquelle sa discussion doit se comprendre en la replaçant dans le cadre d'une philosophie du langage. De façon plus précise, j'essayerai de montrer quel est le lien entre l'«argument du langage privé», comme le désignent les interprètes, l'argument qu'il avance contre l'idée qu'il pourrait exister un langage comme celui-là, et ses vues sur le langage et la signification. Il y a en réalité, je pense, non pas un mais deux «arguments du langage privé» et les deux arguments, que je vais exposer, visent indirectement à mettre en relief une conception d'ensemble du langage, celle qu'il met de l'avant dans ses Recherches, et non pas seulement, de façon plus étroite, une conception ayant trait au langage des sensations (bien que beaucoup de ses remarques se rapportent au problème du langage des sensations). Comme je le dirai aussi plus loin, cette image du langage qu'offre Wittgenstein dans les Recherches soulève une difficulté, si je l'interprète correctement, mais celle-ci n'enlève rien à l'intérêt philosophique de ses remarques.

Les travaux de Fred Sommers dans le domaine de l'ontologie (l'étude des catégories) ont été l'objet, jusqu'à présent, de beaucoup moins d'attention critique qu'ils ne sont aptes à en susciter. C'est au cours des années soixante que Sommers a élaboré sa théorie et qu'il l'a rendue publique par le moyen d'une série d'articles et de conférences. Bien que ses travaux aient alors fait l'objet de quelques critiques ou commentaires, ils ont, depuis, généralement été passés sous silence. Récemment, la revue Monist a fait paraître un numéro spécial entièrement consacré au thème des catégories. Considérant le thème, l'importance et la qualité des articles regroupés dans ce numéro, il est surprenant de constater que les idées hautement originales et suggestives de Sommers ne soient mentionnées par aucun des auteurs. Evidemment, une des raisons pour lesquelles les idées de Sommers suscitent présentement si peu d'intérêt est le fait que, depuis la fin des années soixante, il a lui-même laissé de côté l'ontologie pour se tourner vers la logique—un domaine où il a fait et fait toujours couler beaucoup d'encre.

A paper which succeeds in being erudite, yet lively, and which tells an amusing tale without digressing from its theme, deserves great admiration. Such is Professor George's discussion of Kant and liberalism. He first points out briefly that in fact Kant exercised small influence on liberal thought in the nineteenth century. The bulk of his paper is devoted to the question of whether Kant was a liberal at all and to justifying his unconventional negative answer. In the course of so doing he presents the diverting tale of the ingenuous young aristocrat who solicits Kant's opinion as to whether one's wife should be inoculated against the pox. But the diversion is pertinent. Kant's two answers to the question reveal two different ways in which the Kantian moral theory, sententiously expressed in the so-called “categorical imperative”, might be incompatible with liberal opinion.

There are at issue here, I believe, two related questions: What is an adventitious idea for Descartes, and what is the relation between the understanding and the senses? Miles asserts that there is an adventitious idea of body but that it consists only of the proper sensibles, i.e., colours, sounds, tastes, odours, etc. Only these are given through the senses. Extension is not included in the adventitious idea, but is given only to the understanding. I take this to mean also that the modes of extension, figure, motion and magnitude, are not given through the senses either, since the thought of them presupposes extension. Against this I would say, however, that there are passages in which Descartes seems definitely to be including extension and its modes in what is given through the senses. In Meditation III when he introduces the notion of the adventitious idea it is as one which seems to be produced by external bodies. In his ideas of corporeal things he finds a few which he clearly perceives: extension, figure, relative position and change of positions. His ideas of the other qualities are confused and obscure. In MeditationVI he undertakes to examine the nature of sense, and to enquire whether from those ideas which are apprehended by this mode of thought— “or the mode which I entitle sensing (sensum)” —he could derive any certain proof of the existence of corporeal things. First he perceives by the senses that he has a body. “And outside myself, in addition to the extension, figure and motion of bodies, I sensed (sentiebam) in them” (AT VII, 74f.) hardness, heat, lights and colours, scents and sounds. At the end of the Principles of Philosophy in treating of the senses Descartes says that nothing in external things can be apprehended by us through sense except their figure, size and motion (IV. 198, AT VIII-1, 321). And later he remarks that we observe size, figures and motions by several senses, e.g., by touch, sight and hearing; “we also distinctly imagine and understand this. This cannot be said of other things that come under our senses, such as colours, sound and the like, which are perceived not by several senses but by single ones; for their images are always confused in our minds, nor do we know what they are” (IV. 200, AT VIII-1, 323).

Twenty-three years after its publication, Maurice Merleau-Ponty's The Visible and the Invisible remains a philosophical enigma. Consider, for example, the curious niche the work occupies within the body of phenomenological literature. The Visible and the Invisible is frequently cited for its study of the residual problem areas of phenomenology—the relationship of consciousness to the perceptual milieu and, more recently, the relationship of language to the world—while its proposed solutions to such problems remain largely ignored.

In what follows I will sketch a very simple possible-world semantics which will allow us to sharpen the notion of a non-reductive, but materialist, mind-body identity theory. This simple semantics will enable us to characterize the various possible positions on mind-body identity and display the range of positions with respect to psycho-physical reduction. Though I am sympathetic to a non-reductive position which I label “autonomous monism”, I will be concerned here less with presenting positive arguments for that position than with describing a framework in which such arguments can be made and pointing out the issues that the position raises. The discussion achieves its abstract viewpoint at the cost of slightly idealizing the process of theory reduction, but the overview attained is worth the price.

L'histoire de la philosophie voit d'abord en Hobbes un spécialiste de la philosophie politique, au point qu'on en oublie souvent l'importance du reste de son oeuvre. Sans doute, il n'est pas faux d'insister sur la contribution hobbienne à la philosophie politique. Et de l'avis de Hobbes lui-même, c'est dans ce domaine qu'il avait été particulièrement novateur. Cependant, son ambition était plus large: il voulait construire un système entier de philosophie, dont la politique ne devait représenter que la dernière partie. En effet, selon l'ordre de sa grande oeuvre, les Eléments de la philosophie, l'exposé du système total se divisait en trois grands livres: Du corps, De l'homme et Du citoyen. Apparemment, le système devait donc se composer des trois parties suivantes: une physique, une anthropologie et une science politique. En fait, le premier volume, sur le corps, comporte également la méthodologie, la logique et la philosophie première. La division en trois a pourtant sa vérité, et même une vérité troublante si l'on prend au sérieux la volonté hobbienne de constituer un système rigoureux dans lequel les sciences de l'homme et de la politique résulteraient de celle des corps en général, en ce sens du moins que les dernières sciences supposeraient les principes des premières. Car il semble que Hobbes ait admis une certaine autonomie des trois grandes parties de son système, au point que, par exemple, la politique paraît pouvoir trouver son propre fondement en elle-même, sans référence particulière aux développements de la physique.

It will come as no surprise that I have a different interpretation of the four passages in which, McRae claims, Descartes “definitely includes extension and its modes in what is given through the senses”. In the first, Descartes includes extension, etc., among his ideas of corporeal bodies. This is not to say that he includes them among his adventitious ideas, though. All adventitious ideas are ideas of external bodies. But the converse is not true. Not all ideas of corporeal bodies are ipso facto adventitious ideas, for, as I see it, the idea of the true and immutable nature of body is non-sensible and innate. McRae slides from “all adventitious ideas seem to be ideas of external bodies” to “all ideas of external bodies (including extension) are adventitious”.

The problem I want to raise in this paper will not be a problem for anyone who does not share both the following concerns or prejudices. The first is that we should take a materialist, extensional approach to linguistic meaning, specifically, the approach that is suggested by the work of Donald Davidson. The second is that social analysis must be emancipatory, and that this requires the conceptual possibility of postulating social structures that are in some sense hidden by discourse. The problem I want to address lies in a possible conflict between these concerns, both of which I will clarify, though not justify (except in so far as we take their compatibility to be apart of their respective justifications). The problem is this: Does the methodological core of Davidson's semantics—the principle of charity—permit interpretation informed by a concept of ideological concealment?

As with many of our philosophical problems, the existence of this one is quite precarious. We can avoid avoiding it only if we move along a rather specific route, which, I am afraid, will constitute a good chunk of my paper.

Early in the Second Meditation Descartes has found grounds to doubt his previous opinions, and following his resolve to reject as false anything not entirely indubitable, he rejects these opinions. He then asks whether there might remain something impervious to doubt that he has not yet considered. One item as yet unconsidered is his own existence:

I myself, am I not at least something? But I have already denied that I had senses and body. Yet I hesitate, for what follows from that? Am I so dependent on body and senses that I cannot exist without these? But I was persuaded that there was nothing in all the world, that there was no heaven, no earth, that there were no minds, nor any bodies: was I not then likewise persuaded that I did not exist? (HR I, 150)

Suppose that we have negative, natural rights to our lives, liberty, and possessions and that these rights are absolute or indefeasible. Then at best only minimal states will be legitimate, where such are states that restrict their activities to the enforcement of the basic rights of individuals and the like. (Indeed, it is possible that no actual states, minimal or not, will be legitimate.) Such appears to be the consequence of absolute natural rights. When made aware of these implications of absolute natural rights, many philosophers deny their existence. In the absence of a convincing defense of absolute natural rights, the defense of the minimal state thereby loses force.

Hypothetical contractarians hold that justice is defined by a contract which would (rationally) be made in some specified situation. The characterization of this situation is a matter of great controversy. If it is taken to be our real-life situation, obvious counterexamples arise. Previous acts of predation may make rational an agreement which could hardly be called “just”. Various alternative characterizations have been offered with a variety of justifications. Still, this is a difficult point in contractarian theory.

David Gauthier distinguishes maximizing given the actions others do from maximizing given the happiness others get, and maintains that universal conformities to the first rule coincide with equilibria in utility spaces of possible interactions, whereas universal conformities to the second coincide with optima. In Part One of the present paper some of his views concerning these matters of technical detail are tested under a variety of interpretations, and against a range of situations including most prominently situations in which actions of agents are interdependent. Several limitations and needed qualifications are discovered.