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Volume 31 - March 2015

Contents

Page 2 of 3

Articles

  • HAUSMAN AND MCPHERSON ON WELFARE ECONOMICS AND PREFERENCE SATISFACTION THEORIES OF WELFARE: A CRITICAL NOTE

  • Alexander F. Sarch
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    19 February 2015, pp. 141-159

  • Hausman and McPherson defend welfare economics by claiming that even if welfare does not consist in preference satisfaction, preferences still provide good, if fallible, evidence of welfare. I argue that this strategy does not yet fully solve the problems for welfare economics stemming from the preference satisfaction theory of welfare. More work is needed to show that our self-interested preferences are sufficiently reliable, or in some other sense our best, evidence of well-being. Thus, my aim is to identify the challenges that remain and clarify what additional work is needed before Hausman and McPherson's defence of welfare economics succeeds.

Reviews

Reply

  • OPPORTUNITY AND PREFERENCE LEARNING: A REPLY TO CHRISTIAN SCHUBERT

  • Robert Sugden
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    07 May 2015, pp. 297-303

  • This paper replies to Christian Schubert's critical review of my work on opportunity as a normative criterion. Schubert argues that the criterion I have proposed would not command general assent because it does not recognize the legitimacy of individuals’ preferences for achieving self-development by constraining their future opportunities. I argue that my account of the ‘responsible agent’ is compatible with self-development, and that preferences for self-constraint are less common than Schubert suggests. For the purposes of normative economics, my opportunity criterion is much more generally applicable than Schubert's criterion of ‘opportunity to learn’.

Reviews

Front Cover (OFC, IFC) and matter

  • EAP volume 31 issue 3 Cover and Front matter

  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    22 September 2015, pp. f1-f3
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Reviews

Back Cover (IBC, OBC) and matter

  • EAP volume 31 issue 3 Cover and Back matter

  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    22 September 2015, pp. b1-b10
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Reviews

Front Cover (OFC, IFC) and matter

  • EAP volume 31 issue 1 Cover and Front matter

  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    19 February 2015, pp. f1-f4
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Reviews

Back Cover (IBC, OBC) and matter

  • EAP volume 31 issue 1 Cover and Back matter

  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    19 February 2015, pp. b1-b4
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Page 2 of 3