Donaldson argues that agreeing with Hardin to banish deontological justifications from international discussion amounts to abandoning the power of deontology to interpret political intent and to establish hard limits on political behavior. The moral language of deontology may not be sufficient for the moral interpretation of international affairs, he admits, but does turn out to be necessary.

As part of the roundtable, “Ethics and the Future of the Global Food System,” this essay examines how the key decisions within the global system of food production are shaped by the organization of the global political economy. The understanding of the global political economy follows standard definitions that focus on the dominant market practices and the institutional structures within which those practices are embedded. I identify examples of market practices and institutional policies that structurally impair the ability of states to secure the human rights of their citizens, and explain specific issues of structural injustice raised by each example. The conclusion provides a survey of a range of alternative solutions for transforming the global political economy and creating the conditions for a more just and ecologically sustainable food system. Ultimately, our conception of human rights and the mechanisms for their protection and enforcement must change in order to address the scale and gravity of problems affecting the future of agriculture and our ability to feed the world.

Although humanitarian intervention is never politically neutral, Mapel maintains that this point can be overdrawn. Arguing that humanitarian agencies cannot always actively pursue political agendas, Mapel asserts that the objectives of such missions must be determined on a case-by-case basis. Pushing the issue a step further, he argues that in deciding whether there is an obligation to intervene, the nature of the conflict, the costs and risks of intervention, and other factors must all be taken into consideration. Mapel concludes in support of Winston's call for a standing UN military force for humanitarian interventions but notes that debates over the objectives of interventions and the nature of justice in complex situations remain obstacles to the establishment of such a force.

Brzezinski shapes his discussion around three “new dimensions” of human rights: the protection of human rights from the arbitrary power of the state, the institutionalization of democracy, and the need to confront the potential exploitation of human individuality by science. Brzezinski predicts that the interface between ethics and science will be the new frontier of politics, and it will place on the shoulders of democratic leaders, and ultimately on all those who are concerned with human rights, the obligation to be at least part-time scientists and philosophers.

Korea became known as the Hermit Kingdom at the end of the nineteenth century when it had withdrawn into itself under the threats of its neighbors-China, Russia, and Japan. This characterization has endured through this century even despite Korea's internal war and the involvement of the international community in that conflict. The election of Roh Tae Woo marked the beginning of a new stage in Korean politics: “the period of Korean-style democracy.” Robert Myers follows the historical eras and events leading up to this change and predicts a less threatening, less Confucian politics for the Korea of the future.

Whence does international law derive its normative force as law in a world that remains, in many respects, one where legitimate politics is practiced primarily at the national level? As with domestically focused legal theories, one standard answer is positivistic: the law's authority is based on its origin in agreed procedures of consent. This is certainly plausible with respect to treaty obligations and commitments that derive from the United Nations Charter, but it leaves customary international law vulnerable to legitimacy critiques—of which there is no shortage among international law skeptics. Even with respect to conventional international norms, such as treaty provisions, there is often a sense that such consent is democratically thinner than the public consent to domestic law, particularly fundamental domestic law, constitutional norms, and derivative principles of legitimate governance. State consent in international law, in this view, is often a very imperfect proxy for democratic consent to international legal norms. While it is obvious to international lawyers why (as a matter of positive law doctrine) state consent should make international norms prevail over domestic norms to which there is arguably deeper democratic consent, persistent critics of international law have questioned whether this should be so as a matter of legitimacy.