The European Union has been tightening its grip on the criminal laws of the member states. Article 31 of the Treaty on European Union introduced the framework decision as the appropriate instrument to harmonize criminal law. In this way, member states may be required to adopt minimum levels of criminal definitions and sanctions. This is a matter of ‘third pillar’ law. The case under scrutiny, however, is a perfect illustration of the delicate relationship between EU first pillar law and domestic criminal law.

Constitutional limits to the discretion of the legislature in forming the electoral system — Political equality — Equal suffrage — Equal opportunities for political parties — Free expression of popular will — Functionality of the parliament — Concrete normative standards for assessing the constitutionality of an electoral system — Conception of parliamentary democracy emphasising representation of political minorities and protection from ‘tyranny of the majority’

Both the EU- and the EC-Treaties refer in prominent places to the establishment of economic and monetary union (Articles 2 EU and EC). This union is mentioned as one of the principal means of achieving the Union's and the Community's economic and social objectives. Such a prominent place is not allotted it in the Constitution. In its effort to separate the basic provisions from the other provisions in the treaties, the Convention decided to retain only the European Union's objectives in the actual constitutional part. The concrete activities pertaining to the economic and monetary union, as well as its ‘guiding principles’ of stable prices, sound public finances and monetary conditions and a sustainable balance of payments were relegated to Part III that deals with the Union's policies.

Interrelation between economic and political dimensions of constitutionalism – European market integration and erosion of democratic representation within Member States of the EU – Regulatory externalities between national democracies – European market citizenship and its ramifications for democratically legitimate exercise of the power to tax – Underinclusiveness of domestic democratic process – Political representation beyond the state – European economic constitution as a source of political empowerment and the EU economic freedoms as political rights – The European Court of Justice as a protector of representation – Reinforcing political participation through regulatory competition – European market freedoms enhance representation but at the expense of political equality – Economic freedoms as insufficient means of political empowerment – Improving democratic representation and equality beyond the state requires properly political citizenship instead of mere market rights

Sincerity of belief as a condition for the protection of Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights – Three types of insincerity in the context of freedom of belief – Parody religions – Fraudulent religions – Conceptual linkage between insincerity and ulterior motive – Insincerity defined as demanding to practise one’s ‘belief’ while solely having an ulterior motive – Circumstances that should not be considered evidence of insincerity: implausible manifestations, inconsistency with co-believers – Circumstances that should be considered evidence of insincerity: obvious unseriousness, ignorance, personal inconsistency – Comparison to rejected and accepted forms of evidence of insincerity in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights – Burden of proof in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.

‘The Law of Laws’ – Overcoming Pluralism

Editorials in this journal are meant not to comment on acts or events, even if these take the form of judicial rulings or legislative acts. They are meant to point at the events' potential for constitutional scholarship; to indicate and propose new lines of research. The Kadi judgments of the Court of Justice's two instances, discussed in this issue by Stefan Griller, offer such an occasion. They point at the problem of relationships between legal orders. Can these best be understood under the now familiar palliative terms of ‘dialogue’ and ‘accommodation’? There is both reason and reward in looking for a keener articulation of the relationships. That is the contention of this editorial.

Notion of constitutional concept varies over time and space. Constitution for Europe as a further step in guaranteeing rights and separating powers. Amongst others French, Italian, German and Swedish national concepts in the Treaties of the European Communities and of the European Union. Several causes for difficult tracing of national concepts in the Constitution for Europe. Convention method: instead of by diplomats and EU experts, drafting by members of Parliament and (former) members of Government. More room for national concepts. The Intergovernmental Conference: the Empire strikes back, but with mixed impact. Parallels with other constitution making procedures. Concept of constitution: structure and size no argument for denying constitutional character; Constitution octroyée v. contrat social; Franco-American revolution v. British tradition.

We as constitutionalists owe it to ourselves and even to the 500 million other citizens of a member state and of the Union at the same time, to come up with a legally and constitutionally readable understanding of the situation. It must not be one suffering from the split between international and domestic public law. It must not mystify the Union as a completely original structure, intelligible only in its own terms. Such understanding should encompass not only the limits but also the logic of the situation; not only its mechanics but also its evolution. It should be intelligible for the public. It should allow for the multiple dualities of loyalty, of function, of legitimacy. It should allow for shared authority. Constitutional thought is well equipped to deal with actual duality and ambivalence. These characteristics of the Union are real and are here to stay.

Since the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, the principle of subsidiarity is to govern the exercise of powers between the European Community and the Member States in areas that do not fall within the exclusive competence of the Community. According to the treaty provision, the principle means that the Community can only take action if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community. A similar provision is now part of the draft ‘European Constitution’ 2003; it merely adds that Member State action can be taken at the national, the regional and the local level. Even without this useless supplement, the definition of subsidiarity looks fairly complicated.

While the Nice Treaty cast a shadow over the Convention's work on the institutions and led to the project's first failure in the Brussels Summit, the war in Iraq cast shadows over the common foreign and security agenda. On the one hand, it proved the extent to which Europe is divided over substantive positions and over the means to act, particularly the resort to war. On the other hand, there is an increased popular sense that Europe should play a role (reflected in Eurobarometer polls, including one especially commissioned by Giscard). Article I-40 of the Draft Constitution on defence reflects that ambition. It remains to be seen whether this facilitates Europe to unite when it comes to giving foreign policy teeth in the form of a real and effective common ‘defence’ policy.

As with most other provisions of the Constitution, Article I-40 in the main builds on and consolidates the texts as we already have them in the existing Treaties, but at the same time, it innovates.