Rarely has international law been investigated from a Business to Agency (B2A) or even Agency to Agency (A2A) perspective. In recent years, the “mushrooming” of agencies at European level has triggered the importance of looking more closely into the relationship of the agencies towards each other. Is there a struggle over competences and regulatory objects, and would such competition lead to desirable outcomes? In this paper I will first show that, due to the historical development of administrative law in Europe and the USA, the perception of the desirability of agency competition differs. I will then contrast these findings with EU pharmaceutical law and show that it tends to avoid competition. Also, in practice, competition among agencies is still exceptional for European pharmaceutical regulation. Finally, I conclude these findings and hint at the limits of the desired process for further coherence. Although a move towards even greater convergence in European risk regulation is desirable, it does have its limits set by the principle of conferral in Article 5 (1, 2) EU read in conjunction with the areas of shared competence and the competence to support, coordinate and supplement.