A collateral challenge impugns the validity of an administrative decision in a proceeding that is not specifically designed for the modification or setting aside of that decision. On the current state of the law, there is a presumption in favour of collateral challenge in an inferior court, which can be displaced by a contrary legislative intention. I argue, however, that the current presumption lacks a clear doctrinal basis, and that it places too much emphasis on statutory interpretation as a useful tool for rebutting, or indeed vindicating, the starting presumption (let alone determining what administrative law ‘grounds’ a collateral challenge might encompass). I suggest a rearticulation of the presumption as an expression of a defendant’s entitlement to vindicate legal rights. I point out, however, that contemporary norms of administrative law may otherwise demand a stricter approach to permitting collateral challenges. On this alternative view, a challenger must identify clear legislative authorisation for what is essentially a judicial review function.

Over the last three decades, Australian administrative law decisions about who will be allowed to stay in Australia have led to more interaction and tension between the elected government (Parliament and Ministry) and the judiciary than any other subject matter. This interaction has been intensified by Parliament’s attempts to amend the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to codify judicial review and the procedures to be followed when making decisions under the Act. These amendments were made with the specific aim of minimising, if not practically eliminating, the judiciary’s influence over executive decision-making. However, this outcome has not been achieved. Rather, through a thousand cuts, or more literally cases, the codification efforts of Parliament have been weakened. Instead, the judiciary has put in place an overarching judicial review framework centred on the inherently flexible concept of jurisdictional error. This framework places equal emphasis on both express and implied statutory obligations and procedures. Express procedures have often being interpreted to include judicially created natural justice-like obligations and implied procedures often including other natural justice-like obligations or at least a base level of fairness premised on the constitutionally entrenched premise that the executive cannot decide arbitrarily.

This article considers how the use of referenda to enact constitutional change relates to the concept of a ‘constitution outside the courts’. It argues that the referendum is a challenge to this concept but that these challenges arise in a more complex manner than might first be assumed. First, a referendum occurs within a legal framework which calls into question the notion of the referendum as an extra-legal interruption to the constitutional order. Secondly, this suggests that the referendum is more likely to be the end point of a process of constitutional change rather than the vehicle or impetus for it. This means that the relevant developments may occur elsewhere in society. Using Ireland as a case study, the article argues that there is a constitution outside the courts which depends to a significant extent on the mediating influence of multiple actors—including the courts.

The article departs from the discussion of constitutional mobilisation—the ‘process by which social actors employ constitutional norms and discourses to advocate for constitutional change’—to introduce the concept of constitutional resistance—the public invocation of constitutional norms and principles, in defence of a distinctive view of constitutionalism, in opposition to governing or reform action by the authorities. Constitutional mobilisation and resistance are theorized on an interdisciplinary and conceptual basis, suggesting that the study of the critical role of societal actors in constitutional politics and in ‘constituent conflicts’ remains so far underexplored. The analysis of constitutional resistance is particularly relevant in the contexts of authoritarian societies or democratic societies that face increasing populist and authoritarian challenges. The article first briefly explores various scholarly approaches that provide considerable contributions for the development of a political sociology of constitutional mobilisation. It subsequently discusses constitutional mobilisation and focuses in particular on constitutional resistance, a so far undiscussed dimension of constitutional mobilisation, exemplifying the latter by briefly exploring the cases of Italy and Poland.

The High Court currently applies two different tests to determine the validity of laws that effectively burden the implied freedom of political communication (‘IFPC’) under the Constitution—a test of ‘structured proportionality’ and one of ‘calibrated scrutiny’. Both tests have potential advantages, and disadvantages, but there is also a case that, over time, the Court should again adopt a single approach to assessing the validity of laws burdening the IFPC. The article therefore explores what it might mean to create a true hybrid between the two current approaches—that is, a test of ‘calibrated proportionality’. Such an approach, it suggests, should be understood as having three key dimensions: first, explaining how and when certain context-specific ‘calibrating’ factors could usefully inform a test of ‘necessity’ and ‘adequacy in the balance’ under a test of structured proportionality; second, showing how attention to constitutional values can help calibrate the intensity of the Court’s application of the tests; and third, suggesting a well-identified continuum for calibrating the intensity of judicial review, based on four broad categories of case.

The Uluru Statement from the Heart offers an opportunity to reorder the Australian constitutional hierarchy as it relates to First Nations. The proposal for a First Nations Voice provides a tailored, structural response to the experiences of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people under the Australian state. For the First Nations Voice to meet this potential, it will require more than careful design of the Voice as a new constitutional institution; it will require existing constitutional institutions within the legislature and executive to learn to ‘listen’. This article draws on the political and democratic listening literature to examine how political listening might be practised at the interface between the First Nations Voice and existing constitutional institutions. We suggest five principles to guide this cross-institutional relationship together with ways these principles might be incorporated into governance structures.

This article examines the claim that the adoption of structured proportionality analysis is not well suited to the Australian constitutional context and argues that this claim is mistaken. Structured proportionality analysis is sometimes associated with a strong commitment to fundamental constitutional rights which is, it is conceded, foreign to Australia. However, structured proportionality can also be understood merely as a method of analysis which changes the High Court’s previous approach only slightly. This argument clears the way for the adoption of proportionality in Australia. However, it is also argued that the positive case for its adoption is inconclusive. Proportionality promises an increase in transparency by isolating the balancing element of the analysis. However, it is unclear how much difference this somewhat minor adjustment will make in practice and those advantages must, in any event, be measured against the cost of distraction and confusion created by doctrinal innovation. Finally, the article addresses ‘calibrated scrutiny’, Gageler J’s preferred form of analysis. It is argued that this approach offers some advantages. However, it need not be seen as an alternative to the proportionality method. On the contrary, the two approaches could be reconciled and a form of proportionality used as a manner for better development of the law.

According to a conventional story told by scholars, the Australian Constitution is virtually invisible as a symbol within Australian political debate and culture. This article challenges that conventional story, arguing that the Constitution plays a more significant public role than is commonly assumed. Analysing the ongoing debate over the constitutional recognition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, the article highlights four prominent symbolic Constitutions: the practical, the liberal, the outdated and the exclusionary. These constitutional symbols are mobilised by different political actors for a range of political purposes. Understanding constitutional symbolism helps in seeing the ideological work performed by the Constitution outside the courts and prompts constitutional scholars to be more conscious of how they contribute to that ideological work through their representations of the Constitution.

In 1840, some of the sovereign nations of Māori signed te Tiriti o Waitangi (the Māori language version of the Treaty of Waitangi) with the British Crown. Hone Heke was the first Māori leader of the northern nation of Ngāpuhi to sign, but by 1844 he was leading a significant revolt against British colonialism in Aotearoa New Zealand by chopping down British flagpoles erected on his lands. While Māori may have initially welcomed the intent of te Tiriti as a means for seeking British help to protect their international borders, the British prioritised the English version of the Treaty which recorded the transfer of sovereignty from Māori to the British. As the British transposed their dominant legal traditions of governance, including bringing to the fore their doctrine of parliamentary supremacy, Māori have been seeking their survival ever since. We extend this by focusing on why the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty needs to adapt to the Treaty’s promise of bicultural power sharing.