The outbreak of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (hereinafter BSE) in Europe has brought about serious tensions and fears – not only among consumers, but also among the national and European authorities responsible for risk management. Faced with the incapacity of the existing system to control the situation, on the one hand, and the need to restore consumers’ confidence on the other, the EU and national regulators felt obliged to repair the weaknesses as soon as possible. However, remedial actions undertaken at the time of the BSE crisis were not always the product of thorough consultations and they were often not well coordinated. Thus, they became a source of disagreement among the various actors in play. The case Commission v. France, which I will examine more closely in this paper, illustrates such a conflict among the national and European scientific authorities. The judgment was delivered in 2001, but the problem of the successful integration of science into the regulatory decision-making process of the EU still remains unsettled. In this paper I will present suggestions as to how the situation could be influenced by the outcomes of recent reforms of European food safety law and the establishment of the European Food Safety Authority.

On 22 November 2005, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) delivered a judgement in a preliminary ruling procedure from the Arbeitsgericht München (Labour Court Munich), answering questions concerning the interpretation of Clauses 2, 5 and 8 of the Framework Agreement on fixed-term contracts, put into effect by Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999, and as regards the construction of Article 6 of Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation. Essentially, the Arbeitsgericht wanted to know whether a statutory provision exempting employees of 52 years of age and older from limitations to the conclusion of fixed-term contracts was compatible with Community law.

The Article deals with the protection of consumer borrowers and lending investors in peer-to-peer lending within the legal framework provided by EU credit laws. This is the legal framework for EU Member States in the area of loans to consumers. In particular, the article analyses the business model of taking lending decisions on financial technologies (“Fintech”) and big data vis-à-vis the legal obligation of the creditworthiness assessment by lenders. At the same time, it extends the applicability of such a business model to the credit-risk analysis undertaken in the interest of lenders. Ultimately, it questions to what extent EU law caters for peer-to-peer lending, and and to what extent consumers and lenders can find protection. It hints that peer-to-peer lending presents risks for both consumers and lenders, falling short of legal obligations and established practices for their protection.

This contribution discusses National Parliaments’ subsidiarity objections raised in the context of the Early Warning Mechanism (EWM) to the European Public Prosecutor Office proposal, and the European Commission response to them. It argues that National Parliaments raised important points, on how does subsidiarity apply respectively, when the wording of the Treaty grants the Council the option to act, as opposed to an obligation to act; on how to assess the inefficiency of the national level; on how does subsidiarity apply in a geographically fragmented context, and on the legitimacy for the EU to regulate non cross-border behaviors. It criticizes the Commission's hasty dismissal of all National Parliaments’ objections, and its decision to leave the proposal's text untouched. It further argues that the Commission's interpreted the EWM as an arena where to test the political feasibility of the proposal, as it had occurred in the past, rather than as a proper subsidiarity policing mechanism. It finally provides some observation on how this interpretation of the EWM has negative implications to terms of subsidiarity policing, of understanding the substance of the principle, and of input legitimacy.

Frontex has become one of the major players in European external border management. As its powers and resources have increased, so have the challenges surrounding its compliance with fundamental rights. A major concern continues to be how to ensure legal accountability for fundamental rights violations that occur in the context of its activities. While Member States can be held accountable before their own national courts and before international courts, neither of these options are available in relation to Frontex. But it can be brought before the Court of Justice of the European Union to account for the conformity of its conduct with EU law. This Article explores the potential of the EU action for damages to offer a remedy for fundamental rights violations committed by Frontex. It identifies where public liability law falls short of providing a remedy for fundamental rights violations committed by EU bodies, explores the possibilities to close that gap, and assesses the implications this has for Frontex’s liability. The Article argues that the action for damages may be the means to close the accountability gap in the specific case of Frontex, but also more generally in circumstances where EU administration is delivered in the form of informal or factual conduct. If it is to fulfill that role, the CJEU would have to lower the threshold for EU liability where fundamental rights are concerned.

Very seldom has a judgment or advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) received so much media coverage as the recent Advisory Opinion on the Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo rendered on 22 July 2010 in response to a question posed by the General Assembly. The question had been forwarded on behalf of a request by Serbia and was phrased in the following way: “Is the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with international law?”

The new Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Article 81 and 82 of the EC-Treaty, which came into force on 1 May 2004, brings fundamental changes in the application of European competition law. It replaces the Antitrust-Regulation No. 17 which has been in force for more than 40 years. Regulation No. 1/2003 establishes a system of direct applicability of Article 81(3) EC-Treaty, which abandons the requirement of notification as a key element of the old system under Regulation No. 17. Under the new scheme set up by Regulation No. 1/2003 Article 81(3) will be directly applicable. This enables national competition authorities and national courts to apply Article 81 and 82 of the EC-Treaty in their entirety, including paragraph 3 of Article 81. Although the new regulation is to be considered as an important step in strengthening and reinforcing European competition policy, in particular in view of the enlargement of the European Union, the numerous changes involve uncertainties which call for adjustment. The following article gives an overview of the new enforcement system for Articles 81 and 82 of the EC-Treaty, set up by Regulation No. 1/2003.

The international arena is increasingly important in EU legal discourse. Using the word “global” is highly fashionable at present, but what does it mean to refer to this concept? It is not an exaggeration to claim that if “constitutionalism” is added to the picture you have a new catchphrase for understanding the EU legal architecture beyond the nation state and its interrelationship with the external sphere: “Global constitutionalism.” Much of the discussion on the normative dimension of EU powers is centered on the function of the EU as a promoter of values abroad. This is also what the Lisbon Treaty promises as set out in Article 3(5) and Article 21 in the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) by guaranteeing, inter alia, that the EU shall uphold its values in the relationship with the wider world and contribute to the protection of its citizens. As witnessed in the recent judgment on the validity of the EU's Emissions Trading System (ETS), the EU's values may sometimes spill over to the global level. In the ETS case, the Court of Justice set out to make a powerful statement on the importance of environmental protection, even when such concerns extend beyond the borders of Europe. Therefore, the question of global constitutionalism in the EU seems inextricably linked to the normative question of what values the EU should promote or conversely “borrow” from the outside world.

The “unity dogma” has long characterized the European law discourse. In many of its landmark decisions the European Court of Justice had recourse to the “unity argument,” such as in Costa vs. E.N.E.L., where it rightly states that “the executive force of Community law cannot vary from one state to another … without jeopardizing the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty.” Other expressions of the “unity dogma” include the legal principle of non-discrimination enshrined in the fundamental freedoms, which lie at the heart of the single market, or the political concept of acquis communautaire obliging new Member States to subscribe to all existing Community laws. Indeed, the establishment of a supranational legal order requires a continued focus on its uniform application in the Member States without which the effectiveness of European law is at stake. My intention is not to call into question the underlying rationale of this quest for unity. The aim of this contribution is rather to show that the asymmetric non-participation of individual Member States in selected areas of Union activity can be embedded into the existing European legal order and does not contradict its constitutional aspirations, thereby giving substance to the Union's motto “United in Diversity.”

In this presentation I shall start with a brief introduction into the concept of Reflexive Law (Part I), in order to examine what makes especially Reflexive Law a promising candidate for a fruitful contribution to the ongoing debate on the normative-legal or mere social-factual status of Lex Mercatoria (Part II), and finally coming up with the suggestion of some criteria or features, which we should draw special attention on in the process of the emergence of a New Law Merchant as an autonomous legal system (Part III).

It is a generally held assumption that the EU economic free movement rights are tools in the creation of a European internal market; and that their main goal is the (negative) market integration of different national markets. Yet these freedoms do not determine how market integration is to proceed, or which kind of integrated European market will emerge. The resulting market may be more or less regulated, and the creation of the relevant regulatory rules may be allocated to a variety of sources. These options are reflected in the different proposed tests used to determine whether a national measure prima facie infringes one of the market freedoms. The proposed tests fall into two main categories—broad tests and narrow tests—and each type has its own implications for European integration. Broad tests, usually associated with obstacle tests or even with economic due process clauses, tend to be seen as having three main outcomes. One result of broad tests is centralization, implying that ultimate decisions concerning the legitimacy of national law rests with EU institutions, and particularly with the Court of Justice of the European Union (“the Court” or “CJEU”). Another outcome of broad tests is the possible harmonization of national laws through the European political process by increasing the amount of national legislation susceptible to being harmonized under Articles 114 to 118 on the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”). A third consequence of broad tests is deregulation through the elimination of national rules creating obstacles to trade. Alternatively, narrow approaches-usually associated with discrimination or typological tests-are usually coupled with regulatory pluralism via a greater degree of control of the harmonization competences of the EU, decentralization through the protection of a greater sphere of Member States' autonomy, and economic agnosticism. Views on the potential outcomes of broad and narrow tests are, in turn, related to normative debates about the ideal levels of centralization, harmonization, and regulation in the internal market.

The Federal Republic of Germany counts among the earliest States parties to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It ratified the ECHR on 5 December 1952, three years ahead of Italy, and hence found itself among the original members of the treaty system when the ECHR entered into force on 3 September 1953. For the new democratic Government, it was a decision of principle to affirm its willingness to cooperate peacefully within the group of European States, submitting to an international review mechanism with regard to all of its activities. Therefore, very shortly afterwards, it accepted also the individual application under Article 25 ECHR, which at that time was not yet compulsory for all States parties. For many years under the Nazi dictatorship, Germany had brought death and destruction to its neighbours. Now, organized under a democratic and liberal constitution, the Basic Law (BL), it wanted to manifest its newfound identity as a civilized State abiding by the rule of law.

The Gesetz zur Bekämpfung der Korruption (KorrBekG – Anti-Corruption Act), enacted in 1997, was the last measure to improve Germany's anti-corruption criminal law that was solely initiated by German political actors. Since then all amendments originated in international legal instruments. Implementing only the minimum requirements of these international provisions has led to inconsistencies within the criminal law dealing with active and passive bribery. Further anti-corruption conventions signed by the German government require additional modifications. This opportunity should be used as a starting point for a thorough reform of Germany's anti-corruption criminal law.

It should be no surprise that a case can be made both for and against the legality of secondary market bond purchases by the European Central Bank (ECB), and of the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) Program in particular. It is also no secret that the ECB—like many other institutional actors in Europe—is in several ways testing the boundaries of legal provisions as a consequence of the financial and sovereign debt crisis. Still, the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) Order of 14 January 2014 on the OMT Program is surprising for several reasons.

The Common European Asylum System (CEAS) seeks to harmonize national asylum procedures. The initial implementation design of the CEAS, reflective of the theory of executive federalism, foresaw that national authorities were to conduct asylum processing and implement the harmonized norms. The implementation design of the EU asylum policy has, nevertheless, started to shift. An integrated European administration is emerging. One area this is pronounced in is asylum decision-making, where patterns of joint implementation have surfaced. This term broadly refers to staff and experts deployed by the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), an EU agency, working alongside national administrators, including on the processing of asylum claims. This Article scrutinizes the emergence of joint implementation patterns in EU asylum policy and the resulting accountability challenge, drawing both from legal analysis and political science theories. I also refer to administrative practice as documented in secondary sources. EASO is currently subject to a mosaic of accountability processes. Two main pitfalls emerge: the intricate balance between accountability and independence; and accessibility for the individual. Against this backdrop, I focus on extra-judicial accountability through the European Ombudsman which, combined with the envisaged internal “individual complaints mechanism” within EASO, could go some way in ensuring applicants’ procedural rights.

From the moment of its inception the European Union (EU) has included a court that was entrusted to give coherence and integrity to the interpretation and application of the Union's primary and secondary law. That the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) was to play an important role in settling disputes was clear. But few anticipated how instrumental the Court would become in the development of EU law.

The current contribution will elaborate on the manner in which the Declaration of the International Labour Organization (ILO) on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (hereinafter the 1998 Declaration) functions as an instrument of governance for the purpose of promotion and persuasion. The purpose of this activity is to improve the observance by States of certain principles contained in the 1998 Declaration. At the outset one should stress that this governance technique is a trade mark of the ILO as a whole and not only of the 1998 Declaration. The basic premise of the ILO is to rely on cooperation and dialogue rather than sanctions in its efforts to realize its goals.

This contribution deals with a topic that has so far received scant attention: the administrative governance of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). Over the course of the last 65 years, the CJEU has developed its own particular version of judicial self-government. This article analyzes its genesis, its characteristic features and provides a comprehensive assessment. Three arguments are put forward: First, self-government at the CJEU can be associated with a number of positive effects for the Court as an institution. It contributes to keeping the Court out of the public limelight, to fostering its judicial authority vis-à-vis key compliance constituencies and to securing its judicial independence. Second, while strong forms of judicial self-government can lead to a lack of transparency and accountability, these problematic side effects have been largely avoided at the CJEU. This is, in many respects, due to the dialogic accountability relationship that has been established with the European Parliament in the context of the EU budgetary process. Nevertheless, third, as regards more recent developments, such as the establishment of an expert panel for selecting new CJEU members and the Court's legislative role in amending its own Statute, from the perspective of transparency, room for improvement exists.

Despite the increasing urgency of global environmental issues, international environmental law continues to struggle for relevancy and effectiveness. Even as legal efforts have intensified, the global environment has continued to deteriorate. In particular, state-centric, multilateral “hard law” instruments have proven an increasingly ineffectual means of regulating the global environment.