The Bremen Regional Court is located in a monumental building – the Altes Gerichtshaus (Old Courthouse). A stone slab has adorned its facade since time immemorial. It has been placed directly under the jury courtroom – where the capital crimes come to trial. The inscription on the slab reads: “Thou shalt not kill.” During the National Socialist dictatorship the ruling powers wanted to take down the slab and destroy it. But some citizens of Bremen stopped them. Instead, the commandment against killing was merely covered with a stone slab and not uncovered again until after 1945. The admonition can still be seen today at the Bremen Regional Court. This episode from Bremen's judicial history brings to light three things. First, “Thou shalt not kill” – one of the ten Biblical commandments – is the archetype for all rules associated with human coexistence. Second, the commandment did not suit the agenda of the National Socialists, who perfected the killing of human beings in their extermination camps with industrial means. Third, the people sensed intuitively that rejecting the commandment against killing was a fatal error that would lead to barbarism. That is why they made sure the commandment stayed where it was, even though it became invisible during the Nazi dictatorship.

As my work has argued previously, European integration enjoys an “administrative, not constitutional” legitimacy. This view is in obvious tension with the deeply-rooted conceptual framework—what we might call the “constitutional, not international” perspective—that has dominated the public-law scholarship of European integration over many decades. Although the alternative presented in my work breaks from that traditional perspective, we should not view it as an all-or-nothing rejection of everything that has come before it. The administrative alternative can be seen, rather, as providing legal-historical micro-foundations for certain theories that also emerged out of the traditional perspective even as they too are in tension with it. I am referring in particular to Joseph Weiler's classic notion of European “equilibrium”—now updated as “constitutional tolerance”—as well as Kalypso Nicolaïdis's more recently developed theory of European “demoi-cracy” on which this article focuses in particular. The central idea behind the “administrative, not constitutional” interpretation—the historical-constructivist principal-agent framework rooted in delegation, as well as the balance demanded between supranational regulatory power and national democratic and constitutional legitimacy— directly complements both theories. The administrative alternative suggests how the relationship between national principals and supranational agents is one of “mediated legitimacy” rather than direct control. It has its origins in the evolution of administrative governance in relation to representative government over the course of the twentieth century (indeed before). By drawing on the normative lessons of that history—notably the need for some form of national oversight as well as enforcement of outer constraints on supranational delegation in order to preserve national democratic and constitutional legitimacy in a recognizable sense—this article serves an additional purpose. It suggests how theories of European equilibrium and demoi-cracy might be translated into concrete legal proposals for a more sustainable form of integration over time—a pressing challenge in the context of the continuing crisis of European integration.

Criminal procedure is most critical for the rights of the accused. It does not surprise that criminal procedural issues often give rise to constitutional complaints by convicted persons. Yet far beyond the ordinary cases, the latest opinion of the Federal Constitutional Justices on the constitutionality of the so-called deal-proceedings according to § 257c of the German Criminal Procedure Code (StPO) has caused much attention. The constitutional complaints, which kicked off the proceedings in Karlsruhe, forced the Justices to address the very basis of criminal procedure, its structure and traditional foundations. The decision of 19 March 2013, however, testifies the disunity amongst the justices and their anxiety not to trigger a stampede in the criminal justice system. Even if the outcome is rather unspectacular, the decision is nevertheless one of the most important and fundamental judicial documents concerning criminal procedure of the last years. Because of the centrality of the issue and its relevance also for comparative criminal law, we have decided to provide this topic with the broad room it deserves and put together a special issue on the “deal-decision” of the German Federal Constitutional Court.

The relation between internal market freedoms (the so-called “fundamental freedoms”) and fundamental rights is a recurring question in EU law. In recent years, after rulings such as Schmidberger, Omega, Viking, and Laval, attempts to provide a framework for approaching and resolving clashes between fundamental freedoms and fundamental rights have acquired a special urgency. Less attention, however, has been devoted to capturing the different nature of fundamental freedoms and fundamental rights, and to evaluating the implications of the choice whether or not to include fundamental freedoms in the same category as fundamental rights. The dominant focus in the literature is on what happens when free movement and fundamental rights pull in different directions. Yet, the question of whether fundamental freedoms should be regarded as fundamental rights also deserves close scrutiny. It is especially important to understand the implications of this classification since the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights appears to treat some, but not all, fundamental freedoms as fundamental rights. In particular, the Charter seems to regard the free movement of persons and services as fundamental rights, but not the free movement of goods or the free movement of capital. A similar approach is exhibited in the case law: While the Court recognizes the fundamental rights character of free movement of persons, it does not appear to extend that characterization to the entirety of free movement law. This article attempts to make sense of this dichotomy by relying on an account of fundamental rights that adopts a non-instrumental focus on the right-holder. It argues that certain free movement provisions, namely the free movement of goods and capital, cannot be characterized as fundamental rights because they are inherently instrumental—they are a means to the internal market end. By contrast, the other free movement provisions appear to match the account of fundamental rights adopted here. As this article aims to show, the classification of certain, or all, fundamental freedoms as fundamental rights is a question that affects the interpretation of the scope of the free movement provisions. Moreover, as will be seen, the question is closely related to the debate on the convergence between the free movement provisions, and on the persistence of the “wholly internal rule,” the rule that requires a cross-border connection to trigger the application of free movement law.

On 7 February 2014 in the OMT Case, the German Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe referred a question about the interpretation of Treaty law to the European Court of Justice for the first time. The question was whether the European Central Bank exceeded its mandate when it declared, in September 2012, that it was prepared to make emergency, unlimited purchases of specific states' bonds. Some view the referral as a genuflection acknowledging the judicial superiority of European Union jurisprudence. Has the Karlsruhe Court relinquished its role as “the final arbiter” and thereby surreptitiously bid farewell to the German sovereignty that the same Senate of the Constitutional Court so vigorously endorsed in the Lisbon Treaty Case in 2009?

Although not explicitly regulated by the EU treaties, EU agencies not only exist but also have increased in number and power. In addition, while EU agencies may exercise very similar functions to those of the Commission, Articles 290 and 291 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) do not list agencies among the possible authors of non-legislative acts. The existing situation raises the questions of the extent to which the ongoing agencification in the EU is legitimate and what its limits are. This article addresses these questions in the light of the old and new Treaties and case law, including the just released ESMA-shortselling case. It shows that while the Lisbon Treaty made a few steps forward on the road of legitimizing EU agencies and delegating important powers to them, the scope of powers that EU agencies can have remains unclear. In this respect, the European Court of Justice's lenient approach in the ESMA-shortselling case is unfortunate because it neither clarifies the issue nor pushes the Union Legislator and the Member States to address it. Consequently, in the absence of clear limits, further agencification is likely to persist at the risk of increasing the democratic legitimacy deficit and remaining accountability gaps.

The Maastricht Treaty (the “Treaty”) first introduced the status of EU citizenship. The twentieth anniversary of the signing of the Treaty, marked in 2013, was declared the European Year of the Citizen. Union citizenship has been understood as the world's first post-national citizenship, although it is still complementary to national citizenships. EU citizens enjoy rights that have been expanded, modified, and reinterpreted in light of the EU integration process. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has been a driving force in this process. This twentieth anniversary has provided the occasio for this special issue. Indeed, much has happened over the last two decades. The Maastricht Treaty entered into force on the heels of German reunification, and afterwards, a series of EU treaties followed: The Amsterdam Treaty, the Nice Charter of Fundamental Rights, the aborted constitutionalization process and the Rome Treaty in 2004, and the Treaty of Lisbon. The Euro took over former national currencies in 2002; the enlargement process led to today's twenty-eight Member States. But the ratio of this special issue is based on other events as linked to the 2008 financial crisis, bailouts, the fiscal compact, and similar measures. In a nutshell, the timeliness of this volume is linked to the current financial disarray. Since prognosis presupposes diagnosis, no further words are necessary as to the importance of this task. It is (almost) self-evident that before taking action and preparing for the future, one needs to address the very first question: Nosce te ipsum or know thyself. Union citizens need to take a step back and ask what they need to be and who they want to become.

As part of the 2010 EU/IMF economic adjustment program or “bail-out,” the Irish Government was required to undertake billions of euros in cuts to social protection spending over a three-year period. These have been implemented in subsequent budgets, resulting in increased levels of poverty and social exclusion. In light of these impacts on social rights in Ireland and other Member States, this article argues that the outcome of such Union legislative measures should be subject to some degree of rights-based scrutiny. It examines how, in the Hartz IV decision, the German Constitutional Court ruled that an attempt by the German Government to pass legislation that significantly cut a range of social welfare benefits breached the fundamental right to a subsistence minimum under the German Basic Law. Drawing inspiration from the approach of the German Constitutional Court, the article argues that the two elements of the German Basic Law which grounded that decision—the right to human dignity (Article 1(1)) and the social state principle (Article 20(1))—are both present within the Union Treaties as a result of changes occasioned by the Lisbon Treaty. The article advocates that the European Court of Justice should discover such a right within Union law and use it as a tool to analyze the impact of future cuts mandated by Union institutions on the economically disadvantaged.

German history of the twentieth century offers a rich resource of precedent for property restitution and compensation programs. The Federal Republic of Germany instituted different mass claims proceedings shaped to “reverse” or mitigate violations of property rights that took place as part of (a) the persecutions by the Nazi regime from 1933 to 1945, (b) the Land Reform (Bodenreform) during the Soviet occupation of East German territories from 1945 to 1949, and (c) the nationalization activities of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) from 1949 to 1990. Except for cases under the Land Reform in the Soviet zone, restitution preceded compensation as the main means of redress. All reparation schemes involved specific compensation arrangements including elaborate property evaluation systems.

European Union citizenship is derived from Member State nationality. This fact often has been considered a “birth defect” to be overcome by either disconnecting EU citizenship from Member State citizenship or by reversing the relationship in a federal model so that Member State citizenship would be derived from that of the Union. I argue in this essay that derivative citizenship in a union of states can be defended as a potentially stable and democratically attractive basic feature of the architecture of the EU polity where EU citizenship is perceived of as one layer in a multi-level model of democratic membership in a union of states such as the EU. This perspective is not a defense of the status quo, but rather allows for—or even requires—a series of reforms addressing a number of inconsistencies and democratic deficiencies in the current citizenship regime.

Most academics writing about Union citizenship tend to compare it to that which they know best: Nation State citizenship. It then comes as no surprise when they conclude that the current construction of EU citizenship is internally incoherent, externally not sufficiently inclusive, and also lacking in democratic legitimacy. To a certain degree, I agree with this criticism; however, such authors often apply the wrong standard of comparison and therefore are likely to promote faulty solutions. As the EU Treaties clearly have spelled out since the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, EU citizenship is complementary or additional to Member State nationality without replacing it. National citizenship is a constitutive element of EU citizenship and therefore cannot serve as an external standard of comparison.

This article focuses on the strategy to replace the UK Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) with a home-grown Bill of Rights to lessen the influence of the European Court of Human Rights' case law. Without attempting to disregard the national-specific elements, the discussion of these questions is very relevant for all States confronted with the influence of Strasbourg. The tension between coherence, efficiency and autonomy is overarching. The article therefore approaches the issue not only from an outsider's perspective but also, where relevant, from a comparative constitutional law perspective. Both perspectives seem to be largely absent from the current (academic) debate. Firstly, this article analyzes the current relationship between the UK Supreme Court and the Strasbourg Court, which reveals that the judicial arguments in support of a mirror principle are not so much based on section 2(1) HRA, as they are, in the domestic courts' relationship with Strasbourg, on concerns about international obligations, hierarchy, effectiveness of the Strasbourg Court, coherence and efficiency. Internally, judicial arguments are founded on concerns about separation of powers, limited jurisdiction, and accustomedness to the precedent system. In the second part, this article focuses on the potential impact of a home-grown Bill of Rights on the current relationship between both courts; concluding that a home-grown Bill of Rights will most likely cause domestic courts to receive less latitude by Strasbourg and will not absolve domestic judges from the duty of taking into account the Strasbourg case law.

Judicial independence appears on most laundry lists of all bodies or institutions engaged with the rule of law. It is considered an unqualified public good. As a result, all major players engaged in legal reform and building a rule of law have diverted significant resources to this issue. For instance, the United Nations created the office of Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers in 1994. The World Bank has been investing heavily in judicial reforms in Latin America and Asia. In Europe, the Council of Europe has been pushing for judicial independence and judicial reform throughout the continent. Additionally, the European Union included judicial independence among its core requirements for the accession countries. Both organizations, the European Union and the Council of Europe, then jointly encouraged legal and judicial reforms in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). A number of non-governmental organizations have likewise paid considerable attention to this issue.

The much–awaited ruling of 19 March 2013 by the German Federal Constitutional Court is of great importance to the forensic practice. The Court ruled on the constitutional appraisal of the provisions on plea agreements in criminal procedures. The decision is basically convincing but not in every point of its arguments. Certain conclusions of the Federal Constitutional Court are particularly problematic because they alter the preceding legal situation substantially and have an extensive effect on the appraisal of appeal law.

One of the most famous scenes from the 1957 James Dean movie classic “Rebel Without a Cause” is the chicken run scene. Two cars are speeding towards an abyss; the one who slows down or jumps out of the car first loses. The chicken run in the movie ends in tragedy; when one of the protagonists finally tries to get out of his car, it is too late—he is caught in the car and dies.

The European legal system governing data protection issues is widely regarded as an adequate blueprint for late developers to follow. According to this position, host countries will benefit from receiving the ready-made data protection law because it has already gone through a process of trial and error in Europe. For example, China follows the traditional civil law measures on data protection, such as contractual and tort liability. No Chinese legislation deals specifically with the right to protection of personal data. In China, researchers paid attention to the European legal system, which is regarded as the milestone for data protection. Some vigorously suggest that China should quickly move to enact data protection law based on the model provided by European law.

When Chinese researchers strongly promote the European legal system over data protection issues, they send an underlying message that the quality of European laws is good enough to sufficiently deter violations: Individuals would be prohibited from carrying out harmful actions as soon as the expected law is transplanted to China. From a Chinese perspective, our country could quickly move to enact a similar law following the tone of Europe in order to enhance the efficiency of data protection. But is this a compelling position? Will European data protection laws indeed regulate unambiguously and prospectively? Will European data protection laws provide clear guidance to Chinese judges for resolving data protection-related cases? And will the court-enforced laws sufficiently solve the broad spectrum of problems on data use? Understanding the European enforcement mechanism covering data protection issues, and thereby assessing its efficacy on deterrence, is vital to answering these questions.

The European Central Bank's (ECB) program of purchasing government bonds, the OMT program (Outright Monetary Transactions Program), which was announced on 6 September 2012, is illegal. With this program, the ECB transgresses its powers. This is the central message of the Federal Constitutional Court's decision from 14 January 2014. However, the decision is not final. The Federal Constitutional Court has suspended the trial and has referred the matter to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for a preliminary ruling. Only after the ECJ has examined the compatibility of the OMT program with European law will the Federal Constitutional Court pronounce its final judgment.

This article argues that “political herding” plays a crucial role in driving and shaping constitutional change. It links the prevalence of political herding to a psychological phenomenon, “social influence.” It goes on to argue that constitutional change is often driven by the desire for certain substantive policies, which in turn are determined by whether, in a particular epoch, the political community is herding in a progressive or reactionary direction. Contending that the general phenomenon whereby political communities go through recurrent swings to the left or to the right has been neglected by scholars, this essay aims to give this phenomenon the centrality it merits in relation to the evolution of the British constitution. Accordingly it considers the 1906 Liberal government, the 1945 Labour government and the lengthy succession of post-1979 neoliberal governments, analyzing how substantive progressive and reactionary programs led to constitutional change. Finally this article considers the legitimacy both of political herding itself, and of political herding's impact on constitutional change.

This article attempts to give a brief overview as to the interplay between the Norwegian Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. I will do so partly on a general footing and partly connected to a couple of specific cases. In particular, I will comment on the 16 January 2014 judgment from the Strasbourg Court in the Case of Lillo-Stenberg and Sæther v. Norway. This case involved an alleged violation of the right to privacy according to Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), by publishing pictures from the wedding of a well-known couple-both performing artists-in a weekly magazine, without their consent.

The aim of German criminal procedural law is not to convict the accused at any cost. Even a guilty party can only be convicted if the criminal procedure is held in accordance with the law. If this is not possible, the German legal system accepts the risk of possibly acquitting a guilty party; it finds this more tolerable than the irregular conviction of the culprit. A criminal procedure seeks the truth. Only on the basis of a judicial conviction of the crime and its culprit may a sentence be imposed. This, though, can only be based on the so-called procedural truth. On the one hand, the past can never be reconstructed precisely; on the other hand, clarification can only be found through legal means and by following designated paths allowed by procedural law. Therefore, further investigation must cease if it is only possible to proceed by violating procedural law.

The lingering European financial crisis continues to threaten the Eurozone and, in the opinion of German Chancellor Angela Merkel, the very survival of the European idea. With this apocalyptic rhetoric, it is easily forgotten that only nine years earlier Europe overcame a predicament that was, at the time, equally described as the most challenging in its history. Two failed referendums in Member States of the European Union (Member States)—namely, in France and the Netherlands—stopped the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (Constitutional Treaty) in its tracks and led to an extended “period of reflection” for Europe's leaders. From this emerged a reboot of the Constitutional Treaty, now dubbed the Treaty of Lisbon, with few substantial changes, but more success throughout the ratification procedures. The final hurdle presented itself in the form of institutionally strong Constitutional Courts (CC) and Tribunals (CT) of the European Member States. Of these, the following were at one time or another seized with complaints against the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty: The Austrian Verfassungsgerichtshof (Austrian CC), the Belgian CC, the Ústavní soud České republiky (Czech CC), the French Conseil Constitutionnel (French CC), the German Bundesverfassungsgericht (German CC), the Hungarian CC, the Latvijas Republikas Satversmes tiesa (Latvian CC), the Polish Trybunał Konstytucyjny (Polish CT), and the Tribunal Constitucional de España (Spanish CT).