How could one conclude the preceding collection of texts and create the closure necessary for the recognizability, citability, and, indeed, untouchability of this “Special Section on Derrida” within the German Law Journal? And how could one determine the multiple significations of each and all these texts, and connect them through a single thread? And, finally, how is one to respond to the preceding questions? Do they call for an analytical reflection on the structural indeterminacy of conclusion, or for an ethical reflection on its justice?

July 8, 2004, marked a cornerstone for the German law against unfair competition. The amending Statute Against Unfair Competition (UWG 2004) came into force on that day. That day also ended a long discussion among researchers who had called for a thorough modernization of the UWG. In particular, researchers criticized the prohibitions on sales promotion; these prohibitions are now abolished. Furthermore, the new UWG addresses European Union demands for greater liberalization and consumer protection, especially with respect to the electronic communications sector. The new law is a complete reorganization of the old act of 1909. The revised UWG is much more liberal, but still guarantees a high standard of protection for consumers and competitors.

The European Union (EU) acts in the area of international trade through the community's commercial policy regulated by the European Community (EC) Treaty. The position of the Union in external trade relations is dependant on the unique legal character of this entity. By developing a legal order which is supreme to the law of its Member States, and creating a complex system of institutions and modes of decision-making, the Community has ceased to be a mere representative of the countries it comprises. The increasing transfer of competences from the Member States onto the community allowed it to aim at the realization of common objectives as opposed to merely collective ones. As a result, tensions between the EC and dissatisfied Member States occur and the delineation of competences may turn out to be crucial when interests of an individual Member State are involved. Therefore, the paper which considers the situation of the “new” European Union in the area of international trade, in light of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (Constitutional Treaty), should necessarily investigate how the position of the EU will be strengthened vis-à-vis its Member States.

Prior to an acquisition of a stock corporation the purchasers often perform a due diligence at the target company. The due diligence is the examination of the company and can cover the legal, commercial, environmental, financial and fiscal matters of the company. Under US law it is the purchaser's duty to examine a company accurately since the risk of any deficiencies is on him. German law, in contrast, does not require the purchaser to examine the company he purchases. According to § 442 (1) sentence 2 of the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch – BGB) the buyer does not have rights with respect to a defect, if he is unaware of this defect as a result of gross negligence on his part. While for some years now, the performance of due diligence prior to purchasing a company has become quite customary in Germany, German law does not yet require the person wanting to purchase a company to perform a due diligence.

After last year's successful Academia Juris Internationalis workshop on local products, Prof. Dr. Thilo Marauhn and Dr. Sebastian Heselhaus (Academia Juris Internationalis Franz von Liszt, Faculty of Law, Justus-Liebig-University, Giessen) organized the second Jean Monnet – Workshop in the Senate Hall of the Main Building of Justus-Liebig-University in Giessen, Germany, on 2 July 2004.

The Constitutional Treaty was thought to address the new challenges occurring in front of the enlarged Europe in relation to the rapidly changing international political, economic, social and cultural circumstances. In this respect, the problem of the new quality of the European Union is being repeatedly disputed. If the EU is to be something more than an arrangement for inter-state cooperation, the Union has to be able to act rationally on a collective basis, in a way that different interests or preferences will give priority to seeking agreement over self-interest maximization. The question of whether the EU envisaged in the Constitutional Treaty represents a deeper form of integration can be answered by examining its ability to achieve consensus on conflicting issues and to form a common will about how to solve common problems. The field in which the most controversies arise nowadays is that of biotechnology and biomedicine.

“New Foundations for European and Global Governance? The Achievements of Europe's Constitutionalization.” This was the title of the two-day conference organized by the European Community Studies Association (ECSA) of Austria and the Europainstitut of the University of Economics and Business Administration. The meeting was set in the beautiful atmosphere of the Banqueting Hall of the Bank of Austria building in the centre of Vienna on 29 and 30 November 2004.

The question of churches and religious communities in the EU/EC law arose for the first time in 1997, when Declaration No. 11 on the status of churches and non-confessional organisations was attached to the Amsterdam Treaty. According to this Declaration, “The European Union will respect and does not prejudice the status under national law of churches and religious associations or communities in the Member States. The European Union will equally respect the status of philosophical and non-confessional organisations.” The content of this Declaration was commented on many times by distinguished experts of the European ecclesiastical law. Art. I-52 of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (Constitutional Treaty/CT) repeats in paragraph one and two Declaration No. 11, and introduces in paragraph three a provision on dialogue between the EU and religious bodies: “Recognising their identity and their specific contribution, the Union shall maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue with these churches and organisations.”

The “unity dogma” has long characterized the European law discourse. In many of its landmark decisions the European Court of Justice had recourse to the “unity argument,” such as in Costa vs. E.N.E.L., where it rightly states that “the executive force of Community law cannot vary from one state to another … without jeopardizing the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty.” Other expressions of the “unity dogma” include the legal principle of non-discrimination enshrined in the fundamental freedoms, which lie at the heart of the single market, or the political concept of acquis communautaire obliging new Member States to subscribe to all existing Community laws. Indeed, the establishment of a supranational legal order requires a continued focus on its uniform application in the Member States without which the effectiveness of European law is at stake. My intention is not to call into question the underlying rationale of this quest for unity. The aim of this contribution is rather to show that the asymmetric non-participation of individual Member States in selected areas of Union activity can be embedded into the existing European legal order and does not contradict its constitutional aspirations, thereby giving substance to the Union's motto “United in Diversity.”

Discussing the withdrawal provision pursuant to Article I-60 of the Constitutional Treaty (CT), also referred to as the sunset clause, in the morning light of the establishment of a European Constitution is pretty much like talking about divorce on your wedding day. Before I try to start analyzing the text of this new provision, I will briefly outline the status of the legal debate on the right of withdrawal from the current EU/EC Treaty. In this context, I would like to highlight three aspects by making one political and two legal observations.