This article critically assesses the argument that oppositional coordination creates democratization by elections. It argues that the previously acknowledged democratizing effect of pre-electoral coalitions is better described as an alternation effect, by which coordinated oppositional parties are more likely to win elections. The positive effect of oppositional coalitions is, however, short lived and intimately connected with cases where the election is won by the opposition. Evidence of potential endogeneity is presented, which shows that coalitions are more likely when there is a realistic chance of oppositional victories. These results were derived by utilizing an original dataset of 251 authoritarian elections in 86 countries from 1973 to 2004.

This article sheds light on the Greek trigger of the eurozone's fiscal crisis. Using Ostrom's institutional theory of collective action it argues that Europe's predicament is rooted in the failings of political leadership and institutional design at both the European Union and Greek levels. The findings have implications for Ostrom's framework, Europeanization and the future of European integration.

While new institutionalism with its path-dependence theory has proved to be an especially powerful device for explaining the stability and inertia of public policies, its focus on the stickiness of institutions has contributed to conceptual deficits in grasping and explaining actually occurring policy change which have attracted much criticism. With reference to the critical case of German labour market reforms, policy learning is identified as a key mechanism in the paradigmatic transformation of social policy. Pursuing the argument that learning does not happen in a vacuum and is institutionally embedded, policy learning is conceptually enriched with insights from new institutionalism to develop an institutional account of learning. Such an approach to policy learning and a stronger emphasis on ideas address the stability bias in new institutionalism and its path-dependence theory by accounting for knowledge-based institutional change.

One of the most glaring differences between traditional and emerging middle powers relates to their projection of societal values abroad. Since most emerging powers are essentially fragmented multiclass states, class compromise often emerges to intermediate contradictory demands emanating from fragile political coalitions. Against the backdrop of vast income inequalities, and facing some domestic constituencies favouring liberalization on the one hand against pro-redistributive groups on the other, adopting a middle power role, in the cases of South Africa and Brazil, emerges in order to ameliorate these conflicting demands. Two dimensions are examined very briefly, namely recent mediation efforts in Iran and Libya and attempts to effect redistribution by reforming processes of global governance.

Dominant party systems are defined by a lack of party alternation at the national level; however, dominant party systems do not inherently preclude electoral competition at the macro level, the micro level, or both. Nonetheless, little systematic work has documented the competitiveness of elections under a dominant party system. This article describes the nature of competition under one of sub-Saharan Africa's most enduring dominant party systems, Botswana. By examining electoral outcomes at the constituency level, this article demonstrates that elections in Botswana produce significant levels of competition, especially when compared to other sub-Saharan countries. Furthermore, electoral competitiveness appears unrelated to the party system at large: namely, competitiveness is no less or greater under dominant party systems than under multiparty systems.