Consensual knowledge can produce widely varying levels of impact on different international negotiations. In the case of negotiations over UNCTAD's Integrated Program for Commodities, consensual knowledge developed among the experts involved. This consensus tended to support the position taken by the developed countries, thus pointing in a direction already taken for other reasons. Consensus in this case facilitated an agreement, but empirical and theoretical analysis both suggest it may prove to be an incorrect or unstable agreement. The outcome of the commodity negotiations implies that the interaction of key variables, such as uncertainty and the degree of acceptance of the knowledge, might yield different results in other cases. Various specific means might be used more effectively to diffuse expert knowledge among policy makers.

This article analyzes the efficacy of border enforcement against smuggling. We argue that walls, fences, patrols, and other efforts to secure porous borders can reduce smuggling, but only in the absence of collusion between smugglers and state agents at official border crossings. When such corruption occurs, border enforcement merely diverts smuggling flows without reducing their overall volume. We also identify the conditions under which corruption occurs and characterize border enforcement as a sorting mechanism that allows high-skilled smugglers to forge alternative border-crossing routes while deterring low-skilled smugglers or driving them to bribe local border agents. Combining a formal model and an archival case study of opium smuggling in Southeast Asia, we demonstrate that border enforcement has conditional effects on the routes and volumes of smuggling, depending on the nature of interactions between smugglers and border agents. By drawing attention to the technological and organizational aspects of smuggling, this article brings scholarship on criminal governance into the study of international relations, and contributes to debates on the effects of border enforcement and border politics more generally.

This article examines the factors that led to the end of the Cold War from the perspective of the most important U.S. decision makers in both the Reagan and Bush presidencies. The centerpiece of the analysis is a longitudinal study that compares the timing of U.S. decision makers' assessments of the nature of the Soviet threat with changes in Soviet power, foreign policies, and domestic ideology and institutions. This research design allows one to determine if America's key leaders were basing their foreign policies primarily in response to reductions in Soviet power (as realists assert), to more cooperative international policies (as systemic-constructivist and costly signals arguments claim), or to changes in Soviet domestic politics (as democratic peace theories argue). I find that American leaders' beliefs that the Cold War was ending corresponded most closely with Soviet domestic-ideological and institutional changes. As soon as America's most important leaders believed both that Gorbachev was dedicated to core tenets of liberal ideology, and that these values would likely be protected by liberal institutions, they believed the Cold War was ending. These findings help to both illustrate the key determinants of leaders' perceptions of international threats and explain why outstanding Cold War disputes were resolved so smoothly, with the Americans primarily attempting to reassure the Soviets rather than coercing them with America's power superiority.I wish to thank the following people for their helpful comments on previous versions of this article and related projects that led to it: Cliff Bob, Steve Brooks, Dale Copeland, Robert Jervis, Mark Kramer, Jeff Legro, Jack Levy, Allen Lynch, Sean Lynn-Jones, Kimberly Marten, Rose McDermott, Steve Miller, Kevin Narizny, John Owen, Steve Rosen, John Sawicki, Monica Duffy Toft, Steve Walt, and especially Lisa Martin and two anonymous reviewers at International Organization. I also thank the participants in the seminars on international security at the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies and the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, both at Harvard University, and the Center for International Studies at Princeton University. For generous financial and institutional support, I remain grateful to the Olin Institute and the Belfer Center.

Events of and since 11 September 2001 have renewed interest in age-old questions about liberal-democratic governance in the shadow of insecurity, crisis, and war. Academic lawyers in particular have engaged in a vigorous debate about how liberal polities can confront security threats while maintaining their commitment to the rule of law. Yet few empirical political scientists, and even fewer scholars of international relations, have weighed in. The short- and especially long-run effects of international conflict on liberal-democratic institutions and processes remain an underexplored aspect of the second-image-reversed. Prompted by recent research in law, this article finds that prominent arguments often rest on shaky theoretical and empirical foundations. It argues that the two most notable traditions of thought on war and democracy are complementary, not competing; that small wars may also have substantial consequences; and that analysts must distinguish clearly among three distinct causal phenomena—threat, mobilization, and warfare—when considering conflict's impact on democracy. The article critically reviews the effects of conflict on both participation and contestation; identifies the salient outstanding questions and suggests hypotheses addressing them; and explores the implications for contemporary normative debates over executive authority and emergency powers.

Discussions of international commodity organizations often compare the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the Intergovernmental Council of Copper Exporting Countries (CIPEC), yet few researchers have examined CIPEC. A comparison of environmental characteristics of copper and petroleum suggests that although copper producers' collusion is possible, it is problematical and depends on political as well as economic factors. Since its formation in 1967, CIPEC members have been engaged in a gradual process of institution-building, although a lack of institutional leadership has hampered collective policy making. Substantively, CIPEC has dealt primarily with three issues: nationalization, technical pricing arrangements, and market regulatory policies. Until 1974, CIPEC members proved incapable of adopting a regulatory policy; they fostered the illusion of impending action and cooperation. Faced with deteriorating market conditions and stimulated by OPEC's success, CIPEC members have initiated a joint policy. The future of CIPEC will depend on its institutional flexibility as well as on decisions of nonmember producers and developed consumer countries.

Over the past century, Germany has repeatedly attempted to use trade as a tool of foreign policy vis-à-vis Imperial Russia, the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Against the background of continual German economic superiority, this article analyzes Germany's ability to apply trade leverage in terms of four other factors: the nature of the prevailing international trade regime, government views of trade leverage as a tool of statecraft, the degree of German state autonomy in setting trade policies, and the availability of an effective bureaucratic mechanism for controlling German imports and exports. The historical record demonstrates that beyond economic superiority, the application of trade leverage requires a permissive international trade regime, state acceptance of trade-based economic statecraft, an autonomous domestic regime, and a rigorous trade control bureaucracy. Surprisingly, this conjunction of factors, as they applied to Eastern Europe, occurred during both the Nazi period and the early years of the Federal Republic. The article closes by pointing out how two important factors—the politicized nature of the East-West trade regime and the Federal Republic's high degree of state autonomy in setting Eastern trade policy–are being eroded by political and economic change in Eastern Europe.

Several writers have asked whether there exist among states varying predispositions to support the United Nations. Hayward Alker has answered this question with reference to the voting patterns of member nations in support of increased UN activities particularly in the peacekeeping field. More recently Robert Keohane has ranked states by using a support measure based on delegation size and has suggested that size of national delegations to the United Nations is indicative of support for the organization.

The article is an empirical study of the political processes leading to the agreement on the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) that was reached in October 1970 at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Section I of the article sets out the triangular interests that had to reach agreement among developed countries, among developing countries, and between developed and developing countries. Section II poses the problem of the article: How did the UNCTAD secretariat contribute to the political process that resolved the three-dimensional disagreements, if only on a partial basis? The argument of the article is that sustained institutionalized pressure exerted through the UNCTAD secretariat did make a difference in influencing the policy outcomes on GSP. Certain results were achieved through UNCTAD organizational processes–secretariat ideology, Prebisch's leadership, and pragmatic group bargaining–that could not have been achieved through other means.

Sectoral analyses reveal an emerging tension between a global market and an anarchic political system and oblige scholars to examine the dynamic and reciprocal relationship between states and markets. This analysis of commercial-class aircraft manufacturing, a strategic industry, demonstrates how corporate behavior affects political choices and vice versa. It suggests that corporate and political policymaking is a messy process: first, policymakers must respond to multiple and often conflicting demands, from both domestic and international constituencies; second, they are influenced by a number of variables, including ideology, interest group activity, consequences of previous policies, perceptions about their state's position in the international system, and available knowledge about how to realize specific goals. Sets of competing variables which act as centripetal and centrifugal forces are identified and analyzed in terms of how they have impelled corporations to seek transnational production arrangements. Three prototypical structures of international production are delineated, and the potential consequences for states and corporations participating in each model are discussed. The key objectives of the article are to encourage the use of multivariate analyses to explain change in the international system and to provoke further debate about the appropriate policies to pursue to achieve global economic competitiveness across a number of industry sectors.

On April 7, 1948 the World Health Organization came into existence as a specialized agency of the United Nations with the ratification of its constitution by the Byelorussian SSR and Mexico. These ratifications brought the total number of ratifying States (Member governments of the United Nations) to 27, or one more than were required by the WHO Constitution to bring the Organization into existence. The Member states who had ratified the Constitution at that time were Australia, Canada, China, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Greece, Haiti, India, Iran, Iraq, Liberia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Siam, Sweden, Syria, Turkey, Ukrainian SSR, Union of South Africa, USSR, United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia. In addition, Albania, Austria, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Switzerland and Transjordan had also joined the organization.

One of the first of the specialized agencies of the United Nations to become active, the Food and Agriculture Organization has elicited interest beyond the specialized field of agricultural economists. Attempting as it does to solve one of the very basic problems of the world, that of an adequate food supply, the organization represents a significant and hopeful international attempt to create a world in which there may actually exist “freedom from want.” The objectives of FAO, as formally expressed in the preamble to the constitution, read as follows:

“The nations accepting this constitution being determined to promote the common welfare by furthering separate and collective action on their part for the purpose of raising levels of nutrition and standards of living of the people under their jurisdiction, securing improvements in the efficiency of the production of all food and agricultural products, bettering the conditions of rural populations, and thus contributing toward an expanding world economy, hereby establish the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.”

State formation occurred in Korea and Japan 1,000 years before it did in Europe, and it occurred for reasons of emulation and learning, not bellicist competition. State formation in historical East Asia occurred under a hegemonic system in which war was relatively rare, not under a balance-of-power system with regular existential threats. Korea and Japan emerged as states between the fifth and ninth centuries CE and existed for centuries thereafter with centralized bureaucratic control defined over territory and administrative capacity to tax their populations, field large militaries, and provide extensive public goods. They created these institutions not to wage war or suppress revolt: the longevity of dynasties in these countries is evidence of both the peacefulness of their region and their internal stability. Rather, Korea and Japan developed state institutions through emulation and learning from China. The elites of both copied Chinese civilization for reasons of prestige and domestic legitimacy in the competition between the court and the nobility.

Interim Commission of WHO: The third session of the Interim Commission of WHO, which began on March 30, 1947 at Geneva, closed on April 12, after assigning priority to the various health problems confronting the world. Representatives of sixteen of the eighteen member states (Liberia and the Ukrainian SSR being absent) attended the session. Results of Conference discussions indicated wide-spread agreement on such matters as 1) appointment of expert committees to develop program proposals relating to specific diseases, 2) strengthening of national health services, and 3) facilities for training public health personnel. It was hoped that a practical first year's program could be presented to the first World Health Assembly when that body convenes, probably in February, 1948.

It will cause little controversy in the spring of 1975 to observe that the world is in a profound political and economic crisis, or that interdependence is a palpable and often unpalatable fact. Conflict over formerly latent issues is increasingly evident, as governments try desperately to cope with the effects of other governments' policies, as in the case of oil, or with resource shortages, as in the case of food. Many of the problems from which such issues arise–including also environmental degradation, inflation, and recession–have immediate impacts on people's daily lives. Unlike traditional foreign policy issues, they are not separate from domestic politics, and experienced largely through the mass media, but rather encountered daily on the job and at the market. Domestic and foreign policies are closely intertwined, and important domestic interests are threatened by events abroad. It is becoming clear that ties between national economies can transmit economic evils as well as economic goods.

In the metalworking and chemical industries of Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia, the ownership structure of firms, their product sector, and propensity to obtain technology through licensing are closely associated. Foreign firms cluster in industrial sectors with complex and volatile technologies, in which their technological advantages permit the exaction of monopoly rents. Ownership structure and product sector, as well as firm size, are related to the firm's decision to obtain technology by licensing rather than by generating it autonomously or obtaining it through other means. Ownership structure, product sector, and licensing appear to interact with choice of machinery imports and research and development activities in such a way as to produce a “technological dependence syndrome” in which opportunities for “learning by doing” are consistently missed.

Recent international relations scholarship has argued that political elites constrain the use of military force by democracies. Despite the persuasiveness of this research, scholars have largely ignored elite dynamics’ ability to constrain the initiation of covert operations. This omission is consequential because scholars of US foreign policy often assume that covert operations serve as a substitute for the overt use of force; secrecy allows leaders to limit information to congressional elites and thus weaken their oversight capabilities. Do elite political dynamics constrain presidents’ ability to act secretly or do they affect the overt use of force only? I argue that elite political constraints—particularly opposition from Congress—extend to the president's ability to initiate covert operations. By examining the trade-off between US military force and CIA-initiated covert operations during the Cold War, I find the likelihood that covert operations are initiated decreases significantly during periods of divided government and that there is no distinguishable trade-off between covert operations and overt military force. The results suggest that constraints on covert operations became more uniform across unified and divided government following congressional oversight reforms in 1975 that reduced the information asymmetry between the majority and minority party. These findings have important ramifications for the nascent literature on back-door bargaining and covert signalling. Because democratic leaders frequently face domestic political costs even when acting in secret, covert operations should allow leaders to credibly convey their resolve.

International arbitration is a distinctive feature of both contemporary international politics and the ancient world. Explanations of arbitration in the international relations literature generally posit that states engage in arbitration to mitigate the effects of competition in an anarchical system, or that the practice of arbitration reflects democratic norms. However, an examination of arbitration during the paradigmatic case of the Hellenistic period (338–90 bce) casts doubt on the existing literature. Hierarchy rather than anarchy better characterizes the political context in which arbitration took place: the Greeks often organized themselves into alliances or leagues in which a hegemon dominated decision making, or into federal states with a common foreign policy. This hierarchical setting was a necessary condition for international arbitration where the practice of arbitration was a tool to legitimize hierarchical powers. We assemble an original data set of Hellenistic arbitrations, and use qualitative comparative analysis to show that hierarchy was almost always a necessary condition for international arbitration. Process-tracing of arbitration under three political orders—hegemonic kingdoms in the Greek world, Greek federations, and the Roman Empire—shows that arbitration as a particular means of dispute resolution was used as an ideological device to build and legitimize international order. We then analyze the contemporary record, finding a role for hierarchy in modern international arbitration.

Whether or not less developed countries can better realize their economic aspirations by strengthening their ties with developed countries will remain in dispute as long as there are rich and poor countries. Dispute will be particularly sharp while the main instruments of such interconnection are identifiable institutions like the multinational corporation. It is easier to map the growth of the multinational corporation than to assess its consequences, but the need for an assessment cannot be ignored. As this essay's subtitle suggests, my main concern is consideration of arguments which are critical of the role of the multinational corporation.

A conceptual framework for the analysis of global political change is presented and illustrated with examples drawn from the Cold War. The most important issues on an agenda, the critical issues, go through identifiable stages: genesis, crisis, ritualization, dormancy, decision making, and authoritative allocation. The effects of the different stages on behavior of international actors is examined in a preliminary fashion, and a theoretical rationale is offered. Each stage, treated in detail, relates to the others in terms of differences in behavior associated with each stage, the evolving of relationships among actors, and the resolution of issues. The concluding section elaborates the research implications.