Reports on the United Nations by three United States groups, the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, the President's Commission, and the United Nations Association of the USA, are summarized and compared. They reveal informed concern about United States participation in the UN at a time when Congress and the executive exhibit negativism and neglect. Conclusions are drawn on (1) differing priorities for the UN system and their interdependence, (2) the special capabilities of the United States for setting examples, (3) alternative models for UN problem solving, (4) United States contributions to the UN, and (5) generating political will for creative United States involvement in the UN. Concern is expressed about efforts to cut United States assessments for UN budgets and failure of the reports to adequately consider the political consequences of the fact that “maintenance of international peace and security” is not considered the most important UN task by all members. If congressional and executive neglect are to be overcome, public participation and involvement must be extended.

This essay draws from the experience of Kenya and the East African Community to ascertain the impact of single–country or regional ownership on the commercial performance of public enterprises. The advantages of the larger resource base of a regional community are mooted by the problems of mobilizing those resources. A fledgling public corporation can secure assistance most readily when owned by one state. It is also clear that traits of a corporation independent of its regional or single–country status affect commercial success. The essay concludes with a discussion of the limited contribution public corporations make to further levels of regional integration.

The United States public and government, initially unrealistic in their visions of UN potentialities, have recently been turning toward the extreme of skepticism. There are various reasons for the change: the squabbles over Chinese representation and Rhodesian sanctions, the ever–increasing budgets voted by small powers who apparently pay a disproportionately low share of UN expenses, United States disillusionment at being out–voted by the Afro–Asian bloc, and the latter's insistence that the only really important function of the UN is to end colonialism and racism. Although some of these frictions have been adjusted, others are in danger of flaring into major disagreements, and, in any case, the old easy assumption of permanent US–UN friendship has gone by the board.

The main hypothesis of this article is that transgovernmental interaction among central banks and finance ministries of industrialized countries was as significant in economic policy formation as intergovernmental interaction. Elite interview data indicate, however, that the international consultative process among deputy central bank governors and deputy finance ministers conformed more closely to the intergovernmental image of international politics than had been expected. Both interaction patterns within the deputies’ consultative group and the impact of international consultations upon national economic policies could be explained moderately well in terms of a unified rational actor model. Examination of the transgovernmental interaction does suggest ways to systematically modify and improve interpretations based upon the rational actor model. In addition, the degree of politicization of issues may prove to be a reliable guide when deciding whether the transgovernmental dimension of an issue requires detailed study.

This research reports an exploration of the relationship between a decision maker's role and his perception during an international crisis. Research on the social and political processes of the United Nations suggests that a variety of factors, including communication patterns, nonnational roles, and learning experiences may produce a role orientation in delegates that would have an impact upon their perceptions even when their nation is involved in an international crisis. This proposition is explored using content analysis data from the 1956 Suez crisis. The decision makers whose perceptions furnish the data are the Egyptian and Israeli Permanent Representatives to the United Nations and the occupants of high foreign policy positions in the national capitals of Egypt and Israel. The initial analysis of the data indicates only very small differences in the perceptions. The analysis of the data does not support the original proposition. Finally, some caveats concerning the research are raised.

This article presents an interpretation of the conflicts between universalism and nationalism as they affected United States policy toward the creation of the United Nations. Drawing on heretofore unavailable sources, the author stresses the rising influence of nationalism in the evolution of decisions on the veto power, trusteeships, and regionalism. His focus is on the decision–making process during Roosevelt's last year and the initial months of the Truman administration. He contends that Cordell Hull's universalist UN blueprint, which Roosevelt supported, was inexorably eroded by critics within the American government, especially military spokesmen. These leaders took advantage of the apprehension about the Soviet Union's future policy to further their own ambitions for a strong post–war military posture. Truman was sympathetic to the voices of nationalism, and when he became president the shift away from a strong UN became more pronounced.

The imposition of limited sanctions against Italy was given fair prospect of success by members of the League. Sanctions were to have a twofold purpose. One was to uphold the Covenant and encourage collective security. The other was to end the war by putting pressure on the Italian government so as to make it amenable to a negotiated settlement. It was expected that economic and financial measures (as opposed to military means) would be sufficient, over a period of time, to achieve this. The timetable was upset by unexpected political events and by the collapse of Ethiopian military resistance. Policies are explained, events discussed, and to illuminate some dilemmas a distinction (not then well perceived) is made between politically important “consumatory” assumptions and diplomatically operative “instrumentalist” and reconciliationist practices.

It is argued that the study of regional international politics is important (1) for empirical reasons having to do with the real world saliency of the region as a factor in international politics; (2) for theoretical reasons having to do with the subordinate system as being relatively neglected in scholarship with the exception of the integrationist approach; and (3) for policy reasons having to do with the importance of accurately understanding the dynamics of the region as part of the objective of stabilizing the international system. The dominant approach to regional international politics of the integrationists (neo–functionalists and transactionalists) is then discussed and criticized in terms of the two approaches' normative concerns, the nature of the model utilized, and the theoretical issues that are raised. A major conclusion is that the integrative model used is inappropriate as a vestige of the level of analysis problem, and such theoretical issues as the nature of the dependent variable remain unspecified. It is then argued that the authors' formulation of an empirical systems approach begins to meet these criticisms.

Regional integration theory emphasizes elite social learning and attitude change as concomitant processes of integration. Participation by national elites in EEC decision making may bring about these changes. To test these hypotheses, French and German delegates to the European Parliament were interviewed, and their attitudes compared with those of a control group sampled among their national colleagues. The general finding was that the delegates’ attitudes appear to undergo cognitive, but not affective, changes. Delegates develop more complex perceptions and become better informed and more interested in European matters, yet they become neither more favorable nor less hostile to these issues because of the self–recruitment of many legislators who were avowed Europeans before their nomination. Strong ties to national parties apparently diminish the attitudinal effects of this learning experience. Only when the parliament has full time legislators who exercise potent policy–making tasks will its role in European integration increase.

This study examines the functionalist approach to international relations, focusing on the proposed relationship between experience in international organizations and attitude change of the participants. The functionalist thesis on attitude change is amplified by reference to social–psychological work on the subject. In terms of functionalist theory, attitude change is essentially seen to be the product of socialization into the international organization. Empirical studies of the attitudes of participants to various international organizations are then evaluated for the extent to which they support the functionalist hypothesis. The evidence indicates that while socialization processes produce some attitude change toward the adoption of an “internationalist outlook,” the likelihood and nature of attitude change is also significantly affected by conflict processes within the organization. The functionalist approach is found to be inadequate in dealing with conflict in the organization as well as in need of greater elaboration with respect to socialization. Revisions are suggested which take into account variations in the sociological structure of international organizationsin addition to processes of socialization and organizational conflict as factors affecting attitude change.

Relations between official agencies and private business concerning international coffee policy suggest that the power of the state dominates the international economic arena. The International Coffee Agreement did not benefit the United States coffee industry. Despite this, some large coffee roasting companies supported the Agreement. Without their support it would not have received Congressional approval. The action of the roasters can be explained by the behavioral theory of the firm, which emphasizes managerial discretion and risk avoidance. Large oligopolistic companies, potentially the most powerful of business enterprises, are also the ones least likely to oppose the state. However, the ability of one company to determine American policy toward the import of soluble coffee from Brazil shows that when the economic interests of an oligopolistic firm are unambiguously threatened, it can severely constrain official actors.

The Andean Common Market, the most recent attempt at regional integration in Latin America, differs from the other Latin American efforts both in the factors that prompted its formation and in the support it had when it was established. More importantly, it differs in its terms and provisions, providing for a higher level of integration than any other Latin American effort. Several of its features—a common policy on foreign investment, regional planning and coordination in such fields as industry and agriculture, a quasi–supranational secretariat — make it an innovative approach to integration in Latin America. Numerous factors enhance the integrative potential of Andean integration. Among these are relatively favorable ratings on several of the neo–functional variables of regional integration. These indicators suggest that the effort may attain its objectives and perhaps even set an example to be followed by other economic groupings among Latin American countries. Still, projections about the future of the Andean Common Market must remain mixed. Some negative factors exist within the movement that could, if they triumph over the positive factors, lead to the same stagnation that now characterizes LAFTA and the CACM.

As periodic stock–taking efforts would indicate,1 students of international organizations have become increasingly sophisticated in the methods and techniques used for assessing the dynamics of international efforts at cooperation, and the impact of these efforts on the general stream of international politics. Nowhere has this been more true than in attempts by scholars to come to grips with the political processes acted out in the General Assembly of the United Nations. To para–phrase Keohane,2 we have come to witness a change of focus from a somewhat static description of structures, rules and regulations, to analyses of patterns of voting behavior (and correlates thereof) to, finally, systematic analyses of patterns of interactions leading to votes and resolutions.