Though organized crime is the subject of numerous treaties, traditionally it has not been central to conversations about international humanitarian law (IHL) and the conduct and regulation of armed conflict. There is currently no unanimity as to the criteria to be included so that IHL applies to criminal groups. The articles in this issue of the Review explore how organized crime and the groups that carry it out can be, should be and in fact are regulated through the international legal framework governing armed conflict and other situations of violence.

While the objective of this issue is to clarify the role of criminal groups in armed conflicts and how IHL applies to them, the collection of testimonies presented below has no such aim. This sole purpose of this compilation of testimonies is to give a voice to the victims of organized crime so that their stories, which are usually hidden and silenced, can shed new light on the short- and long-term effects of organized crime on those who suffer from it. These stories provide unique insights into the personal and societal impacts of organized crime, as well as the ways in which victims cope with and resist these criminal networks.

Sophie Orr oversees International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) operations in North, Central and South America (the ICRC Americas Region), providing strategic steering for the organization's response and contributing to humanitarian diplomacy efforts at different levels. The delegations and missions in the region work on addressing a wide range of needs of people affected by present and past situations of conflict and armed violence.

Prior to her appointment as Regional Director for the Americas, Ms Orr worked in many different and often complex environments, first as a foreign affairs producer and journalist with the UK's Channel 4 News. She has previously worked for the ICRC in several countries, mainly in protection and management positions, and later at headquarters, first as Strategic Adviser to the Director of Operations from 2012 to 2016 and then leading the ICRC's operational cooperation with National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and their International Federation.

Ghada Waly is the Director-General of the United Nations Office at Vienna and the Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. She holds the rank of Undersecretary-General of the United Nations. She previously served as Minister of Social Solidarity of Egypt and chaired the Executive Council of Arab Ministers of Social Affairs. She has also served as Assistant Resident Representative at the United Nations Development Program. Ms Waly holds an MA and a BA in humanities from Colorado State University.

The motivations of armed groups are widely considered to be irrelevant for the applicability of international humanitarian law (IHL). As long as organized violence is of sufficient intensity, and armed groups have sufficient capacity to coordinate and carry out military operations, there is an armed conflict for purposes of international law. It follows that large-scale criminal organizations can, in principle, be treated legally on a par with political insurgent groups. Drug cartels in particular, if sufficiently armed and well organized, can constitute armed opposition groups in the legal sense when their confrontation with State forces is sufficiently intense. This article problematizes this interpretation. It corroborates standing legal doctrine in finding that subjective motives are not a sound basis to exclude the application of IHL, but it argues that a workable distinction can be made between the strategic logic and the organizational goals of criminal groups and those of political insurgents. Drawing on a growing body of empirical studies on the political economy of criminal violence, a strong presumption is defended against qualifying as armed conflict organized violence involving criminal organizations.

Negotiations with organized crime groups occur more often than realized, and raise complex questions of ethics, practice and policy. Currently, law provides few incentives for States to choose the path of negotiation, and thus the political costs and moral hazards remain very high and a mano dura (“firm hand”) approach prevails. This paper examines some of the challenges faced by those who in good faith might initiate or participate in negotiations with such groups, offering an assessment of how those challenges can be mitigated and an inquiry, in particular, into how law and policy might be improved or reimagined to make such negotiation more feasible and effective in contexts of armed conflict or other situations of violence.

This article aims to clarify how international humanitarian law (IHL) rules on targeting apply when drug cartels are party to a non-international armed conflict. The question of distinguishing between a cartel's armed forces and the rest of the cartel members is a pertinent matter. It is crucial to avoid considering every drug dealer a legitimate target, just as we do not consider that everyone working for the government is a legitimate target. Nevertheless, it is unclear at what point a member of a cartel would change from being a criminal to being a member of the armed wing of the cartel, hence becoming a legitimate target. The present article will suggest a teleological approach to solving this conundrum.

Armed conflicts leave populations vulnerable to organ trafficking, a criminal enterprise with little international regulation when viewed separately from human trafficking. The Council of Europe's Convention against Trafficking in Human Organs is the only instrument to contemplate the responsibility of actors involved in organ trafficking, but traffickers may go unpunished due to its limited scope. Yet in armed conflict, international humanitarian law offers additional protection. The rules protecting the living and the dead against ill-treatment provide the basic level of protection necessary to consider the international responsibility of organ trafficking networks and the individual criminal responsibility of their members.

Water is the lifeblood of human beings and society, but threats to water, such as the pollution of rivers, cyber crimes, and attacks against water infrastructure, are increasing. In green criminology, scholars have relied on domestic criminal law to develop the concept of crimes against water. This paper argues that international law could provide several frameworks for addressing these crimes. A number of international treaties and customary rules deal directly or indirectly with crimes against water, and the United Nations Security Council has also dealt with crimes against water committed by terrorist groups and parties to armed conflict. Crimes against water may represent violations not only of domestic criminal laws but also of international humanitarian law and human rights law.

In terms of its disruptive impact and intensity of violence, banditry is the gravest security threat that Nigeria currently faces, and it is driving her worst national humanitarian crisis in decades. There are contests about the origin, nature and the drivers of banditry and how well bandits by their modus operandi fit into the various definitional frameworks of an organized criminal group. The article examines what is known about bandits and banditry in light of existing definitional and conceptual paradigms of organized crime and criminal groups, and interrogates the applicability of international humanitarian law to this security crisis that characterizes the current face of conflict in the West African Sahel.

This article aims to demonstrate that respect for international humanitarian law (IHL) may help reduce the impact of organized crime in areas affected by armed conflict through a case study of the conflict in Sierra Leone (1991–2002). In this conflict, a symbiosis in violence was created, with diamond smuggling being essential to achieve the parties’ military objectives, and those objectives being increasingly shaped by involvement in diamond smuggling. This led to further violence connected with the conflict and breaches of IHL. Ensuring compliance with IHL may therefore reduce the impact of these activities in armed conflicts. An important tool in securing this compliance is the influence of other States not party to the conflict, further to their obligation to ensure respect for IHL.

This article addresses the situation of Mexican cartels in relation to the applicability of international humanitarian law (IHL). The analysis starts with a theoretical examination of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia criteria on intensity of violence and level of organization established for assessing the existence of an organized armed group in the context of a non-international armed conflict. The article further examines legal and non-legal literature with the purpose of providing elements to consider the rightness of applying IHL to criminal organizations, also considering similar scenarios in Latin America. The aim of this assessment is to provide additional elements for the consideration of whether IHL is suitable when addressing confrontations between certain criminal gangs and States. Additionally, the article assesses how the commercial purposes of these groups affect their organization and the nature of the violence in which they engage.

The idea that Rio de Janeiro has been plunged into an actual “war” against organized crime is widely discussed and is supported by an ever-increasing number of people in Brazil. Not surprisingly, such discourse has led to less protection for the civilian population, particularly in the so-called favelas, while allowing security forces to carry out operations with even greater relative impunity. This article argues that although urban violence in Rio de Janeiro is indeed a serious problem, it does not reach the threshold required to be considered a non-international armed conflict.

Fifty-two years ago, in 1971, President Nixon declared the “War on Drugs”, identifying drug abuse as a public enemy in the United States. Since then, US drug policy has been militarized and, more recently, privatized. Every year, the US government increasingly contracts private military and security companies to provide intelligence, logistical support and training to armed forces in drug-producing or drug-transit States. In Latin America, this militarization and privatization has increased the intensity of violence and has complexified domestic situations, to the extent that the existing international legal regimes now seem inappropriate to respond to the challenges posed by the War on Drugs. On the one hand, human rights law does not adequately address situations where the State faces organized crime groups that are able to control territory. On the other hand, international humanitarian law (IHL) was not created to address law enforcement situations, which the War on Drugs and the fight against organized crime ostensibly are.

This article examines the situation in Latin America, looking at examples of different types of situations through the lens of intensity and organization of the group involved and, in some cases, the group's control over territory. It discusses the application of IHL and human rights law (focusing on the inter-American system of human rights) in these situations and their complementarity, and debates how these bodies of law are adapting or may need to be adapted.

Violent conflicts involving non-State armed groups challenge conventional perceptions of war and armed conflict. Criminal enterprises (transnational organized criminal groups including gangs and cartels) are involved in violent competition for both profit and territorial control in many parts of the world. This paper examines the situation in Mexico and Brazil as case studies to assess the legal challenges to criminal armed violence when criminal groups battle among themselves and the State. The paper focuses on the operational challenges and considerations facing police, military, and security forces and justice institutions to illuminate the legal challenges.

This article analyzes whether and to what extent energy resources fulfil the definition of military objective within the meaning of international humanitarian law (IHL) and customary IHL. In order to bring conceptual clarity to the duty to protect the natural environment in armed conflict, the article explores the legal limits to the destruction of energy resources (that are part of the natural environment) controlled by armed non-State actors during non-international armed conflicts (NIACs). It examines the practice of the United States, which characterizes the destruction of the natural environment during hostilities as being related to targets that contribute to the “war-sustaining capability” of enemies. Conceptual light is shed on the legality of attacks on oil refineries and installations during NIACs as a matter for IHL.

Approximately 100 years ago, a colonial conflict of great breadth began on the south side of the Mediterranean. Initially seen as an “indigenous” rebellion, the conflict evolved into an intense war, the final phase of which involved the intervention of two great colonial powers (France and Spain). Looking at the Rif War (1920–1926) in a region of what is now Morocco, then claimed by Spain, as an example, this article presents a critical analysis of a conflict rich in lessons for current humanitarian challenges and the sometimes-difficult relationship between humanitarian actors and the parties to a conflict. Assessed in the light of its human cost, which is largely forgotten today, the Rif War can feed debates through necessary historical reflection surrounding humanitarian action and the role of the International Committee of the Red Cross. It will also examine the complicated connections between historical truth, collective memory and the political difficulties inherent to reconciliation.