Attaher Zacka Maïga was born on 10 May 1963 in Bia, Bourem Cercle, Gao Region, Mali. He has spent his life in the service of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, joining the Mali Red Cross as a volunteer in 1987 before working for the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies as a nutritionist in a pilot centre for nutritional recovery and education in Bourem from January 1988 to June 1990. In 1990 and 1991 he acted as consultant to a number of organizations, including World Vision and UNICEF.

In April 1992, Attaher Maïga joined the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) as a “resident” (i.e. local) employee. Since then, he has held many positions. From 1996 to 2000, he was in charge of the Gao office, which employed almost 100 staff, both resident and “mobile” (expatriate). He then took charge of the ICRC's programmes in northern Mali from 2001 to 2006, ran the organization's office in the Malian capital Bamako from 2007 to 2008 and was responsible for the Mali communication programme between 2009 and 2011. From November 2011 to November 2014, he was head of the ICRC's northern Mali sub-delegation, one of the first resident employees to lead an ICRC sub-delegation. Since 2015, Attaher Maïga has been Networking Coordinator for the ICRC's Mali delegation.

In 1996, Mr Maïga initiated the ICRC's post-conflict programmes in his country, covering the fields of agriculture, veterinary services and health. In 2009, he launched a pilot migrant project in Kidal, northern Mali. These much-appreciated initiatives resulted in his being invited to participate in the 2010 Montreuil meeting, which laid the foundations for the reforms currently underway.

Attaher was the first Mali focal point for the ICRC's Unit for Global Affairs. This role gave him a deeper understanding of trends in the Islamic world and enabled him to help the ICRC adjust its dialogue with Jihadist armed groups. Our interview with Mr Maïga highlights his extensive experience with one of the oldest humanitarian organizations and is an opportunity for him to share his understanding of the ICRC's interaction with the armed groups that controlled northern Mali in 2012, when he was representing the ICRC in the region.

Attaher Maïga holds a degree in public administration from the Institut de Gestion et des Langues Appliquées aux Métiers, Bamako.

In recent non-international armed conflicts in countries such as the Central African Republic, Iraq, Libya, Nigeria, South Sudan, Syria, Ukraine and Yemen, various non-State armed groups (NSAGs) have exercised control over territory and people living therein. In many cases, and for a variety of reasons, NSAGs perform some form of governance in these territories, which can include the maintenance of order or the provision of justice, health care, or social services. The significance of such measures became particularly apparent when in 2020 not only governments but also armed groups took steps to halt the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic. This article examines key legal issues that arise in these contexts. First, it analyzes the extent to which international humanitarian law protects the life and dignity of persons living under the control of NSAGs, rebutting doubts as to whether this field of international law has a role in regulating what is sometimes called “rebel governance”. Second, it provides a brief overview of aspects of the lives of people in armed group-controlled territory that are addressed by international humanitarian law and aspects that instead fall into the realm of human rights law. Third, the article discusses whether and to what extent human rights law can be said to bind NSAGs as a matter of law and flags issues that need further attention in current and future debates.

This article examines the presence of 605 armed groups in today's conflict environment by bringing new evidence based on internal research. It looks in particular at the way these non-State entities provide varying degrees of services to the population in the spaces that they control, and how this might impact the way a humanitarian organization like the ICRC engages with them in a dialogue over time. This model of analysis is then used to situate and better explain armed groups’ positions on the COVID crisis.

This article examines whether and how non-State armed groups, as distinct entities, might be required to provide reparations for their violations of international humanitarian law. It shows that the possibility of holding armed groups to reparations is marked by uncertainty in international law. This complex question calls for clarification. In building on these observations, the article explores how the duty to provide reparations by armed groups could be operationalized as a matter of lex ferenda. This exercise involves examining how such a duty could be conceptualized and put into practice. From this discussion, a multi-faceted proposal emerges, which draws upon existing approaches in international law and responds to the particular challenges presented by armed groups. The article ends by considering the implications of the proposal.

Atrocities by non-State armed groups (NSAGs) often capture international attention, but efforts to repair the harm they have caused are often overlooked. This article traces out some of the practices and tensions in NSAGs making reparations during wartime and in post-conflict transitions. It argues that engaging in reparations for acts committed by NSAGs can not only encourage greater compliance with international humanitarian law but also build support amongst civilian populations during armed conflict and facilitate ex-fighter reintegration at the end of hostilities. Drawing from interviews with a number of armed groups, the article also suggests that engaging with the armed group's organization rather than just individuals themselves can be an effective way to collectively mobilize a group's motivation and capacity to deliver on reparations, including recovery of disappeared persons, restitution of property and apologies. As such, this article seeks to contribute to a deeper understanding of reparation practices by NSAGs in order to see how reparations can be mediated and a hierarchy of reparation obligations developed.

ICRC Position Paper March 2021.

In situations of national crisis, it is not uncommon to see community members join together to provide security services to their communities, gap-filling or supplementing the security services of the State. These “community defence groups” perform many roles, from operating checkpoints and conducting surveillance missions to patrolling roads and even participating in combined combat operations with the State. Unfortunately, while many community defence groups perform an important service for their community, some have been accused of serious human rights abuses or even war crimes. This article examines the circumstances in which a State might be responsible in relation to wrongful acts of community defence groups operating within their territory.

Each community defence group differs in its structure, its activities and its relationship with the State. As such, any assessment of the potential responsibility of the State will depend upon the particulars of each group and its operations. The contribution of this article is to provide a framework for assessing State responsibility in relation to community defence groups. It does so by examining the potential attribution of acts of the community defence group to the State, applying secondary rules of State responsibility. In addition, it also considers the potential responsibilities of the State under primary rules of international law, namely international humanitarian law and international human rights law, in circumstances where the primary wrongful act is not attributable to the State.

This paper examines the notion of intensity in the context of common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II (AP II) to the Geneva Conventions in order to establish whether AP II demands a different intensity threshold from the minimum threshold of intensity contemplated in common Article 3. The paper considers the question of whether the inclusion of the term “sustained” in the phrase “sustained and concerted military operations” intrinsic to the threshold in Article 1(1) of AP II introduces a temporal requirement in addition to mere protracted armed violence. The paper argues that the inclusion of the term “sustained” in Article 1(1) of AP II potentially demands prolonged protracted armed violence. The research aims to contribute to the existing literature on the notion of intensity demanded by the scope of application inherent in AP II through an interrogation of the phrase “sustained” military operations by employing the rules of treaty interpretation and by examining relevant case law and scholarly debate. In this way, the author hopes to contribute towards filling a lacuna with regard to the minimum threshold for intensity in the context of treaty law concerned with the classification of non-international armed conflicts.

This paper compares and contrasts the Islamic law of armed conflict with the modern international humanitarian law, with the view of identifying foundational similarities between these two separate canons, drawing extensively from al-Siyar al-Kabir. To this end, it raises the question as to whether the Islamic law of armed conflict is compatible with its modern counterpart, and, if it is, to what extent. To address these interlinked questions, the study departs from the premise that in order to identify resemblance, it is necessary to enquire into the foundations (both legal and philosophical) of the Islamic and contemporary approaches vis-à-vis armed conflicts.

“Secret societies”, “traditional hunters”, “charms” and “mystical weapons” are recurrent terms when analyzing some of the present armed conflicts in the Sub-Saharan region. However, though spiritual beliefs shape armed groups’ behaviour, and such beliefs are integrated into the modus operandi of some armed groups, the role of these beliefs in warfare is largely overlooked. Far from being something anecdotal or incidental, the invisible world plays a role in shaping armed groups’ behaviour and framing warfare dynamics. Spiritual beliefs might influence the respect afforded to international humanitarian law and international human rights law. Such beliefs may also serve various strategic functions, including for legitimation of the group, mobilization of support, control, cohesion, discipline, motivation and protection. Digging further into the matter and understanding how such beliefs impact the internal dynamics of armed groups and their external relations, including with the State, other armed groups and communities, is an essential part of understanding armed conflicts and their aftermath.

When hospitals are damaged or destroyed in armed conflict, the loss is far greater than the physical structures: safe spaces are lost, health outcomes worsen and trust in health institutions is undermined. Despite the legal protections afforded to medical units under international humanitarian law (IHL), attacks on hospitals are a recurring problem in armed conflict. In 2019, the Safeguarding Health in Conflict Coalition documented more than 1,203 incidents of violence against medical facilities, transports, personnel and patients in twenty countries. This article examines investigations of four post-Second World War incidents of attacks on hospitals in armed conflicts in Vietnam, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Palestine and Afghanistan, the role public advocacy campaigns played in bringing about these investigations, and how national and international authorities can work together to promote greater accountability for violations of IHL.

The legal implications of information activities in the context of armed conflict against the background of the digital transformation have so far received only scarce attention. This article aims to fill this gap by exposing some of the legal issues arising in relation to mis- and disinformation tactics during armed conflict in order to provide a starting point for further debate in this respect. Specifically, it explores the existence and content of existing limits imposed by international humanitarian law on (digital) information operations and inquires whether the current framework adequately captures the humanitarian protection needs that arise from such conduct.

Legislating for international courts and tribunals is a delicate and complex process, which sometimes results in unintended consequences. Arguably, the inclusion of a special intent requirement, also known as dolus specialis, concerning “private or personal use” in the definition of pillage under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court is one such consequence. But this is not the only reason why the war crime of pillage deserves special attention. On closer examination, other questions arise concerning its interpretation and application. What is the meaning of “military necessity” and “necessity” in relation to pillage, and how do they correlate with the special intent requirement? To answer these questions, the article examines the drafting history, law and current practice relating to the crime's ambiguous new element. It then proposes several avenues to address the recurring uncertainty regarding its meaning: conservative, radical and pragmatic.

This article examines the 2019 decision by the Supreme Court of Israel (the Court) in the Namnam case, upholding a ban on family visits to Gaza prisoners incarcerated in Israel and affiliated with Hamas.1 This ban was adopted as part of Israel's attempt to pressure Hamas into an exchange of Palestinian detainees and prisoners against missing Israeli civilians and the bodies of Israeli soldiers, apparently being held by Hamas in Gaza. The Court examined the measure primarily in light of Israeli administrative law, and held that it had no grounds to intervene. It held that an analysis under international law would have yielded the same result.

This article examines the decision of the Court in light of the applicable international law. It considers the Court's decision in terms of the permissible restrictions on the right to family life and draws on the Court's reasoning for an in-depth analysis of various unarticulated aspects of the prohibition on collective punishment. The article concludes that an international human rights law analysis might have led to a different outcome, and that had the Court applied the prohibition on collective punishment properly, it would have had to declare the measure unlawful. The article then places the decision in the broader context of the Court's engagement with international law in disputes relating to Palestinians residing in the West Bank and Gaza.

This article investigates the effects that attacks during armed conflict which damage water and wastewater services have on the outbreak and transmission of infectious disease. It employs a lens of uncertainty to assess the level of knowledge about the reverberations along this consequential chain and to discuss the relevance to military planning and targeting processes, and to the laws of armed conflict. It draws on data in policy reports and research from a wide variety of contexts, and evidence from protracted armed conflicts in Iraq, Yemen and Gaza. The review finds a strong base of evidence of the impact of attacks on water and wastewater services, and a high level of confidence in information about the transmission of infectious disease. One clear risk identified is when people are exposed to water supplies which are contaminated by untreated wastewater. Obtaining a similar level of confidence about the cause and effect along the full consequential chain is challenged by numerous compounding variables, though there are a number of patterns related to the duration of the armed conflict within which the attacks occur. As the conflict protracts, both the risk of the spread of infectious disease and the evidence base for gauging the reverberating effects becomes stronger, for example. The article concludes that the reverberating effects of damage from an attack can be foreseen in some contexts and can be expected to become more foreseeable over time. The analysis suggests that the most pragmatic path for military institutions and those involved in targeting operations to take this knowledge into account is through a “precautionary approach” which assumes the existence of the reverberating effects, and works them in to the standard information-gathering and planning processes.

In December 2019, the 33rd International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (International Conference) adopted Resolution 1 (33IC/19/R1), entitled “Bringing IHL Home: A Road Map for Better National Implementation of International Humanitarian Law” (Bringing IHL Home Resolution).

The publication Allies, Partners and Proxies: Managing Support Relationships in Armed Conflict to Reduce the Human Cost of War, launched on 14 April 2021, presents a framework developed by the International Committee of the Red Cross to encourage decision makers to take a holistic view of support relationships and their humanitarian impact. The point of this publication is to generate a comprehensive understanding of the stakes involved in support relationships and guide the decision-making process.

This position paper is available in the six United Nations languages at: https://www.icrc.org/en/document/icrc-position-autonomous-weapon-systems.

1. The use of weapons in outer space – be it through kinetic or non-kinetic means, using space- and/or ground-based weapon systems – could have significant impacts on civilians on earth. This is because technology enabled by space systems permeates most aspects of civilian life, making the potential consequences of attacks on space systems a matter of humanitarian concern.