In 1981, after nearly three years of drafting and deliberations, the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments of the Organisation of African Unity (O.A.U.) at its 18th Session adopted a regional human rights instrument— The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. Recent documentation indicate that an adequate number of ratifications have been received to bring the Charter into force. There has so far however not been any test of its provisions. Nevertheless this article will be devoted to a legal examination and in other ways to a speculative analysis of an aspect of one of the human and/or peoples' rights sought to be guaranteed in the Charter—the right to political self determination. This of course means that the very narrow scope of this paper will hardly touch on the economic aspects of self determination, which is also provided for in the Charter.

The countries of Southern Africa are facing growing demands for water, mainly generated by the requirements of agricultural and industrial development. An examination of the historical development of the water laws in the region indicates a trend towards increased government control over water rights. The extent to which rights that existed prior to the institution of government control are entrenched in, and protected by, new legislation is particularly worthy of study in respect of underdeveloped countries, where the traditional sector's developmental needs for water may only be recognised at a relatively late date. In the case of Swaziland, a series of broadly riparian water laws, and a primarily irrigated estate-based system of agriculture have led to a markedly unequal distribution of surface-water rights.

Legal education in Africa has attracted and will continue to attract the attention of scholars. An important reason is that African countries have enjoyed sovereign statehood for only a comparably short time, during which period transition, experiment, change, and even turmoil, have been the hallmark of society: all factors which must have a profound impact on received law (and, of course, on the primeval law), if this law is to serve effectively as a regulatory and stabilising device. This law, in its received cast, is thrown into a dilemma of turbulence; will it serve in wonted fashion, to give regularity, predictability, and a measure of reason? Or will it readily respond to inevitable change, so as to uphold new institutional positions? As President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia has observed:

“We live in a changing world, and one in which the pace of change is becoming even greater. Neither the character nor the needs of any given society can remain static, and if the law is to fulfil its proper function it must keep pace with the changes. This is not to say that the law must be a straw in the wind; if law is to be an effective instrument of social order it must be a stabilising influence, but it must be flexible and it must be progressive, else it will hinder society in its progress and development. …”

The elections in South Africa are only a start in that nation's task of purging itself of the inheritance of white minority rule. However successfully the democratic process endows organs of state with legitimacy in international forums, by and of itself the fact of black enfranchisement will not change black attitudes to a legal system which for decades willingly implicated itself in the systematic oppression of the non-white majority.

This article examines a recent attempt to promote sustainable forest management in Ghana through the Timber Resources Management Act, 1997. It places the Act in the context of massive deforestation and analyses its provisions imposing social and environmental conditions on the timber industry and giving a greater role to local communities. It warns that excessive government intervention may undermine the industry and the important part it plays in Ghana's economy.

Although the study of comparative law, or rather the study of foreign legal systems in a comparative manner, is in general of academic rather than practical value, except in so far as it gives us insights into the ideas, attitudes and procedures of our own legal system, yet for those who are concerned, as practitioner, judge or student, with certain types of legal system the position is radically different; I refer to legal systems in which internal conflicts of law arise. In such systems the judge is faced, constantly or even daily, with situations which require him, not merely to choose between one system and another as the appropriate one for the decision of the instant case, but to perform a running comparative interpretation, classification or analysis of the institutions of two or more legal systems, which must somehow be brought into harmony (one might aptly use the metaphor of meshing gears here). The part that a rule or a feature of one legal system plays in its functioning total legal complex must be understood, and the rule or feature must be properly characterised so as to permit it to be translated into another legal system which is administered concurrently with the first.

As I read Dr. Allott's article “Towards a definition of Absolute Ownership” I felt increasing dismay because it postulates and makes appear immensely difficult, a problem which in actual working practice barely exists at all. For over sixty years Settlement Officers in the Sudan have been successfully determining ownership without the help of any definition, and in Kenya, during the last five years, the ownership of over a million plots has similarly been decided by committees. Even in West Africa, where there has been no process of systematic adjudication, ownership has been determined in over three thousand cases in Lagos, and ownership is not defined. Indeed I am not familiar with any statute anywhere which does define it.

Nigeria was under military rule from 1966 to 1979, and from December 1983 to date; it had a short civilian interregnum from 1979 to 1983 during the era of President Shehu Shagari.

This rather long period of military administration in Nigeria brought along with it changes in the scope of substantive criminal law as well as procedural changes. This can be partly explained on the ground that the criminal law must react and adjust to societal changes and formulate its own rules to combat them. However, an assessment of the attitude of the military to criminal law might suggest that certain fundamental rules have been sacrificed for despatch.

This article is an attempt to highlight the contribution of the military administrations to the development and scope of criminal law in Nigeria. The approach is to examine the various important criminal law enactments of the military era with a view to see their impact, if any, on the hitherto existing rules and system of criminal law.

The judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights remains a challenge in many countries. This is generally attributable to the inadequacy of a particular country's legal framework, in particular its constitutional framework. Given the importance of judicial remedies in litigation, in particular public interest litigation, this article considers possibilities for the judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights in Botswana. It discusses the institutional, legal and constitutional framework for the promotion, protection and fulfilment of socio-economic rights in the country. It also tackles the issue of whether the judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights is easily achievable when those rights are not constitutionally entrenched. The article also considers whether the absence of directive principles of state policy within Botswana's Constitution is a hindrance to the judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights in Botswana. Within that context, it highlights the possible means of judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights in Botswana.

The adoption of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) has been a milestone for the transformation of Africa's political landscape. This instrument seeks to expand on the ideals of liberal democracy enshrined in the Constitutive Act of the African Union and other African fundamental instruments. The ACDEG seems to pave the way for the right to democracy for Africans, which entails, inter alia, political sovereignty of African citizens. The latter have clearly and vigorously exercised their sovereignty through elections when given such an opportunity. However, in some instances, African citizens resorted to popular uprisings in cases of gross violations of their democracy-related rights. With reference to the recent popular uprisings and coups (or attempted coups) in Africa, this article enquires, from a human rights perspective, whether ACDEG or other instruments, enshrine a right to resist gross undemocratic practices underpinning the right to democracy.

In Botswana, which has one of the fastest growing economies in the world, motor vehicle accidents have become a serious economic and social problem. The waste of human and material resources caused by the resulting deaths, bodily injuries and damage to property has for long been a matter of concern t o the government. This is particularly so because not only are financial resources diverted away from more productive purposes, but members of the public live in fear of being killed, maimed or suffering property damage with no certainty of compensation. Even motor vehicle owners are also adversely affected by the damage to their vehicles and the financially crippling risk of having to pay enormous amounts as damages.

The former (and late lamented) Chief Justice of South Africa, Justice Ismail Mohammed, once observed that:

“The constitution of a nation is not simply a statute which mechanically defines the structures of government and the relations between the government and the governed, it is a ‘mirror of the national soul’, the identification of the ideals and aspirations of a nation, the articulation of the values binding its people and disciplining its government.”

Further, as van der Vyer has warned, “. . . a superimposed constitutional formulae or constitutional arrangements that . . . do not address the real causes of discontent, are sure to generate their own legitimacy crisis.” It follows that the development of an appropriate procedure for constitution-making is of the greatest practical importance. This short comment seeks to examine critically the much-publicized efforts in Zimbabwe to develop a new autochthonous constitution and to draw some lessons therefrom.

This article analyses the interface between political globalization, citizenship and security threats in Africa. Political globalization is assumed to be capable of engendering inclusive citizenship; in the same way, citizenship is considered to be central to the national question in Africa. It is around citizenship that most issues of human rights revolve, both at individual and group levels. The article argues that political globalization in Africa tends to limit the meaning, essence and substance of citizenship, even if the latter is defined from a minimalist perspective of duties-rights relationships. The marginalization and/or exclusionary politics engendered by political globalization, especially for vulnerable groups such as ethnic minorities, women and youth on all fronts - political, economic and socio-cultural, amount to a gross violation of individual and group rights. Consequently, rather than engender inclusive citizenship predicated upon fairness, equality and social justice, the political globalization processes seem to have done otherwise, thereby perverting democratization and citizenship to become sources of security threats in Africa.

Provision for the redemption of alienated land exists in the customary law of many African tribes. Nor is it confined to Africa. Rattray, in discussing land redemption among the Ashanti, quotes the Levitical law of the Old Testament:

“The land shall not be sold for ever for the land is mine … if thy brother be waxen poor and has sold away some of his possessions and if any of his kin come to redeem then shall he redeem that which his brother sold.”

The power of the High Court to apply customary law in appropriate cases is now to be found in s. 17 of the Western Region High Court Law, 1954, No. 3 of 1955, which in this respect merely repeats in substance the provisions of s. 17 of the old Supreme Court Ordinance (cap. 211). The power to enforce customary law in the Region is, as is usual in other places, made subject to such law not being repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience or incompatible with legislative provisions. Also customary law may be applicable between “Nigerians” and “non-Nigerians” where otherwise substantial injustice would be done to either party, and the operation of customary law could be excluded either by the nature of the transaction in question or by the agreement of the parties.