This paper introduces the concepts of amount and speed of a discounting procedure in order to generate well-characterized families of procedures for use in social project evaluation. Exponential discounting sequesters the concepts of amount and speed into a single parameter that needs to be disaggregated in order to characterize nonconstant rate procedures. The inverse of the present value of a unit stream of benefits provides a natural measure of the amount a procedure discounts the future. We propose geometrical and time horizon based measures of how rapidly a discounting procedure acquires its ultimate present value, and we prove these to be the same. This provides an unambiguous measure of the speed of discounting, a measure whose values lie between 0 (slow) and 2 (fast). Exponential discounting has a speed of 1. A commonly proposed approach to aggregating individual discounting procedures into a social one for project evaluation averages the individual discount functions. We point to serious shortcoming with this approach and propose an alternative for which the amount and time horizon of the social procedure are the averages of the amounts and time horizons of the individual procedures. We further show that the social procedure will in general be slower than the average of the speeds of the individual procedures. For potential applications in social project evaluation we characterize three families of two-parameter discounting procedures – hyperbolic, gamma, and Weibull – in terms of their discount functions, their discount rate functions, their amounts, their speeds and their time horizons. (The appendix characterizes additional families, including the quasi-hyperbolic one.) A one parameter version of hyperbolic discounting, d(t) = (1+rt)-2, has amount r and speed 0, and this procedure is our candidate for use in social project evaluation, although additional empirical work will be needed to fully justify a one-parameter simplification of more general procedures.

The benefits associated with mortality risk reductions are a critical input for the benefit-cost analysis of economically significant federal regulations that affect health and safety. The dominant method of estimating the benefits of reducing mortality risks relies on labor markets to estimate the tradeoffs between workers’ wages and occupational risk. The past literature considers all labor market risks to be equivalent, failing to recognize the inherent heterogeneity in occupational hazards. In this research, heterogeneity in the value of reducing risks is explored within the labor market context. Unique location-specific risk data are developed for over 300 U.S. cities to separately identify the wage premiums for facing two disparate occupational risks: violent assault and motor vehicle accident risks. We find that ignoring the underlying heterogeneity in risks can lead to substantial over/under-statements of the benefits of reducing any one particular risk by up to 350%. As such, caution is urged for benefits transfer exercises that apply estimates of the marginal willingness to pay for reducing labor market accident risks to policies affecting very different risks, such as public safety or environmental risks.

The income elasticity of the value per statistical life (VSL) is an important parameter for policy analysis. Mortality risk reductions often dominate the quantified benefits of environmental and other policies, and estimates of their value are frequently transferred across countries with significantly different income levels. U.S. regulatory agencies typically assume that a 1.0 percent change in real income over time will lead to a 0.4 to 0.6 percent change in the VSL. While elasticities within this range are supported by substantial research, they appear nonsensical if applied to populations with significantly smaller incomes. When transferring values between high and lower income countries, analysts often instead assume an elasticity of 1.0, but the resulting VSL estimates appear large in comparison to income. Elasticities greater than 1.0 are supported by research on the relationship between long-term economic growth and the VSL, by cross-country comparisons, and by new research that estimates the VSL by income quantile. Caution is needed when applying these higher elasticities, however, because the resulting VSLs appear smaller than expected future earnings or consumption in some cases, contrary to theory. In addition to indicating the need for more research, this comparison suggests that, in the interim, VSL estimates should be bounded below by estimates of future income or consumption.

This paper deals with public investment in High-Speed Rail (HSR) infrastructure and tries to understand the economic rationale for allocating public money to the construction of new HSR lines. The examination of data on costs and demand shows that the case for investing in HSR requires several conditions to be met: an ex ante high volume of traffic in the corridor where the new lines are built, significant time savings, high average willingness of potential users to pay, the release of capacity in the conventional rail network and airports. On the contrary, net environmental benefits seem to be insignificant in influencing the social desirability of HSR investment. This paper discusses, within a cost-benefit analysis framework, under which conditions the expected benefits could justify the investment in HSR projects.

In order to be sensible about what discount rate to use one must be clear about its purpose. We suggest that its purpose is to help select those projects that will contribute more net benefits than some other discount rate. This approach, which is after all the foundation for benefit-cost analysis, helps to reconcile different suggested procedures for determining the discount rate. We suggest that the social opportunity cost of capital (SOC) is superior to other suggested approaches in its generality and its ease of use. We use the SOC to determine a range of real rates that vary between 6% and 8%. We suggest that approaches based on determination of preferences, which result in hyperbolic discounting, are less appropriate and less useful.

This article explores the combination of laboratory and field experiments in defining a welfare framework and the impact of different regulatory tools on consumer behaviors. First, an overview of strengths and weaknesses raised by the experimental literature show that, for food consumption, lab and field experiments may be complementary to each other. The lab experiment elicits willingness to pay useful for determining per-unit damages based on well-informed, thoughtful preferences, while the field experiment determines purchase/consumption reactions in real contexts. Second, the analytical approach suggests how to combine the results of both lab and field experiments to determine the welfare impact of different regulatory tools such as labels and/or taxes. Third, an empirical application focuses on a lab and a field experiment conducted in France to evaluate the impact of regulation on fish consumption. Estimations for the French tuna market show that a per-unit tax on tuna and/or an advisory policy lead to welfare improvements.

For more than 40 years, governments and professional associations have acted, voted or lobbied against the implementation of the Community Patent (COMPAT, officially called the EU Patent). The econometric results and simulations presented in this paper suggest that, thanks to its attractiveness in terms of market size and a sound renewal fee structure, the COMPAT would drastically reduce the relative patenting costs for applicants while generating more income for the European Patent Office and most National Patent Offices. The loss of economic rents (€400 million would be lost by patent attorneys, translators and lawyers) and the drop of controlling power by national patent offices elucidate further the observed resistance to the Community Patent.

The design of new hospital inpatient rooms is moving towards private (single occupancy) rooms. These rooms are generally preferred by patients and they may improve patient care, but they are more expensive to build and to staff than semi-private rooms. The question of their societal worth is important because hospitals are expensive, long-term investments and, once built, are prohibitively expensive to change. This paper presents a benefit-cost analysis of private rooms versus semi-private rooms in a proposed new hospital. We estimate that the net social benefit of a bed in a private room is about $70,000 more than a bed in a semi-private room.

One of the major difficulties in doing benefit-cost analyses of a development project is to estimate a total economic value of the project benefits, which are usually multi-dimensional and include goods and services that are not traded in the market, and challenges also arise in aggregating the values of different benefits, which may not be mutually exclusive. This paper presents an analysis of a non-motorized transport project in Pune, India, which uses the contingent valuation method to estimate the total value of the project benefits across beneficiaries. A sample of the project beneficiaries are presented with a detailed description of the project and then are asked to vote on whether such a project should be undertaken given different specifications of costs to their households. A function of willingness-to-pay for the project is then derived from the survey answers and the key determinants are found to include household income, distance to the project streets, current use of the transportation modes, future use of the project streets, predicted impacts of the project, and level of trust in the government. The total willingness-to-pay of the local residents is found to be smaller than the total cost of an initial design of the project. Heteroskedasticity is also found to present in the willingness-to-pay models.

In the field of health care management, contingent valuation surveys (CV) are used in cost benefit analyses (CBA) to elicit patients’ monetary valuation of program benefits. We considered the empirical situation of blood transfusions (BT) in cancer patients. Before planning such a CBA, we had to make sure that the CV approach could be used in a particularly critical clinical situation to estimate the marginal benefit of changing from hospital BT to home BT. The fact that the CV approach is feasible and acceptable to severely ill patients was not taken for granted a priori.

We measured patient’s willingness-to-pay (WTP) for home BT in a sample of 139 patients who received transfusions either at home or in the hospital. After considering patient’s participation to the survey and protest responses, we identified possible determinants of WTP values derived from previous knowledge, then we compared their expected influences to predicted influences resulting from econometric analysis to assess the validity of our results. Participation was high (90%) and few patients gave protest responses. Most patients (65%) had received home care, including 43% BT. The median WTP for home BT was 26.5 € per patient.

Good consistency was observed between the expected and predicted influences of possible determinants of WTP. The anchoring bias hypothesis was confirmed. The WTP for home BT increased with previous experience of home care, age, living far from the hospital and low quality of life. Our CV approach is thus a first contribution to the debate on the appropriateness of generalizing access to home BT. However, our results would be worth confirming with a formal cost-benefit analysis.

We evaluate the impact of three auction mechanisms—the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism, the second-price auction (SPA), and the random nth-price auction (NPA)—in the measurement of private willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept for a pure public good. Our results show that the endowment effect is lower with the BDM mechanism. In this market mechanism, the effect disappears after a few repetitions. Yet, on a logarithmic scale, the random nth-price auction yields the highest speed of convergence towards equality of welfare indices. We also observe that subjects value public goods in reference to their private subjective benefit derived from their public funding.

The federal Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), as amended in 1996, enables benefit-cost analysis (BCA) to be used in setting federal drinking water standards, known as MCLs. While BCAs are typically conceived of as a tool to inform efficiency considerations by helping to identify MCL options that maximize net social benefits, in this paper we also illustrate how important equity and affordability considerations can be brought to light by suitably applying BCAs to drinking water regulations, especially in the context of communities served by relatively small water systems. We examine the applicability and relevance of health-health analysis (HHA), and provide an empirical evaluation of the risk tradeoffs that may be associated with the MCL established for arsenic. We find that the cost-associated risks may offset a nontrivial portion of the cancer risk reduction benefits attributed to the MCL (e.g., the additional adverse health impacts from the costs may be roughly half as large as the number of cancer cases avoided). This reveals the relevance of using the HHA approach for examining net benefits of MCLs in small drinking water utilities, and raises issues related to whether and how these cost-associated health risks should be considered in BCAs for drinking water standards.

As traditionally conducted, benefit-cost analysis is rooted in neoclassical welfare economics, which, in its most simplified form, assumes that individuals act rationally and are primarily motivated by self-interest, making decisions that maximize their welfare. Its conduct is evolving to reflect recent work in behavioral economics, which explores the psychological aspects of decisionmaking. We consider several implications for analyses of social programs, focusing largely on economic valuation. First, benefit-cost analysis often involves valuing nonmarket outcomes such as reductions in health and environmental risks. Behavioral research emphasizes the need to recognize that these values are affected by psychological as well as physical attributes. Second, benefit-cost analysis traditionally uses exponential discounting to reflect time preferences, while behavioral research suggests that individuals’ discounting may be hyperbolic. While the appropriate rates and functional form are uncertain, market rates best represent the opportunity costs associated with diverting funds to support a particular social policy or program. Such rates reflect the intersection between technological progress and individual preferences, regardless of whether these preferences fit the standard economic model or a behavioral alternative. Third, behavioral research emphasizes the need to consider the influence of other-regarding preferences on valuation. In addition to acting altruistically, individuals may act reciprocally to reward or punish others, or use the status of others as the baseline against which to assess their own well-being. Fourth, behavioral economics identifies factors that can help researchers develop valuation studies that provide well-informed, thoughtful preferences. Finally, while behavioral research has led some to argue for a more paternalistic approach to policy analysis, an alternative is to continue to focus on describing the preferences of those affected by the policy options while working to ensure that these preferences are based on knowledge and careful reflection. Benefit-cost analysis can be best viewed as a pragmatic framework for collecting, organizing, and evaluating relevant information.

This article reviews the rationale for and various approaches used by economists to incorporate distributional consequences of projects or policies into benefit-cost analyses. Approaches reviewed include distributional weights and metrics based on the Lorenz curve. Analysis of distributional issues in partial equilibrium and general equilibrium settings are briefly reviewed. We present an empirical demonstration of how the contingent valuation method (CVM) and hedonic property methods (HPM) can be used to quantify how non-market environmental benefits are distributed by income and ethnicity. Using CVM, the distribution of non-market benefits can be cross-tabbed with respondent demographics, so that a variety of “distributions” of benefits by relevant demographic groups can be calculated. Using the HPM, the analyst can statistically test to see if the implicit price gradient varies with differences in income and ethnicity. In our empirical example, we find that ethnicity and income interaction terms on the implicit price gradient are statistically significant suggesting differential effects of National Forest fire suppression policies on Hispanics and low income households.

Benefit-cost analysis (BCA) is frequently applied to decisions involving public safety which requires analyzing risk and assessing options to manage risks. Principles and standards may assist analysts, decision-makers, and the public in developing and interpreting such BCAs. Principles and standards at best represent commonly held views among a community of practice. Such views are continually evolving with advances in the field. This paper presents a modularized format towards principles and standards that may assist in focusing discussion and decisions about whether such proposals actually reflect principles and standards within the benefit-cost analysis community of practice. Among topics covered are welfare measures, benefit or cost transfer, and valuing uncertain outcomes.

An understanding of the uncertainty in benefit and cost estimates is a critical part of a benefit–cost analysis. Without a quantitative treatment of uncertainty, it is difficult to know how much confidence to place in the benefit–cost estimates associated with regulatory analysis. In 2002, an NRC report recommended that EPA move toward conducting probabilistic, multiple-source uncertainty analyses in its RIAs with the specification of probability distributions for major sources of uncertainty in the benefit estimates. In 2006, reports by GAO and RFF found that EPA had begun to address the NRC recommendations, but that much remained to be done to meet the NRC concerns. This paper provides a further review of EPA’s progress in developing a quantitative assessment of the uncertainties in its health benefits analyses for the RIAs for four recent rulemakings setting National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS). In conclusion, EPA’s basic approach to presenting the uncertainty in its health benefits estimates remains largely unchanged. Recent RIAs present the results of uncertainty analysis in piecemeal fashion rather than providing an overall, comprehensive statement of the uncertainty in the estimates. In addition, the uncertainty analysis in recent RIAs continues to focus on the concentration-response relationship and largely fails to address the uncertainty associated with the other key elements of the benefits analysis.

In this note we discuss how to estimate the social discount rate when banks have market power. Some data from Sweden are used to illustrate the approach. If other investments are crowded out, the implied social discount rate is around 7 percent, i.e. more or less equal to the one suggested by Burgess and Zerbe (2011) for the U.S. but similar to those often used in the EU (3-4 percent) if private consumption is crowded out by the considered investment.

This is a comment on a paper by David F. Burgess and Richard O. Zerbe. It derives a different set of conclusions than the cited authors do from the customary premises underlying benefit-cost analysis. It concludes that capital should be shadow priced, and that the appropriate discount rate to use in benefit-cost analysis is the interest rate of the capital market to which the public sector has access. It proposes that a plausible source of the great divergence in approaches to discounting stems from different answers being given to the question of whether present day consumption has a future consumption opportunity cost.

We summarize procedures for assessing the benefits and costs of using labor inputs in public projects. Examples are provided to illustrate how information on labor inputs can be analyzed and presented such that, should the analyst choose, labor services generate elements of both benefit and cost in times of high unemployment; however, this is not generally correct in times of full employment. Our analysis is consistent with the overall goal of identifying those projects which are estimated to improve efficiency—those with social benefits in excess of social costs.