Scholarly opinion currently evinces disturbing symptoms of latent schizophrenia on the subject of economic growth in the ante-bellum United States. Virtually every student of the era now appears convinced that the long-term rate of growth of aggregate product per capita underwent a significant acceleration “somewhere during the period between 1815 and 1860,” as Douglass North recently phrased it. And, if many economic historians protest W. W. Rostow's labeling the years following 1843 as the period of the U.S. “take-off,” most do not seem to balk at accepting the guess hazarded by Raymond Goldsmith: “a fairly sharp break in the trend of real national product per head … occurred not very long before 1839,” quite probably during the 1830's. To the uninitiated, it might seem obvious that everybody also subscribes to an explicit set of assertions about the secular rate of growth of per capita product during the period from, say, the founding of the nation to the date of the putative acceleration; otherwise, how could all agree that a significant alteration in the trend had occurred?

Economic development depends on the establishment of appropriate institutions, such as a patent system that defends property rights in inventions. Skeptics argue that patents in early America were unenforceable because judges arbitrarily ruled against patentees. I examine 795 patent cases to assess the role of the courts and find that judges protected patent rights because they believed that inventors were motivated by expected returns. Although changes occurred in the 1850s, the courts consistently upheld the view that the patent system fostered economic growth. If inventive activity indeed responded to material incentives, this finding implies that the legal system stimulated technical change by reinforcing the effectiveness of the patent system.

The laws of the United States are extremely favorable to the division of property.

—Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America

Nineteenth-century laws granted wives previously withheld rights to their own property and earnings as well as liability for debts and contracts. I use 4,198 women's patents to assess whether these laws encouraged greater female commercial activity. Patentees were motivated by potential profits and were responsive to market incentives. Women's patenting jumped significantly in states with legal reforms and was lowest in states without such laws. Much of the subsequent increase occurred in metropolitan centers where property rights were of greater concern. Thus, by reducing transactions costs and increasing expected benefits, legal reforms arguably stimulated women's investments in patenting and commercial activities.

Five pitfalls commonly encountered in estimating the yield on British Consols are identified and discussed herein. The most difficult question is whether Consol prices in the later 1890s reflected expectations of a conversion of the Consol stock in 1923. This is equivalent to asking whether security markets in the 1890s regarded the then extremely low interest rates to be a temporary or permanent phenomenon. Predictions from estimated equations for the yield spread between other high-class investments and Consols are used to determine this question. A corrected monthly series of the yield on Consols between 1850 and 1914 is presented.

Conventional studies of the late-nineteenth-century international monetary system refer heuristically to “core” and “peripheral” countries. In this article, we seek to provide rigorous foundations to such expressions. Applying a formal procedure borrowed from network analysis produces indices of centrality and systematic rankings. We show that the international monetary system of the late nineteenth century is best described as a three-tier system. Other findings include the discovery of a closely knitted European foreign exchange system, a complete lack of foreign exchange linkages within Latin America, emerging intra-Asian relations, and a fairly late ascendancy of the U.S. dollar.

This article presents a critical survey of ten books from the history of capitalism, a newly emerging subfield of history. At their best, the books offer provocative insights and vivid descriptions of some of the darker episodes of our economic past. Yet specious arguments and failures of analytical reasoning sometimes undermine these books' effectiveness as social criticism. I highlight insights from the field of economic history that would strengthen the work of historians of capitalism. I also suggest some opportunities for dialogue, if not collaboration, between the two communities of scholars.

This article assembles new data and methods for studying wealth inequality trends in industrializing America. Inequality grew sharply between 1820 and 1850, leveled off, and increased steadily between 1870 and 1900. Inequality grew due to compositional changes in the population, but also grew within occupations, age groups, and the native-born population. Proposed labor-market explanations are inconsistent with the fact that wealth inequality between occupational groups was declining. Wealth accumulation patterns are also inconsistent with the hypothesis of child default on responsibilities for old-age care. We propose research on a new explanation based on luck, rents, and entrepreneurship.

Few stones have remained unturned in an effort to reconstruct Anglo-American history in the critical years from the Treaty of Paris in 1763 to the outbreak of the Revolution in 1775. Much has been learned by investigating such problems as public finance, colonial administration, and mercantile policy within the context of an expanded British empire. It is not always realized, however, that by the Treaty of 1763 Great Britain acquired new fields for capital investment as well as vast new lands to govern. In addition to taxation and public expenditure, such problems were raised as capital recruitment and allocation, the modification of financial institutions, and the adjustment of debtor-creditor relationships. Though distinct in certain respects, public and private finance impinged upon each other in the period from 1763 to 1775. This was especially the case after the British credit crisis of 1772, when, in addition to the controversy over tea, debtor-creditor relations between the thirteen colonies and the mother country underwent marked deterioration.

This article explores the location of industry in pre–World War I Britain using a model that takes account both of factor endowment and also of New Economic Geography influences. Broadly speaking, the pattern of industrial location in this period was quite persistent and regional specialization changed little. The econometric results show that factor endowments had much stronger effects than proximity to markets, although the latter was an attraction for industries with large plant size. Overall, falling transport costs had relatively little effect on industrial location at a time when proximity to natural resources, notably coal, mattered most.

This article proposes a reinterpretation of the failure of interwar British productivity levels to match those of the United States. We argue that key elements in poor British productivity performance included inadequate human capital, a bargaining environment that allowed workers to maintain restrictive practices, and collusive agreements that limited the exit of inefficient firms. We suggest that weaknesses in the structure of British firms pointed out by Chandler and his followers have been overemphasized and that more attention should be given to the role of the market environment in determining the conduct of business.

The debate over the institutions that link economic growth to public finance tends to disregard the need for savings to finance growing public debt. In seventeenth-century Holland the structure, size, and issuing rates of the debt were determined by investors' preferences, wealth accumulation, and changing private investment opportunities. The growth of savings enabled the creation of a huge debt largely with short-term bills. Issuing rates dropped because savings outstripped private investment alternatives. In Holland, and probably elsewhere as well, credible commitment and efficient fiscal institutions were necessary, but not sufficient to create liquid secondary markets and low costs of capital.

The battle over gold is typically explained as driven by proinflation debtors. However, going off gold would also have caused a depreciation, raising tradable prices relative to nontradables prices and helping producers of exportable primary products. An analysis of Congressional votes on monetary legislation indicates that higher constituency debt levels were not associated with opposition to gold, whereas mining and agricultural production were. This suggests that gold politics was at least as much about the impact of the exchange rate on relative prices as it was about inflation of the overall price level.

The relative price of capital goods, an important component of the user cost of capital, has rarely been incorporated into comparative studies of long-run capital accumulation. This article constructs and explores a data set for capital-goods and equipment prices covering the 1870–1950 period for 11 OECD countries. We document substantial differences across countries in the relative prices of capital goods, but also find convergence in those prices over time. Finally, we show that relative capital-goods prices are strongly negatively correlated with investment rates.

The usual picture of the medieval peasantry is based on nineteenth-century scholarship, which has proven difficult to dislodge from educated minds. This article continues the revision of an important detail in the picture, the scattering of plots in open fields. Some recent work on the subject by Robert Allen and Gregory Clark is midly disputed, and new evidence is presented that risk avoidance is the key to understanding peasant behavior. The reason for the scattering was not sentiment or socialism. Peasants were not perhaps rational in every detail; but they were prudent.

The contribution of railroads to economic growth in the nineteenth century depended on two critical variables: unit savings in transport costs the railroads made possible and the quantity of passengers and freight the railroads attracted. Unit savings depended mainly on geography; either cheap water transport existed before the railroads or it did not. Unit savings depended secondarily on the value of the time the railroads saved and on the flexibility in selection of routes made possible by the new technology. The quantities of passengers and freight actually transported depended on two interrelated factors: the prior development of the economy and its responsiveness to cheaper transport.

This article assesses train speeds in England and Wales 1843–1912. Trains were fast compared with coaches or walking, and the social saving of time saved grew over time to become over 10 percent of national income in 1912. Including fare savings as well, social savings were 14 percent of national income in 1912, with consumer surplus of 6 percent. Time savings dominated fare savings once railways became a new good: travel for the masses. Using the social savings-total factor productivity identity, we show that railways accounted for around a sixth of economy-wide productivity growth in this era.

This study presents fresh evidence on nutrition and health in colonial Kenya by using a new and comprehensive data set of African army recruits and civilians and applying a powerful measure of nutritional status: mean population height. Findings demonstrate huge regional inequalities, but only minor changes in the mean height of cohorts born 20 years before and after colonization. From 1920 onwards secular improvements took place, which continued after independence. I conclude that however bad colonial policies and devastating short-term crises were, the net outcome of colonial times was a significant progress in nutrition and health.

This study establishes long-term trends in the purchasing power of the wages of unskilled workers and develops estimates for GDP per capita for medieval Egypt and Iraq. Wages were heavily influenced by two long-lasting demographic shocks, the Justinian Plague and the Black Death and the slow population recovery that followed. As a result, they remained above the subsistence minimum for most of the medieval era. We also argue that the environment of high wages that emerged after the Justinian Plague contributed to the Golden Age of Islam by creating demand for higher income goods.

This article asks whether the vaunted comparative stability of the Canadian banking system has been purchased at the cost of creating an oligopoly. We assembled a data set that compares bank failures, lending rates, interest paid on deposits, and related variables over the period 1920 to 1980. Our principal findings are (1) interest rates paid on deposits were generally higher in Canada; (2) interest income received on securities was generally slightly higher in Canada; (3) interest rates charged on loans were generally quite similar; and (4) net rates of return to equity were generally higher in Canada than in the United States.

Many distinguished foreign visitors to the United States in the 1850s commented on the advanced states of mechanization in manufacturing. But why, at the same time, were interest rates higher and the aggregate manufacturing capital stock lower in American than in Britain? We resolve this paradox by noting that British engineers were most impressed by only those industries which relied on skilled workers. Using production parameters estimated from 1849 census data, we develop a computable general equilibrium model of the American and British economies which reconciles the apparently contradictory evidence.