I show that hedge funds react to unrealized losses on their passive positions by engaging with the management. The hedge fund managers’ psychological response is consistent with cognitive dissonance: They blame the firms’ management and switch to activism. The loss, which is hedge fund-investment specific, is distinct from economic factors such as the firm’s industry-adjusted performance. Loss-driven activism is more likely to be unfocused on specific issues and results in worse firm performance. This study shows that an overlooked consequence of unrealized losses is to trigger an active engagement with the firm.

We introduce a test to assess mutual funds’ “conditional” performance that is based on updated information and corrects data snooping bias. Our method, named the functional false discovery rate “plus” ($ {\mathrm{fFDR}}^{+} $), incorporates fund characteristics in estimating fund performance free of data snooping bias. Simulations suggest that the $ {\mathrm{fFDR}}^{+} $ controls well the ratio of false discoveries and gains considerable power over prior methods that do not account for extra information. Portfolios of funds selected by the $ {\mathrm{fFDR}}^{+} $ outperform other tests not accounting for information updating, highlighting the importance of evaluating mutual funds from a conditional perspective.

I develop a dynamic model to investigate how labor mobility impacts firms’ decisions. In the model, firms make investment and financing decisions, hire labor with different skill and mobility levels, and set wages through bargaining. The model predicts that, in response to an increase in labor mobility, high-skill firms operate with lower financial leverage, become less responsive to investment opportunities, and invest at lower rates, while low-skill firms remain unaffected. I confirm these predictions in the data using shocks to workers’ mobility across firms. The results are useful in understanding the effects of labor mobility changes driven by government policies or technological shocks, such as the rise of remote work.

This study analyzes meetings of firms with policymakers at the European Commission (EC). Meetings with Commissioners are associated with positive abnormal equity returns for U.S. firms. Firms of the European Union (EU), however, do not experience significant value increases. We identify regulatory outcomes as a channel that can rationalize this difference in value effects of political access. U.S. firms with meetings are more likely to receive favorable decisions in their EC merger decisions than their EU peers. The results suggest that cross-border political access can alleviate uncertainties and alleged discriminatory behavior of regulators in foreign markets.

We investigate whether chief financial officers (CFOs) serving on U.S. corporate boards benefit shareholders in M&A transactions. We find that acquisitions made by firms with CFOs on boards have significantly better acquirer announcement returns. This is due to the CFO director’s ability to select targets with better strategic and financial fit. CFO board membership can create shareholder value if there are effective governance regimes restraining managerial entrenchment and CFOs’ interests are closely aligned with those of shareholders through equity ownership. Furthermore, sitting on boards enables CFOs to secure more and cheaper financing for their acquisitions.

Corporate bonds’ book-to-market ratios predict returns computed from transaction prices. Senior bonds (even investment grade) with the 20% highest ratios outperform the 20% lowest by 3%–4% annually after non-parametrically controlling for numerous liquidity, default, microstructure, and priced-risk attributes: yield-to-maturity, bid–ask spread, duration/maturity, credit spread/rating, past returns, coupon, size, age, industry, and structural model equity hedges. Spreads for all-bond samples are larger. An efficient bond market would not exhibit the observed decay in the ratio’s predictive efficacy with implementation delays, small yield-to-maturity spreads, or similar-sized spreads across bonds with differing risks. A methodological innovation avoids liquidity filters and censorship that bias returns.

We examine the effects of a severe climate event on local firms. Our data include 8,218 business credit reports and a detailed survey of 273 businesses in the area affected by Hurricane Harvey. Delinquent credit balances doubled in areas with the worst flooding, although nonflooded areas also had significant credit impairments. Only independent businesses showed signs of distress; subsidiaries of larger firms did not. Firms were largely uninsured and often were denied credit postdisaster. Many funded recovery informally, such as through friends and family. Our findings suggest that several financial frictions compound the challenges posed by a severe climate event.

Using comprehensive account-level data, we separate Chinese retail investors into 5 groups and document strong heterogeneity in trading dynamics and performances. Retail investors with smaller account sizes cannot predict future returns correctly, display daily momentum patterns, fail to process public news, and show overconfidence and gambling preferences, while retail investors with larger account balances predict future returns correctly, display contrarian patterns, and incorporate public news in trading. Using performance measures established in previous literature, we find that smaller retail investors suffer from poor stock selection abilities and trading costs, while large retail investors’ stock selection abilities are offset by trading costs.

This article shows that changes in the tone of central bank communication have a significant effect on asset prices. Tone captures how the central bank frames economic fundamentals and its monetary policy. A positive tone surprise is associated with increases in stock prices and interest rates, whereas credit spreads and volatility risk premia decrease. These tone effects are robust to controlling for policy actions as well as for conventional measures of monetary policy shocks. Our results suggest that communication tone is a powerful instrument of monetary policy, which affects risk premia embedded in asset prices.

Machine learning-based stock market beta estimators outperform established benchmark models both statistically and economically. Analyzing the predictability of time-varying market betas of U.S. stocks, we document that machine learning-based estimators produce the lowest forecast and hedging errors. They also help to create better market-neutral anomaly strategies and minimum variance portfolios. Among the various techniques, random forests perform the best overall. Model complexity is highly time-varying. Historical stock market betas, turnover, and size are the most important predictors. Compared to linear regressions, allowing for nonlinearity and interactions significantly improves predictive performance.

We develop methods for testing factor models when the weights in portfolios of factors and test assets can vary with lagged information. We derive and evaluate consistent standard errors and finite sample bias adjustments for unconditional maximum squared Sharpe ratios and their differences. Bias adjustment using a second-order approximation performs well. We derive optimal zero-beta rates for models with dynamically trading portfolios. Factor models’ Sharpe ratios are larger but standard test asset portfolios’ maximum Sharpe ratios are larger still when there is dynamic trading. As a result, most of the popular factor models are rejected.

We show that the negative relation between real investments and future stock returns is primarily driven by the subsample of firms building additional capacity. We develop a real options model to rationalize that evidence based on the premise that firms need to learn how to best operate modern capacity vintages, inducing idiosyncratic uncertainty in that capacity’s production costs over the learning period. Conversely, the uncertainty lowers the expected return of firms with newly built capacity until it is resolved. Further evidence based on profit sensitivities to aggregate conditions; analyst forecast-error volatilities; and high- versus low-tech industry subsamples supports our uncertainty explanation.

Antitakeover measures are controversial because the evidence of their net effect on shareholders is mixed. We propose that, for many firms, the potential bonding benefits outweigh the agency costs of the quiet life, explaining the mixed results. We study business combination and poison pill laws as exogenous shocks to takeover vulnerability and use shareholder valuation of internal slack as an indicator of the net effect of takeover protection. Firms susceptible to quiet life agency problems exhibit a decrease in the market-assessed value of internal slack. Conversely, cash appreciates at companies where takeover protection bonds commitments with major counterparties.

We examine how changes in foreign labor regulations affect U.S. multinationals’ operating strategies. We show that firms with integrated operations in countries where labor regulations become tighter tend to establish arm’s-length relations with local business partners in that nation. The substitution between integrated and arm’s-length operations is stronger toward joint ventures than suppliers and weaker in the presence of financial constraints. Our findings are consistent with the idea that when firms find it harder to terminate their workers in integrated operations, they change to an operating model where it is easier to replace or discontinue business partners instead of employees.

Returns to currency carry and momentum compensate for the risk of global interest rate volatility (IRV), with risk exposures explaining 92% of the cross-sectional return variations. This unified explanation stems from its impact on foreign exchange intermediaries. An intermediary-based exchange rate model shows that a higher global IRV increases the uncertainty of future risk-taking and tightens current financial constraints. Position unwinding triggers loss of carry and momentum. Additional empirical results confirm this economic channel. Global IRV risk is also negatively priced in other currency strategies and momentum. The explanatory power is not driven by existing measures of uncertainty or intermediary constraints.

Mutual fund families increasingly hold bonds and stocks from the same firm. We present evidence that dual ownership allows firms to increase valuable investments and refinance by issuing bonds with lower yields and fewer restrictive covenants, especially when firms face financial distress. Dual holders also prevent overinvestment by firms with entrenched managers. Overall, our results suggest that mutual fund families internalize the agency conflicts of their portfolio companies, highlighting the positive governance externalities of intra-family cooperation.

This study analyzes Form D filings to understand brokered startup offerings. About 60% of brokers are FINRA-registered; the rest, “finders,” are not. Startups with fewer seasoned investors and more local brokers tend to use brokers. Venture capital firms rarely join brokered offerings, but non-accredited investors do, especially offerings with finders. Overall, brokers aid in raising capital. Yet, startups using finders often fail to exit successfully and close following funding. This implies finders might be directing funds from non-accredited investors to lower-quality startups. Brokers help startups raise money without VC support, but the effectiveness of this capital allocation is unclear.

Stock-market effectiveness in attracting and retaining firms under public ownership depends not only on stand-alone firms’ net listing benefits but also on gains from merging with a public acquirer. Using a novel merger-adjusted listing count, we show that the dramatic (≈50%) post-1996 U.S. listing decline—often attributed to declining listing benefits—is reversed as the “missing” firms de facto continue existing inside their public acquirers. Our merger adjustment also eliminates the U.S. listing gap, pointing instead to a distinct U.S. listing advantage: providing access to a well-functioning market for complex merger transactions.

Using real-time data, we show that currency excess return predictability is in part due to mispricing. First, the risk-adjusted profitability of systematic trading strategies decreases after dissemination of the underlying academic research, suggesting that market participants learn about mispricing from publications. Moreover, the decline is greater for strategies with larger in-sample profits and lower arbitrage costs. Second, the effect of comprehensive risk adjustments on trading profits is limited, and signal ranks and alphas decay quickly. The finding that analysts’ forecasts are inconsistent with currency predictors implies that investors’ trading contributes to mispricing and suggests biased expectations as a possible explanation.

I show that a tariff policy change that increased trade with China led to a decline in U.S. public listing rates and elevated industry concentration. Consistent with heterogeneous firm models of trade, the shock impeded the entry and performance of small domestic manufacturers but did not adversely impact large multinationals. In addition, stock price reactions to the tariff policy change and threat of reversal imply that trade liberalization creates or destroys value depending on firm size. These findings suggest that recent trends in the U.S. public equity market are driven, in part, by fundamental changes in the global competitive landscape.