The Stable (or Pareto-Lévy) distribution has been of considerable interest in describing the behavior of security prices ever since the important work by Mandelbrot [6], [7] and Fama [1]. The aforementioned contributions focused on the empirical hypothesis that security price data are better fitted by theoretical distributions with infinite variance rather than finite variance. Specifically, in the case of Stable distributions, the “characteristic exponent” is less than two, and the data are not adequately fitted by a normal distribution. Remarkably, however, although almost the entire body of literature addressing empirical questions with respect to the distribution of security prices investigages the behavior of the (natural) logarithm of security price relatives, to this author's knowledge no paper exists which analyzes the portfolio choice implications of the assumption that the logarithm of the asset returns has a symmetric Stable distribution with infinite variance. Thus, in Fama [2], Samuelson [10], and Ziemba [12], where the problem of selecting an optimal portfolio in Stable markets is the object of concern, one finds that it is assumed that the price-relatives (returns) have a Stable distribution; this rather than the logarithm of the price relatives. And it should be noted that none of these authors suggests that the untransformed price-relatives are better-fitted by a symmetric Stable distribution as compared with the logarithm of the price-relatives.

I find overlapping institutional ownership (OIO) in a customer and supplier increases the duration of their supply chain relationship. Results are stronger when vertical holdup is more severe. A quasi-natural experiment around mergers of financial institutions provides causal evidence of OIO improving relationship survival rates. Concurrent with longer-lived relationships, valuations and innovation increase, consistent with OIO effects on relationship longevity being beneficial. I find evidence of OIO strengthening relationships via an internalization channel: With more OIO, partners cooperate more, with the supplier extending more trade credit. Overall, results indicate OIO strengthens vertical relationships by alleviating holdup problems.

Two-pass cross-sectional regression (TPCSR) is frequently used in estimating factor risk premia. Recent papers argue that the common practice of grouping assets into portfolios to reduce the errors-in-variables (EIV) problem leads to loss of efficiency and masks potential deviations from asset pricing models. One solution that allows the use of individual assets while overcoming the EIV problem is iterated TPCSR (ITPCSR). ITPCSR converges to a fixed point regardless of the initial factors chosen. ITPCSR is intimately linked to the asymptotic principal components (APC) method of estimating factors since the ITPCSR estimates are the APC estimates, up to a rotation.

We examine the role of government in the labor–creditor relationship using the case of the Chrysler bankruptcy. As a result of the government intervention, firms in more unionized industries experienced lower event-window abnormal bond returns, higher abnormal bond yields, and lower cumulative abnormal bond returns. The results are stronger for firms closer to distress. We also observe the effect in firms in which labor bargaining power is stronger and those with larger pension liabilities. Overall, the results underline the importance of government as a significant force in shaping the agency conflict between creditors and workers.

We compare the stock return forecasting performance of alternative payout yields. The net payout yield produces more accurate forecasts relative to alternatives, including the traditional dividend yield. This remains true even after excluding several years during the Great Depression when issuance was unusually high. The measure of cash flow used to form the yield matters economically. Long-term investors’ hedging demand for stock is considerably reduced when net payout, rather than dividends, serves as the cash-flow measure. An agent relying on an incorrect payout measure is willing to pay an economically significant “management fee” to switch to the optimal policy.

Research departments are managed by directors of research (DORs). Subordinate analysts working for higher-quality DORs provide superior earnings forecasts that elicit stronger market reactions, provide better investment recommendations, and have better career outcomes. For the broker, higher-quality DORs drive more trading commissions. Economically, analysts benefit the most from DOR–analyst industry alignment resulting from DORs’ former analyst experience. We provide several tests to mitigate endogeneity concerns and explore various mechanisms to explain these results. Overall, our article identifies a unique channel whereby the industry-specific and general human capital of top management filters through to individual subordinates and consequently improves organizational performance.

Current literature stresses that efficient funds do not exist when asset returns are continuously distributed. This paper shows that the existence of efficient funds can be restored if security returns are generated by a linear factor model.

Do changes in stock market indicators, such as the short interest ratio, signal changes in stock prices? Popular stock market lore and numerous books and articles support the worth of “technical” analysis. On the other hand, to the extent that stock prices follow a random walk, technical indicators would seem to be of no value. The two positions can be reconciled to a degree by realizing that a variable can follow a random walk with respect to its own sequence and still be successfully predicated by some other variable(s). Furthermore, successful predications of stock prices can be made on the basis of available information, if that information is used in some unique manner that has not been fully developed by other market participants.

This paper describes the development and testing of a model of bank portfolio selection that considers variability of both income and gross asset levels as the risks involved in banking. In particular, the model is formulated as maximizing expected profit subject to risk constraints on wealth losses and the availability of liquid assets. The parameters for these constraints include the covariance matrices of rates of return on bank assets and deposit changes. Included in the latter category are fluctuations in business loans which are treated as negative deposits because, due to deposit feedbacks and the like, these can reasonably be considered exogenous to the short-run portfolio decision. Basically, the model is an extension of Markowitz's work [11] to incorporate problems associated with portfolios that include assets having imperfect markets and liabilities that are not completely under the control of the economic unit. As such, it is applicable (with minor institutional modifications) to the entire spectrum of financial intermediaries.

At any point in time a firm must decide both the level of working capital consistent with its productive assets and how to finance these assets. Academic theorists in business administration have traditionally approached decision making of the firm on a segmented rather than on a global basis and have been satisfied with developing suboptinizing decision rules. Thus there has been concern about managing working capital and concern about choosing the optimum capital structure, but traditionally the two decisions have not been made jointly. And even if they were made jointly, decisions would still remain in the working capital area involving inventories, credit granting, and marketable securities. This paper is an attempt to interrelate working capital and capital structure decisions with working capital used not only as a buffer to avoid ruin but also to affect sales via changing inventory levels and credit policies. The possibility of ruin introduces a discontinuity that precludes perfect elimination of leverage effects via a market.

We have proposed two additions to the theory of leverage optimization by firms operating in a competitively structured industry.

First, whether the capital market is or is not subject to leverage-related imperfections, the force of entry will cause the long-run relationship between profits, π, and leverage, γ, to be given by the equation

(17) π(γ) = 0.

Even if it is possible in the short run for firms to add positive increments to profits by increasing γ beyond its current level, competitive pressures will erode these increments completely.

Second, if the capital market is subject to leverage-related imperfections, firms will choose smaller leverage ratios than they would in the absence of these imperfections. If, in addition, the industry is subject to the force of entry, optimal leverage ratios will be even smaller. Put another way, each firm's leverage ratio in the long run will reflect not just the impact of imperfections on capital costs, but also the impact of entry on product price, output, and operating profits.

In this paper, we compare the robustness in application of the Gaussian assumption of security return distributions to the robustness of the general stable assumption. Using actual stock return data to simulate the “real world,” a stock market is constructed in which stock returns conform to a Gaussian distribution as well as to a stable Pareto-Levy distribution. Using these two sets of stock returns, efficient frontiers are generated under both assumptions of parametric environments. It is shown that the Gaussian assumption, and its incumbent statistical techniques, is preferable to the general stable assumption.

This article shows that changes in the tone of central bank communication have a significant effect on asset prices. Tone captures how the central bank frames economic fundamentals and its monetary policy. A positive tone surprise is associated with increases in stock prices and interest rates, whereas credit spreads and volatility risk premia decrease. These tone effects are robust to controlling for policy actions as well as for conventional measures of monetary policy shocks. Our results suggest that communication tone is a powerful instrument of monetary policy, which affects risk premia embedded in asset prices.

Theory predicts that capping brokers’ compensation exacerbates the exploitation of retail investors. We show that regulated caps on mutual fund 12b-1 fees, effectively sales commissions, are associated with negative equity fund performance, but only after a structural shift toward maximum permitted levels of the fees around 2000. Past this break point, flow–performance sensitivity shifts from the middle- to the highest-performing funds, suggesting that the fee cap increases performance-chasing behavior by constraining brokers’ incentives to learn about lower-ranked funds. The policy implication is that regulators must reevaluate the efficacy of caps on brokerage fees.

This article examines the effect of board governance on investment efficiency. I use the staggered enactment of board reforms in 41 countries as a shock to board structure that exogenously improves the quality of board oversight of managers. I find that investment-Q sensitivity improves by roughly half post-reform. This effect is more pronounced for firms that are more exposed to the reforms or when external governance mechanisms are less likely to discipline managers. These findings suggest that increased board oversight strengthens managers’ incentives to make investment decisions that are more in line with their firms’ growth opportunities.

Real option analysis typically assumes that projects are continuously evaluated and launched at precisely the time determined to be optimal, but real world projects cannot be managed in this way because of the costs of formally evaluating an investment opportunity. This paper shows that immediate investment is more attractive if evaluation costs are high or the amount of information to be revealed by an evaluation is large. The optimal delay until a reevaluation is long if evaluation costs are high or the amount of information to be revealed by an evaluation is small. The reduction in the value of project rights is especially severe when the value of the completed project is strongly mean reverting because then precision in investment timing is particularly important.

We study the role of state controlling shareholders in corporate payout policy. The State Capital Operation Program in China requires parent central state-owned enterprises (CSOEs) to contribute part of their consolidated income to a new fiscal fund. We find that listed CSOEs, partially controlled by parent CSOEs, experience significant reductions in dividend payouts as the income-contribution ratio increases. The dividend reductions are concurrent with increases in intragroup resource transfers—listed CSOEs’ loans to, and commercial trades with, group peers. The program yields adverse consequences for listed CSOEs’ investment and employment, yet being mitigated by group-level dividend reductions.

While corporate social responsibility by firms aims at improving welfare for different social groups, whether it achieves this is often difficult to measure. After Apr. 2018 protests, Starbucks enacted policies that anybody could sit in their stores and use the bathroom without making a purchase. Using anonymized cellphone location data, we estimate this led to a 7.0% decline in attendance relative to other nearby coffee shops. The effect is 84% larger near homeless shelters and larger for Starbucks’ wealthier customers. The average time spent per visit declined by 4.1%. Public urination citations decreased near Starbucks locations, but other minor crimes were unchanged.

Do language skills affect investment decisions? This article addresses this question by identifying the effect of English proficiency on the stock market participation of immigrants in the United States and Australia. To establish causality, we construct an instrumental variable for English proficiency by exploiting the phenomenon that younger children acquire languages more easily than older children. We find that English proficiency has a significant positive effect on stock ownership among immigrants in both countries. Moreover, we provide evidence that a reduction in information costs and an increase in trust may serve as the mechanisms underlying the language ability effect.

We began this paper by posing four questions about the characteristics of optimal geometric mean portfolios. Tentative answers to these questions were obtained from an examination of the solutions to a relatively large number of geometric mean portfolio problems generated from a Monte Carlo simulation of ex-ante security return data. The results of this examination can be summarized as follows. First, the number of risky securities contained in an optimal geometric mean portfolio depends on one's expectations concerning future market conditions and on the conditions under which borrowing is permitted. If all capital must be invested, the investor who believes the market will fall should invest in just one security, he who believes the market will remain unchanged should diversify among two securities, while he who believes the market will rise should diversify among four to seven securities. In the event that some capital must be withheld from investment, the investor who believes the market will rise and who can borrow on reasonable terms will again diversify among four to seven securities, choosing the same securities in the same relative proportions as in the preceding situation. Should the investor be permitted neither to borrow nor to invest all his capital, his best portfolio consists of two to four securities, assuming he expects the market to rise.