Solving capital budgeting problems with linear and integer programming has been part of the finance literature for some time [21, 22, 23, 7, 14, and 18]. Capital budgeting problems have unique properties that distinguish them from other integer linear problems discussed in the mathematical programming literature. Capital budgeting problems generally have the following characteristics: (1) the matrix tends to be rectangular with more variables than constraints; (2) they are all maximization problems with ≤ constraints and nonnegativity conditions in the general form 0≤xi≤1 in the case of linear programming and xi = 0, 1 in the case of integer problems; and (3) there are often mutually exclusive projects among the variables. The purposes of this note are to illustrate some computational experience using existing integer algorithms to solve a set of capital budgeting problems and to begin to catalog the performance of integer codes on financial problems.

We study securities market models with fixed costs. We first characterize the absence of arbitrage opportunities and provide fair pricing rules. We then apply these results to extend some popular interest rate and option pricing models that present arbitrage opportunities in the absence of fixed costs. In particular, we prove that the quite striking result obtained by Dybvig, Ingersoll, and Ross (1996), which asserts that under the assumption of absence of arbitrage long zero-coupon rates can never fall, is no longer true in models with fixed costs, even arbitrarily small fixed costs. For instance, models in which the long-term rate follows a diffusion process are arbitrage-free in the presence of fixed costs (including arbitrarily small fixed costs). We also rationalize models with partially absorbing or reflecting barriers on the price processes. We propose a version of the Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985) model which, consistent with Longstaff (1992), produces yield curves with realistic humps, but does not assume an absorbing barrier for the short-term rate. This is made possible by the presence of (even arbitrarily small) fixed costs.

We show that the currency risk embedded in the benchmarks of international mutual funds negatively affects fund performance. More specifically, a high benchmark-implied currency risk induces funds to invest in markets with less volatile currencies, leading to a higher degree of currency concentration in portfolio holdings. This currency concentration, however, departs from the optimal equity allocation strategy across countries and reduces fund performance. We document that funds resorting to high currency concentrations underperform funds with low currency concentrations by as much as 1%–2% per year.

An important maintained hypothesis in financial economics states that the average interest rate on a firm's debt is positively related to its leverage. This hypothesis has a long history going back at least to the work of Kalecki [4] where it was used to derive a determinate size for the competitive firm when the production function is homogeneous of degree one. The upward sloping interest rate-leverage relationship has also played an important role in the theory of finance. In this connection, it is somewhat interesting to find both Modigliani-Miller [5] and their many critics in complete agreement on the nature of this relationship. In particular, their statement on this subject conveys the impression that this relationship is governed by an unalterable law when they write: “Economic theory and market experience both suggest that the yields demanded by lenders tend to increase with the debt-equity ratio of the borrowing firm” [5, p. 273].

It has been said [2,4,5,6,7, and 8], and it seems to be widely accepted, that the geometric mean of the price relatives of a group of securities can be interpreted as the return which would have been earned on a portfolio of those securities, managed continuously over time to maintain an equal money investment in each security. This is a theoretical concept which could not be implemented literally by a portfolio manager, but it can still be treated rigorously in a mathematical sense. In a recent paper in this journal Rothstein [8] defined continuous reallocation as the limiting case of a policy which does have an operational definition. He showed that the index corresponding to a policy of the equalization of dollar investments approaches the geometrically averaged index as its limiting value. We shall argue that this interpretation of the geometric mean is a misleading one, since it depends upon assumptions which imply serious market inefficiencies.

The growing sensitivity of savings deposits to flow in response to changes in interest rate differentials has become so commonplace in the past decade that the term “disintermediation” has become a part of the economists' vocabulary. It is a major conclusion of this paper that the volatility of savings deposits began to increase as early as 1950 for savings and loan associations and credit unions and as early as 1945 for mutual savings banks. As an indication of this, we proxy changes in the competitive environment for savings deposits by making yearly estimates of the elasticity of savings deposits with respect to deposit rates at savings and loan associations, mutual savings banks, and credit unions.

Financial or capital market theory is intimately concerned with the concept of a general equilibrium. But most of the empirical work in finance has been concerned with the estimation of single-equation ordinary least squares cross-sectional models. One way of capturing some of the flavor of a general equilibrium is to use a simultaneous equation valuation model. Thus the value or the return on a security can be determined simultaneously in relationship to and in competition with the other securities in the system. Simkowitz and Jones [4] have recently described how the methodology could be used. Simkowitz and Logue [5] have recently performed a study using this methodology.

Models developed to explain variations in cash balances of firms have generally postulated forms of rational choice for the decision maker. Two examples of these kinds of models are (1) Baumol's inventory-type model where the choice of the initial balance is made in terms of a planning period in which outflows of cash, but no inflows, are considered; (2) Miller and Orr's model wherein inflows and outflows occur randomly and a decision is triggered to increase or reduce cash balances when an upper or lower threshold is passed. Statistical tests of the inventory-type model have had limited success, particularly in attempts to identify the increasing efficiency in the use of cash balances as a function of the size of the firm. The apparent linear double logarithmic relationship between cash balances of firms and their sales volumes has cast doubt upon the increased efficiency proposition that derives from the Baumol model. Meltzer has modified this model to demonstrate that it implies linearity. The Meltzer tests will be challenged in this paper, and we shall establish that his results, as well as Baumol's conclusions, are particular outcomes that can be better explained in another type of model.

This note has given results for the probability of committing a Type I error in first-order stochastic dominance when it is assumed that both options have been sampled from the same distribution of returns. The probabilities are based on known results in the stochastic processes and statistical goodness-of-fit literatures, but have not been recognized in connection with the problem of estimation of risk in stochastic dominance. Further work on FSD Type II error probabilities based on ideas in this paper is in progress.

We document that the likelihood of asset sales increases with union presence and union wages. Furthermore, acquiring firms gain significant concessions from the incumbent union following asset sales. Finally, the anticipation of union concessions helps explain the excess stock returns around asset sale announcements. We find no comparable effects for takeovers. We conclude that asset sales, but not takeovers, are partially motivated by the potential to extract concessions from unions.

Foreign migration flows have important stock market consequences. Foreign-born resident networks within U.S. Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) are associated with excess return comovement between locally headquartered stocks and American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) from countries with ties to the MSA through the network of foreign-born residents. This comovement is hardly due to correlated fundamentals and at least partially driven by correlated trading within members of a common investor base consisting of foreign-born residents. Our evidence has implications for both investors and foreign multinational corporations (MNCs) seeking to reap benefits from cross-listings and is consistent with the notion that foreign-born residents exhibit both local bias and home (country) bias.

We provide evidence of a network of information flow between activists and other investors prior to 13D filings. We match EDGAR search activity to investor IP addresses, identifying specific investors who persistently download information on an individual activist’s campaign targets in the days prior to that activist’s 13D disclosures. This outside investor’s knowledge of pending activist campaign plans seems to benefit both parties: the informed investor, unnamed in the 13D, increases its holdings in the targeted stock prior to the price surge upon 13D disclosure, while the activist earns voting support that increases their likelihood of pursuing and winning a proxy fight.

We examine forward prices in a market where nonstorable inventory exacerbates the influence of seasonal and hourly variation in supply and demand, expected and unexpected, on the level and volatility of spot prices. We find strong evidence, unusual for a commodity, that the difference between contemporaneous forward and spot prices has power to forecast both the spot price change and the risk premium realized at delivery. Our evidence of a time-varying risk premium is consistent with expected hourly and seasonal variation in the needs of producers and retailers of electricity to hedge against extreme spot price decreases and increases, respectively.

Private information imposes a severe trading disadvantage on uninformed traders while at the same time providing firms with valuable signals for investment adjustment. The two forces have opposite impacts on the cost of capital, and the net effect depends on which force dominates. We show that stocks of firms with low flexibility in investment adjustment (“value firms”) command an information premium, whereas stocks of firms with high flexibility in investment adjustment (“growth firms”) deliver an information discount. These results are consistent with the findings that growth firms exhibit stronger investment sensitivity to information in stock prices than value firms.

The U.S. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has released a database of consumer complaints about banks’ financial products to the public since 2013. We find a greater reduction in mortgage applications to banks that receive more mortgage complaints in local markets after the disclosures. The effect is stronger in areas with more sophisticated consumers and higher credit competition, and for banks receiving more severe complaints. The number of monthly mortgage complaints per bank exhibits faster mean reversion after the publication of the database. These findings suggest that the public disclosure of mortgage complaints enhances product market discipline and consumer financial protection.

In a recent paper Lloyd and Shick (LS) [4] report empirical results of tests of Stone's [7] two-factor model. Based on a sample of 60 banks and the 30 Dow Jones stocks, LS conclude that their findings generally support Stone's model. That is, an “interest rate risk” proxy appears to explain an additional portion of the variability of the sampled security returns over and above the variability due to an equity market proxy.

The purpose of this paper is to provide evidence that the Bureau of the Census' X–ll program for seasonal adjustment [3] overstates the incidence of seasonality in some forms of times series data. This problem arises in a recent study by Bonin and Moses [1] (hereafter B-M) indicating that 7 of the 30 Dow Jones Industrial stocks exhibited persistent seasonal patterns during the period July 1962 through June 1971.

Price adjustment delays occur between in-the-money convertible preferred stock prices and common stock prices. Convertible preferred prices systematically deviate from the prices predicted from their conversion relations with common stocks. The price predictability stems from price changes in the underlying common stocks leading the price changes in the convertible preferred stocks by up to nine hours. Cross-sectionally, about 70 percent of the variation in the unsigned size of the price deviations is explained by proxies for costs of arbitrage.

Although Imai and Rubenstein are correct that our proof — that the Miller- Modiglianl (M-M) and Sharpe-Lintner-Mossin (S-L-M) capital asset pricing models are mutually consistent — is incomplete, their comments indicate some confusion about the relationships involved in the equilibrium pricing of assets in these models. Further, they seem to imply that Stiglitz's proof in terms of dollar returns is in some sense superior to a proof in terms of rates of return. This is erroneous. Accordingly, we shall further clarify the relationships inherent in the models and correct our presentation of the proof of the invariance of capital costs in the context of the S-L-M model.