Bayesian learning claims that the strength of the price impact of unanticipated information depends on the relative precision of traders' prior and posterior beliefs. In this paper, we test for this implication of Bayesian models by analyzing intraday price responses of T-bond futures to U.S. employment announcements. By employing additional detailed information in addition to the widely used headline figures, we extract release-specific precision measures. We find that the price impact of more precise information is significantly stronger, even after controlling for an asymmetric price response to “good” and “bad” news. This result strengthens previous findings that differences in earnings response coefficients across companies are related to proxies for the credibility of the reported financial information.

This paper provides an analysis of the predictability of stock returns using market-, industry-, and firm-level earnings. Contrary to Lamont (1998), we find that neither dividend payout ratio nor the level of aggregate earnings can forecast the excess market return. We show that these variables do not have robust predictive power across different stock portfolios and sample periods. In contrast to the aggregate-level findings, earnings yield has significant explanatory power for the time-series and cross-sectional variation in firmlevel stock returns and the 48 industry portfolio returns. The mean reversion of stock prices as well as the earnings' correlation with expected stock returns are responsible for the forecasting power of earnings yield. These results are robust after controlling for bookto-market, size, price momentum, and post-earnings announcement drift. At the aggregate level, the information content of firm-level earnings about future cash flows is diversified away and higher aggregate earnings do not forecast higher returns.

Several studies (see [7], [15], [9], and [16]) have attempted to ascertain the empirical relationships that exist between the financing and investment decisions of firms. The primary impetus for these efforts was provided by Modigliani and Miller (MM) [20], [21] when they demonstrated that under the assumption of perfect capital markets, the optimal investment decisions of a firm are separable from its financing decisions. In the presence of market imperfections, interdependencies between these decisions that violate the basic MM propositions may exist. Therefore, the studies referred to above have essentially focused upon determining whether market imperfections have been of sufficient magnitude to lead to joint determination of investment and financing decisions. Though the original MM propositions were introduced more than two decades ago, the nature of the empirical relationship between investment and financing decisions remains a controversial issue. The fact that this matter is still unresolved is not attributable to a lack of attention, for the original propositions have been examined in the presence of taxes, bankruptcy costs, and agency costs with no clear consensus emerging.

Recent studies suggest the transfer of privileged information via social ties but do not explicitly examine the cost of these ties to shareholders. We document a significant positive relation between stock transaction costs and a company’s social ties to the investment community. Social ties based on education and leisure activities, stronger ties, and ties to individuals responsible for trading have greater effects. Using investment connection deaths as natural experiments, we document that exogenous severance of ties reduces trading costs and trading activities by connected parties. Our evidence illustrates an important and previously undocumented consequence of social ties.

The widespread notion that dollar-cost averaging can help an investor minimize the risk of investing all of one's capital in the market at an inappropriate time is aptly stated by Malkiel [4, p. 242]:

Periodic investments of equal dollar amounts in common stocks can substantially reduce (but not avoid) the risks of equity investment by insuring that the entire portfolio of stocks will not be purchased at temporarily inflated prices. The investor who makes equal dollar investments will buy fewer shares when prices are high and more shares when prices are low.

This article provides evidence that firm value declines when credit default swaps (CDSs) are initiated and that the effect is greater when CDS trading activity is higher. This decline, which arises from an increase in the cost of capital as opposed to a decrease in free cash flows, traces to a deterioration in the firm’s credit quality and stock liquidity. Firm value declines less when CDS trading is likely to produce incremental information, suggesting that CDS trading has informational benefits for firm value. However, the evidence does not indicate that firm value increases because CDS availability facilitates investments.

I evaluate whether the so-called long-run risk framework can jointly explain key features of both equity and bond markets as well as the interaction between asset prices and the macroeconomy. I find that shocks to expected consumption growth and time-varying macroeconomic volatility can account for the level of risk premia and its variation over time in both markets. The results suggest a common set of macroeconomic risk factors operating in equity and bond markets. I estimate the model using a simulation estimator that accounts for time aggregation of consumption growth and utilizes a rich set of moment conditions.

We test the luxury consumption hypothesis of Ait-Sahalia, Parker, and Yogo (2004), using a unique international art price, import/export flow, and stock market data set. We find that the demand for art by Japanese collectors is positively correlated with art prices and Japanese stock prices. This correlation is magnified during the “bubble period” of the Japanese economy (the mid-1980s to the early 1990s) and gains even further strength for works of art typically favored by Japanese collectors. Our results suggest that Japanese investors (or Japanese asset markets) indeed affect international art prices—especially during the bubble period and its aftermath.

In a world where individuals are assumed to receive new information about an asset in random and sequential order, the volume of trading for a given message is a random variable. If the probabilities of trading events can be specified, it is possible to develop closed form expressions for the expected number of trades and the variance of trading. The result is a theory of trading which relates the number of trades to the characteristics of the message and to the number of participants in the market for an asset.

Myers and Majluf (1984) showed that in a world of asymmetric information, managers of overvalued firms issue equity, while managers of undervalued firms use cash, if available. This paper shows that, in a multiperiod world, managers of undervalued firms may find it optimal to issue stock, even though cash is available. Consequently, the market does not interpret all announcements of equity issues as signals of firm overvaluation. The paper also generates predictions regarding the effect of information asymmetry and investment opportunities on i) dividend policy, and ii) the cross-sectional distribution of market reactions when an equity issue is announced.

Bank regulators tend to disagree with the idea that markets can play a role in bank regulation. The markets for bank securities are viewed by regulators as inefficient and lacking the necessary information to demand sufficient risk premiums on bank obligations to affect bank management decisions. On the other hand, bankers who have an active market for their securities tend to place faith in market assessments to determine the cost of management policies; therefore, they tend to think that the market plays an important role in “regulating” bank management decisions. The regulators are perhaps correct about the markets for small and medium–sized banks, but for those banks which have an active market for their securities, do investors adjust rates of return for the presence of increased potential of bankruptcy? If so, when does the adjustment take place?

It is commonly believed that deposit rates are determined primarily by supply: Depositors require higher deposit rates from risky banks, thereby creating market discipline. An alternative perspective is that market discipline is limited (e.g., due to deposit insurance and/or enhanced capital regulation) and that internal demand for funding by banks determines rates. Using branch-level deposit rate data, we find little evidence for market discipline as rates are similar across bank capitalization levels. In contrast, banks’ loan growth has a causal effect on deposit rates; for example, branches’ deposit rates are correlated with loan growth in other states in which their bank has some presence, suggesting internal capital markets help reallocate the bank’s funding.

We uncover a positive stock market risk-return tradeoff after controlling for the covariance of market returns with the value premium. Fama and French (1996) conjecture that the value premium proxies for investment opportunities; therefore, by ignoring it, early specifications suffer from an omitted variable problem that causes a downward bias in the risk-return tradeoff estimation. We also document a positive relation between the value premium and its conditional variance, and the estimated conditional value premium is strongly countercyclical. The latter evidence supports the view that value is riskier than growth in bad times, when the price of risk is high.

Financial analysts have been intrigued by bond ratings since John Moody first started publishing them in 1909. Bond ratings are assigned by three agencies (Moody's, Standard and Poor's (S&P), and Fitch); these ratings are widely publicized and are, therefore, critically important. A bond's rating affects investors' purchase decisions and, consequently, the issuing firm's cost of debt and, indirectly, its cost of equity.

This article investigates the options market around a revision in the financial analysts’ consensus recommendation. The results demonstrate that options investors trade in the correct direction of the upcoming revision approximately 3 days prior to the announcement. We find this behavior in option-implied prices, implied volatilities, and options trading volume. Tests confirm that the options market leads the stock market before the financial analysts’ revision. Moreover, using all firms with outstanding options, an out-of-sample analysis produces a profitable zero-cost trading strategy net of transaction costs based on the relative valuations between the synthetic and the underlying equity security.

This paper examines mutual fund families’ proxy voting records to analyze their choices between voting against management (“voice”) and voting with their feet (“exit”). Even though proxy voting is particularly conducive to governance through voice rather than exit, we provide evidence that both exit and voice are important governance mechanisms when Institutional Shareholder Services recommends voting against management. Funds with smaller ownership blocks and shorter investment horizons are more likely to exit, and funds are more likely to exit small, liquid firms with greater insider ownership.

The large deviation of the actual return of a leveraged exchange-traded fund (LETF) from the leveraged multiple of the underlying index return has drawn considerable attention from investors, regulators, and the financial media. Despite this attention, the sources and fundamental determinants of the LETF return deviation remain unidentified. This study constructs a clear, unified, objective, and executable framework that addresses the behaviors, sources, and determinants of the LETF compounding and noncompounding deviations. Our theoretical predictions and empirical results hold the promise of guiding investors, regulators, financial advisors, and portfolio managers toward a thorough understanding of the return behavior of LETFs.

This paper documents the existence of a slowly evolving trend in the log dividend-price ratio, DPt, determined by a demographic variable, MYt: the middle-aged to young ratio. Deviations of DPt from this long-run component explain transitory but persistent fluctuations in stock market returns. The relation between MYt and DPt is a prediction of an overlapping generation model. The joint significance of MY and DPt in long-horizon forecasting regressions for market returns explains the mixed evidence on the ability of DPt to predict stock returns and provide a model-based interpretation of statistical corrections for breaks in the mean of this financial ratio.

We examine whether the market demand curve for equities is dawnward sloping. Unlike previous studies that examine individual stocks' demand curves, we look at the aggregate demand curve. As a proxy for aggregate demand, we employ equity mutual fund flows. Unlike previous studies that focus on events that are unlikely to convey new information to the market, we devise an empirical framework that disentangles the price-pressure effect and the information effect. We do not find evidence for the price-pressure effect that equity fund flows directly affect stock market prices in the presence of fundamentals of firms. Instead, we find that equity fund flows seem to be influenced by the performance of the stock market and that investors try to forecast fundamentals of firms and change their demand for stocks accordingly. Overall, these findings are with a horizontal market demand curve for equities.

We develop a closed-form general equilibrium model of stock index futures prices in a continuous-time economy with stochastic interest rates and market volatility. We show that futures prices implied by the model have very different properties from those of the cost of carry model. Using NYSE stock index futures data, we examine the restrictions imposed on futures prices by both the equilibrium and cost of carry models. Consistent with the equilibrium model, we find that stock index futures prices are related to market volatility and that their interest-rate sensitivity is a nonlinear function of contract maturity.