We examine commercial real estate fund managers’ abilities to generate abnormal profits through selection of outperforming property submarket segments or through the timing of entry into and exit from submarkets. The vast majority of portfolio managers exhibit little market timing ability, with the exception of non-NYSE real estate investment trusts after the financial crisis. A substantial fraction of managers seems able to successfully select property submarkets. Selection performance exhibits significant persistence. Managers that are active in more liquid markets tend to exhibit better timing performance, while managers exhibiting better selection ability appear to be active in less liquid markets.

A substantial amount of scholarly effort in recent years has been devoted to the determination of the relationship between banking structure and performance. In general, the results of these studies indicate that banking structure affects both the price and quantity of banking services, but, for practical policy purposes, the impact of banking structure is quite small. Yet, the results of these studies have been inconclusive and contradictory to a substantial degree.

We study how firms alter investment projects to mitigate exposure to political uncertainty. We examine deal-level merger data and find that, in addition to delaying and forgoing merger announcements, acquirers shift merger announcements earlier in time to avoid the period between announcement and effective dates overlapping an election, shift targets geographically away from election states, decrease the size of election-year deals, and shift from equity to cash financing for election-year deals. These results are stronger for acquirers with tighter financial constraints and deals more likely to be financed with equity and show financing matters to firms’ responses to election uncertainty.

After exogenous demand shocks caused by natural disasters, FinTech lenders are more responsive to increased demand for reconstruction mortgages than traditional banks and non-FinTech shadow banks. Both FinTech and traditional banks increase credit supply, but FinTech supply is more elastic without increases in risk-adjusted interest rates or delinquency rates. Comparing lending supply channels, banks respond to regulatory incentives to lend to damaged areas, whereas FinTech lenders supply more credit when traditional banks rely more on balance sheet financing and physical branch networks. Compared to traditional banks, FinTech lenders increase supply elasticity more aggressively in response to local competitive pressure.

We conjecture that marketplace lending provokes an increase in the quantity of entrepreneurship, particularly in more regionally disadvantaged areas, albeit at lower average quality. Using a fuzzy regression discontinuity design that exploits exogenous variation in borrowers’ access to marketplace loans along U.S. state borders, we estimate a 10% increase in marketplace lending causes a 0.44% increase in business establishments per capita. The effects are more pronounced for less experienced entrepreneurs, for small and less profitable firms, firms more dependent upon external finance, in industries with lower sunk costs of entry, and for low-income regions with inferior access to financial institutions.

We consider a model of chief executive officer (CEO) selection, dismissal, and retention. Firms with larger blockholder ownership monitor more; they get more information about CEO ability, which facilitates the dismissal of low-ability CEOs. These firms are matched with CEOs whose ability is more uncertain. For retention purposes, the compensation of these CEOs is more sensitive to firm value and relatively less sensitive to business conditions. Moreover, these CEOs receive lower salaries when CEO skills are sufficiently transferable. A diffusion of best monitoring practices increases competition for CEOs and raises CEO pay in all firms, including those with unchanged monitoring ability.

After the public outcry over backdating, many firms began scheduling option grants. This eliminates backdating but creates other agency problems: Chief executive officers (CEOs) aware of upcoming option grants have an incentive to temporarily depress stock prices to obtain lower strike prices. We show that some CEOs have manipulated stock prices to increase option compensation, documenting negative abnormal returns before scheduled option grants and positive abnormal returns afterward. These returns are explained by measures of CEOs’ incentives and ability to influence stock prices. We document several mechanisms used to lower stock price, including changing the substance and timing of disclosures.

In our theoretical work on DSD ([17], [18], [19]), specially constructed examples were used to demonstrate that DSD is stronger than TSD. The results of the present paper imply that similar examples also arise naturally from realworld data. They also suggest that such examples are rare. In the specific cases studied here, the differences between these two stochastic orderings are real, but small, and TSD would likely be a suitable approximation to DSD for practical purposes. The differences between the resulting efficient subsets seem relatively less important as the size of the initial portfolio universe increases. For example, the percentage reduction in the efficient TSD subset for a 1000-portfolio problem is smaller than for a typical 100-portfolio problem. This was found to be true throughout the preliminary phases of the study, as well as in the final phase reported here. The (to us) disappointing performance of DSD resulted primarily from the left-tail problem, which became increasingly prevalent as the initial portfolio set expanded. This suggests that DSD would be most useful in problems of choice among relatively few alternatives, perhaps of the capital budgeting type. In addition, there are numerous nonfinancial problems in which DSD could prove to be useful in ranking alternative management policies. Finally, the greater strength of DSD may remain important in theoretical investigations, especially for situations in which the left-tail problem is absent.

Considerable literature in the investment, growth, and financing of the corporation has developed in recent years. While theoretical studies in this area have contributed importantly to the understanding of the firm's time-optimal decision program, they have generally been limited in scope to the all-internally-funded firm and steady-state dynamics. The well-known analyses of Gordon ]7[ and Lintner ]13[ are typical of this restricted focus. Herein we relax these specializing conditions, both by permitting external equity as a financing alternative and by not a priori requiring the firm to make identical (earnings proportional) investment and financing decisions at every time instant such that it progresses only along a constant, exponentially growing earnings path.

Installment credit grantors require a method of distinguishing delinquent borrowers from whom an extension will be likely to result in repayment of the loans from those for whom the probability of repayment is too low to warrant further expenditure and against whom additional collection efforts would be unprofitable. A method evolved from the techniques utilized in the Marginal Credit Risk Study in the attempt to distinguish personal bankrupts, who in filing bankruptcy could be presumed to express the intent to not repay, from petitioners filing under Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act and debt counselees who, under both plans, voluntarily enter programs for the repayment of their debts.

We study changes in market quality associated with 9 modifications to the New York State securities transaction tax (STT) between 1932 and 1981 and 3 changes to the federal STT between 1932 and 1966. We find that when there is an increase in the level of an STT, individual stock volatility increases, bid–ask spreads widen, price impacts are greater, and volume decreases. We examine the propensity of traders to switch trading locations to avoid the tax and find mixed evidence that they will change locations. Overall, our findings support the notion that the imposition of or increases in an STT harm market quality.

Post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD) is stronger in firms that release earnings on days when market returns are higher in magnitude. This drift remains robust after controlling for previously documented factors such as Friday releases, the number of simultaneous releases, and price delay measure. Negative earnings surprises drive this drift, and the drift is more pronounced among small stocks, value stocks, and stocks that have low analyst following. Slower analyst response to earnings contributes to the drift. These findings are consistent with investors paying more attention to market information and less attention to firm-specific information due to attention constraints.

I analyze optimal loan modification schemes in a stochastic home price and stochastic interest-rate environment. Lenders maximize loan values by managing the borrower’s option to default on the loan and prepayment option. Given negative equity, controlling for the borrower’s ability to pay, rate reductions and maturity extensions result in a higher probability of redefault by homeowners even after modification of their loans. In contrast, loan write-downs (the Principal Principle), not a favored recipe, are value maximizing for the lender. A shared-appreciation mortgage enhances the ability to pay, mitigates adverse selection, and reduces the present value of expected deadweight foreclosure costs.

Using cash flows from a large sample of buyout and venture funds, I show that private equity (PE) distributions predict returns in the industries of funds’ specialization. My tests distinguish timing skill from reactions to market conditions and spillover effects of PE activity. Fund managers foresee comparable public firms’ earnings but sell at the industry peaks only if they have performance fees to harvest. These results have implications for manager selection and improve our understanding of PE fund returns and the role of PE in capital markets.

Does the momentum effect arise naturally from the determination of asset prices in market equilibrium? We calibrate a standard endowment model of multiple assets under recursive preferences. The momentum effect partly comes from investors’ aversion to consumption risks. An unexpected dividend increase generates a positive return and increases the asset’s proportion of consumption, raising the correlation between its future dividend growth and consumption growth. This is compensated by a higher expected return, generating the momentum effect. The cross-sectional difference in expected returns is also a key contributor. The quantified model produces sizable momentum profits, often close to the observed profits.

This paper generalizes and tightens Chen and Yeh's (2002) analytical upper bounds for American options under stochastic interest rates, stochastic volatility, and jumps, where American option prices are difficult to compute with accuracy. We first generalize Theorem 1 of Chen and Yeh (2002) and apply it to derive a tighter upper bound for American calls when the interest rate is greater than the dividend yield. Our upper bounds are not only tight, but also converge to accurate American call option prices when the dividend yield or strike price is small or when volatility is large. We then propose a general theorem that can be applied to derive upper bounds for American options whose payoffs depend on several risky assets. As a demonstration, we utilize our general theorem to derive upper bounds for American exchange options and American maximum options on two risky assets.

In a past issue of this journal, Carl J. Norstrøm [3] developed a sufficiency condition for the existence of a unique nonnegative internal rate of return for an investment project. His method is appealing because it involves a simple computation using cumulative undiscounted cash flows and because it applies to a wide range of practical situations.

This study compares the dividend policies of independently owned and bank holding company-affiliated commercial banks. The hypothesis tested is that there exists a significant, positive relationship between the amount of cash dividends paid by a bank and its affiliation with a holding company. The issue is an important one because the distribution of earnings as dividends obviously reduces a bank's ability to generate capital internally, and retained earnings have been the chief source of growth in bank equity capital. For some time the bank supervisory authorities have been concerned over the relative decline in importance of capital in the balance sheet of the average bank, such funds permitting banks to absorb unexpected losses and weather periods of financial crises. Capital adequacy is thus a major consideration in the regulators' assessment of bank dividend policy. Prior research has shown that the banking subsidiaries of bank holding companies have maintained lower capital in relation to assets than have other banks despite achieving greater profitability. Since a bank's capital position is usually positively correlated with its earnings, this implies that affiliated banks have been more generous in paying dividends. Indeed, the statistical evidence of this study indicates that the banking subsidiaries of holding companies paid significantly higher dividends than other banks over the four–year period from 1973 through 1976. Whether or not this has resulted in these firms maintaining less than “adequate” capital is a question that goes far beyond the scope of this paper, but which ultimately must be considered.

In the world of practical finance, the management of working capital—cash, marketable securities, receivables, and inventories is, perhaps, the most pressing and most frequently encountered problem for financial managers. Yet, in the realm of theoretical finance, and even at the level of “textbook” finance, working capital is given minimal attention.

Short interest is the number of shares of a stock borrowed for sale (and not yet replaced) by investors who anticipate a decline in the stock's price. After its price falls, the stock is purchased to replace the borrowed shares, the selling price being higher than the purchase price whence the profit. The New York and American Stock Exchanges disclose the current outstanding short interest for the market as a whole and for selected stocks around the 15th of each month.