This study investigates the implications of cross-country differences in banking regulation and supervision for the international subsidiary locations and risk of U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs). We find that BHCs are more likely to operate subsidiaries in countries with weaker regulation and supervision and that such location decisions are associated with elevated BHC risk and higher contribution to systemic risk. The quality of BHCs’ internal controls and risk management plays an important role in these location choices and risk outcomes. Overall, our study suggests that U.S. banking organizations engage in cross-country regulatory arbitrage, with potentially adverse consequences.

I examine the ability of the U.S. investor protection regime to limit insider trading returns, absent Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the short-swing rule). I find that in this setting, U.S. insiders execute short-swing trades that i) beat the market by approximately 15 basis points per day and ii) systematically divest ahead of disappointing earnings announcements. These results indicate that the bright-line rule restricting short-horizon round-trip insider trading plays a substantial role in protecting outside investors from privately informed insiders in the United States.

Although venture capitalists (VCs) can choose from thousands of potential syndicate partners, many co-syndicate with small groups of preferred partners. We term these groups “VC communities.” We apply computational methods from the physical sciences to 3 decades of syndication data to identify these communities. We find that communities comprise VCs that are similar in age, connectedness, and functional style but undifferentiated in spatial location. Machine-learning tools classify communities into 3 groups roughly ordered by their age and reach. Community VC financing is associated with faster maturation and greater innovation, especially for early-stage firms without an innovation history.

We examine forward prices in a market where nonstorable inventory exacerbates the influence of seasonal and hourly variation in supply and demand, expected and unexpected, on the level and volatility of spot prices. We find strong evidence, unusual for a commodity, that the difference between contemporaneous forward and spot prices has power to forecast both the spot price change and the risk premium realized at delivery. Our evidence of a time-varying risk premium is consistent with expected hourly and seasonal variation in the needs of producers and retailers of electricity to hedge against extreme spot price decreases and increases, respectively.

We hypothesize that political activism is valuable because it helps reduce political uncertainty, which, in turn, fosters firm innovation. We find that firms that support more politicians, winning politicians, politicians on congressional committees with jurisdictional authority over the firms’ industries, and politicians who join those committees innovate more. We employ a natural experiment to show a causal effect of political activism on innovation. We also show evidence of intra-industry and geographical political activism spillovers.

We study the link between information barriers in global markets and the organizational form of asset management. Fund families outsource funds in which they are at an informational disadvantage to generate performance. Using a structural model of self-selection, we endogenize the outsourcing decision and estimate positive gains from outsourcing of 4–14 basis points per month, thereby reconciling underperformance of outsourced funds with performance maximization by fund families. The gains from outsourcing provide a novel proxy for the information barriers that segment global financial markets: The more segmented the underlying markets where the funds invest, the larger the gains from outsourcing.

Does option-based compensation affect payout policy? To address this question, we examine the adoption of mandatory expensing of stock options. Our identification strategy exploits the fact that the reduction in option-based compensation after the accounting change varies with the firm-specific expected accounting impact. Across a battery of tests, we do not find that (accounting-driven) reductions in option-based pay cause dividends to increase or repurchases to decrease. Our results contrast with the widely held belief that option-based pay has a significant causal influence on payout policy and cast doubts on its role in the shift from dividends to repurchases.

I develop an analytically tractable model that integrates the risk-shifting problem between bondholders and shareholders with the moral-hazard problem between shareholders and the manager. An optimal contract binds shareholders and the manager, and this contract’s flexibility allows shareholders to relax the manager’s incentive constraint following a “good” profitability shock. Thus, the optimal contract amplifies the upside and thereby increases shareholder appetite for risk shifting. Whereas some empirical studies find a positive relation between risk shifting and leverage, others find a negative relation. This model predicts a non-monotonic relation between risk shifting and leverage and can reconcile these contradictory empirical findings.

We document a substantial customer complaint gap between stock and mutual financial firms. To assess whether this 21% per year complaint gap stems from complaint-prone customers in stock insurers, we examine state-adjudicated complaint success. To further delineate between customer selection or treatment explanations, we exploit within insurer complaints around random claims (natural disasters) and attention shocks (media scrutiny). Further tests reveal the complaint gap widens with greater competition, near insolvency thresholds, and with more price regulation. Overall, the results are inconsistent with the hypothesis that mutual financial firms exhibit low customer satisfaction, suggesting customers find this a beneficial organizational structure.

We provide a new framework for valuing multidimensional real options where opportunities to exercise the option are generated by an exogenous Poisson process, which can be viewed as a liquidity constraint on decision times. This approach, which we call the Poisson optional stopping times (POST) method, finds the value function as a monotone sequence of lower bounds. In a case study, we demonstrate that the frequently used quasi-analytic method yields a suboptimal policy and an inaccurate value function. The proposed method is demonstrably correct, straightforward to implement, reliable in computation, and broadly applicable in analyzing multidimensional option-valuation problems.

We propose a new approach, based on investment data, to determine firms’ return exposure to investment-specific technology (IST) shocks. When applied to U.S. data, we find that, in contrast to the pattern estimated from empirical IST proxies, value firms have higher exposure to IST shocks than growth firms. When applied to simulated data from existing theoretical models, our approach reveals that existing empirical findings may result from measurement errors in the IST proxies. Importantly, our simulation analysis uncovers the key role played by investment data in determining the economic mechanism through which IST shocks affect cross-sectional asset prices.

This paper explores the optimal consumption and investment behavior of an individual who derives utility from the ratio between his consumption and an endogenous habit. We obtain closed-form policies under general utility functionals and stochastic investment opportunities by developing a nontrivial linearization to the budget constraint. This enables us to explicitly characterize how habit formation affects the marginal propensity to consume and optimal stock–bond investments. We also show that in a setting that combines habit formation with Epstein–Zin utility, consumption no longer grows at unrealistically high rates at high ages and investments in risky assets decrease.

Is liquidity better when a trade counterparty’s brokerage firm is unknown (anonymous) or known (transparent)? We examine a quasinatural experiment where some firms switched from transparent to anonymous trading and then, 1 year later, switched back. Our results for inside spread, price impact, and limit order book depth suggest that liquidity improves when anonymous post-trade reporting is introduced and liquidity worsens when anonymous post-trade reporting is reversed.

Using country- and institution-level data, we find that the “coming wave” of emerging- market (EM) investors systematically over- or underweight their equity portfolio holdings in a way that reflects the influences of past capital and trade flows from a foreign country. We interpret this finding as support for van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009) information endowment hypothesis. Strong past capital and trade flows create an information advantage that leads EM investors to disproportionately overweight a given foreign market, even relative to developed market investor counterparts. We also pursue predictions of the information endowment hypothesis by constructing novel information-advantage proxies based on relationships among investment firms and the headquarters of their parent companies. These proxies also offer reliable explanatory power for international portfolio allocations.

In portfolio risk minimization, the inverse covariance matrix of returns is often unknown and has to be estimated in practice. Yet the eigenvalues of the sample covariance matrix are often overdispersed, leading to severe estimation errors in the inverse covariance matrix. To deal with this problem, we propose a general framework by shrinking the sample eigenvalues based on the Schatten norm. The proposed framework has the advantage of being computationally efficient as well as structure-free. The comparative studies show that our approach behaves reasonably well in terms of reducing out-of-sample portfolio risk and turnover.

We document that fund managers are more likely to allocate assets to firms managed by executives and directors with whom they share a similar political partisan affiliation. We find that this bias is not associated with improved fund performance. Funds with more partisan bias suffer from higher levels of idiosyncratic volatility than those with less bias. Partisan bias is more evident when fund managers are less experienced, in more informationally opaque firms, and when the U.S. president comes from fund managers’ own party. These findings suggest that political partisan bias among fund managers may be due to in-group favoritism.

We analyze the relation between expected option returns and the volatility of the underlying securities. The expected return from holding a call (put) option is a decreasing (increasing) function of the volatility of the underlying. These predictions are supported by the data. In the cross section of equity option returns, returns on call (put) option portfolios decrease (increase) with underlying stock volatility. This finding is not due to cross-sectional variation in expected stock returns. It holds in various option samples with different maturities and moneyness, and is robust to alternative measures of underlying volatility and different weighting methods.

The psychology literature suggests that individual commitment has a positive effect on team performance by mitigating the free-rider problem. With its detailed management-team information, the mutual fund industry provides a unique opportunity to study how individual managerial commitment is related to performance. Committed fund managers are defined as those who work only for one fund. With few incentives to acquire private information, teams with no committed members underperform those with committed members. These findings remain robust after we incorporate various controls. We also explore why non-committed teams have been used increasingly often despite their poor performance.

Using a fast numerical technique, we investigate a large database of investors’ suboptimal nonexercise of short-maturity American call options on dividend-paying stocks listed on the Dow Jones. The correct modeling of the discrete dividend is essential for a correct calculation of the early exercise boundary, as confirmed by theoretical insights. Pricing with stochastic volatility and jumps instead of the Black–Scholes–Merton benchmark cuts the amount lost by investors through suboptimal exercise by one-quarter. The remaining three-quarters are largely unexplained by transaction fees and may be interpreted as an opportunity cost for the investors to monitor optimal exercise.

We investigate whether firms’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) reputations and environmental lobbying efforts protect shareholder wealth in the event of environmental lawsuits. Using a sample of lawsuits filed in United States Federal Courts, we find that firms with superior CSR reputations suffer worse market reactions to environmental allegations. In contrast, lobbying cushions filing-date valuation losses, providing insurance-like protection against lawsuits. Our results are robust to subsample analyses, a falsification test, propensity score matching, and alternative empirical proxies and model specifications.