We characterize the relation between asset structure and capital structure by exploiting variation in the salability of corporate assets. To establish this link, we distinguish across different assets in firms’ balance sheets (machinery, land, and buildings) and use an instrumental approach that incorporates market conditions for those assets. We also use a natural experiment driving differential increases in the supply of real estate assets across the United States: The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990. Consistent with a supply-side view of capital structure, we find that asset redeployability is a main driver of leverage when credit frictions are high.

This study examines board monitoring when a credible chief executive officer (CEO) replacement is on the board. Inside directors whose talents are in greater demand externally, as reflected by their holding outside directorships, are more likely to become CEOs, and their presence is associated with greater forced CEO turnover sensitivity to accounting performance and CEO compensation sensitivity to stock performance. These results reveal that certain insiders strengthen board monitoring by serving as a readily available CEO replacement and contradict the presumption that all insiders are under CEO control. Furthermore, the results persist when accounting for the endogenous firm selection of talented inside directors.

Using a demographics-based proxy for smartness, we show that the portfolio distortions of “smart” investors reflect an informational advantage, while the distortions of “dumb” investors reflect psychological biases. Specifically, smart investors outperform dumb investors by about 3% annually on a risk-adjusted basis. Furthermore, among investors with high portfolio distortions, smart investors outperform passive benchmarks by 2%, and the smart-dumb performance differential is 5%. At the stock level, a portfolio of stocks with smart investor clientele outperforms the dumb clientele portfolio by 3.50% annually. These findings suggest that behavioral and information-based explanations for portfolio distortions apply to distinct subsets of investors.

During 1980–2000, an average of 310 companies per year went public in the United States. Since 2000, the average has been only 99 initial public offerings (IPOs) per year, with the drop especially precipitous among small firms. Many have blamed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the 2003 Global Settlement’s effects on analyst coverage for the decline in IPO activity. We find very little support for the conventional wisdom, and we offer an alternative explanation. Our economies of scope hypothesis posits that the advantages of selling out to a larger organization, which can speed a product to market and realize economies of scope, have increased relative to the benefits of operating as an independent firm.

We examine the role of algorithmic traders (ATs) in liquidity supply and demand in the 30 Deutscher Aktien Index stocks on the Deutsche Boerse in Jan. 2008. ATs represent 52% of market order volume and 64% of nonmarketable limit order volume. ATs more actively monitor market liquidity than human traders. ATs consume liquidity when it is cheap (i.e., when the bid-ask quotes are narrow) and supply liquidity when it is expensive. When spreads are narrow ATs are less likely to submit new orders, less likely to cancel their orders, and more likely to initiate trades. ATs react more quickly to events and even more so when spreads are wide.

Stock market average returns and Sharpe ratios are significantly higher on days when important macroeconomic news about inflation, unemployment, or interest rates is scheduled for announcement. The average announcement-day excess return from 1958 to 2009 is 11.4 basis points (bp) versus 1.1 bp for all the other days, suggesting that over 60% of the cumulative annual equity risk premium is earned on announcement days. The Sharpe ratio is 10 times higher. In contrast, the risk-free rate is detectably lower on announcement days, consistent with a precautionary saving motive. Our results demonstrate a trade-off between macroeconomic risk and asset returns, and provide an estimate of the premium investors demand to bear this risk.

This paper examines the characteristics and pricing of stocks that are actively traded by speculative retail investors. We find that stocks with high retail trading proportion (RTP) have strong lottery features and they attract retail investors with strong gambling propensity. Furthermore, these stocks tend to be overpriced and earn significantly negative alpha. The average monthly return differential between the extreme RTP quintiles is −0.60%. This negative RTP premium is stronger among stocks that have lottery features or arelocated in regions where people exhibit stronger gambling propensity. Collectively, these results indicate that speculative retail trading affects stock prices.

We test the implications of anchoring bias associated with forecast earnings per share (FEPS) for forecast errors, earnings surprises, stock returns, and stock splits. We find that analysts make optimistic (pessimistic) forecasts when a firm’s FEPS is lower (higher) than the industry median. Further, firms with FEPS greater (lower) than the industry median experience abnormally high (low) future stock returns, particularly around subsequent earnings announcement dates. These firms are also more likely to engage in stock splits. Finally, split firms experience more positive forecast revisions, more negative forecast errors, and more negative earnings surprises after stock splits.

I study the effects of overvalued equity on acquisition activity and shareholder wealth, using managers’ insider trades to measure overvaluation. I find that overvalued equity drives managers to make stock acquisitions, and such acquisitions destroy value for acquirer shareholders. Overvalued stock acquirers earn negative and lower returns in the short run and substantially underperform similarly overvalued nonacquirer firms in the long run. My results do not support the idea that managers can benefit shareholders by converting overvalued equity into real assets through stock acquisitions.

The 4 equity market factors from Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) are pervasive in academia and practice. However, not much is known about their joint distribution and dynamics. We find striking evidence of asymmetric tail dependence across the factors. While the linear factor correlations are small and even negative, the extreme correlations are large and positive, so that the linear correlations drastically overstate the benefits of diversification across the factors. We model the nonlinear factor dependence dynamics and explore their economic importance in a portfolio allocation experiment showing that significant economic value is earned when acknowledging nonlinear dependence.

We study what determines catering through the payout policy and how catering affects firm value. We create a catering index, measuring how the firm caters to its investors’ payout preferences. The index is based on the revealed payout preferences of mutual funds holding the firm’s stocks. Catering is constrained by market segmentation and dispersion in investor payout preferences. It is also associated with positive value effects: Firms increasing their catering index also experience an increase in value. Furthermore, greater catering ability is associated with a more positive market reaction to corporate announcements of equity issues and dividend payouts.

We investigate the relation between a firm’s product warranty level and its leverage. We find that leverage relates negatively to the warranty level and that this relation is robust to controls for endogeneity and self-selection into offering warranties. The negative warranty-leverage relation obtains only in the subsample of firms in the manufacturing industries. We also show that firms with warranties have the lowest debt levels, firms without warranties but operating in industries where other firms offer warranties on average carry higher debt, and firms in industries where no firm offers a warranty have the highest debt levels.

This paper develops a unified approach to comprehensively analyze individual hedge fund return predictability, both in and out of sample. In sample, we find that variation in hedge fund performance across changing market conditions is widespread and economically significant. The predictability pattern is consistent with economic rationale, and largely reflects differences in key hedge fund characteristics, such as leverage or capacity constraints. Out of sample, we show that a simple strategy that combines the funds’ return forecasts obtained from individual predictors delivers superior performance. We exploit this simplicity to highlight the drivers of this performance, and find that in- and out-of-sample predictability are closely related.

We compare investment policies across public and private firms in different institutional settings. Using a large cross-country data set, we find that public listed firms are better positioned to take advantage of growth opportunities than private firms. Specifically, public listed firms exhibit higher investment sensitivity to growth opportunities than private firms. This differential, however, only exists in countries with well-developed stock markets. Furthermore, the relative advantage public firms have at allocating capital depends on the degree of agency costs and reliance on external equity.

We examine the relation between the shareholder base and payout policy. Consistent with the idea that the shareholder base is related to the cost of external financing, we find that firms with small shareholder bases have lower payout levels and maintain higher cash holdings. We show that undertaking an open market repurchase results in a significant reduction in the size of the shareholder base. Consequently, we find that firms with small shareholder bases are less likely to undertake a repurchase (reduce the shareholder base even further) and are more likely to pay special dividends.

This paper provides a new explanation for why closed-end bond funds coexist along with otherwise identical open-end bond funds. Closed-end bond funds offer investors the opportunity to leverage their fixed income investment at very low borrowing rates and are attractive to investors for this reason. We find that differences in leverage are reflected in the discount on closed-end bond funds in a manner consistent with the advantage of leverage.

A number of studies of U.S. stock returns document what is referred to as the investment or asset growth effect. Specifically, firms that increase investment or total assets subsequently earn lower risk-adjusted returns. This study finds substantial cross-country differences in the asset growth effect. In particular, the asset growth effect is stronger in countries with more developed financial markets, but it does not seem to be associated with corporate governance or the costs of trading. Overall, the evidence is consistent with a q-theory where financial market development captures either managers’ willingness or ability to align investment expenditures to the cost of capital, but it is inconsistent with the hypothesis that the asset growth effect is due to bad governance and overinvestment.

In acquisitions, target chief executive officers (CEOs) face a moral hazard: Any personal gain from the deal could be offset by the loss of the future compensation stream associated with their jobs. Larger, more important parachutes provide greater relief for these losses. To explicitly measure the moral hazard target CEOs face, we standardize the parachute payment by the expected value of their acquisition-induced lost compensation. We examine 851 acquisitions from 1999–2007, finding that more important parachutes benefit target shareholders through higher completion probabilities. Conversely, as parachute importance increases, target shareholders receive lower takeover premia, while acquirer shareholders capture additional rents from target shareholders.

This paper documents that riskier firms with higher idiosyncratic volatility grant more stock options to nonexecutive employees. Standard models in the literature cannot easily explain this pattern; a model in which a risk-neutral firm and an employee with prospect theory preferences bargain over the employee's pay package can. The key feature which makes stock options attractive is probability weighting. The model fits the data on option grants well when calibrated using standard parameters from the experimental literature. The results are the first evidence that risky firms can profitably use stock options to cater to an employee demand for long-shot bets.

We provide a first look at short selling by mutual funds, a phenomenon not examined by prior research. Mutual funds that short do so frequently and in significant amounts, averaging about 16% of fund assets. These funds outperform benchmarks by 1.5% per year. An analysis of portfolio holdings shows that these funds generate abnormal performance from their short (4.1% per year) and long (1.5% per year) positions. Managers of short-selling mutual funds also exhibit superior performance in other funds they manage that do not use short sales. These findings suggest that managers of short-selling mutual funds are skilled.