Recent studies document both a significant decline in firms’ propensity to pay dividends and a significant increase in firms’ propensity to repurchase shares and issue equity over the past 30 years. In this paper we test whether firms’ net cash disbursements to equity holders have declined in a pattern similar to firms’ propensity to pay dividends. Contrary to the evidence using dividends, we find no evidence that the conditional propensity to distribute net cash to equity holders has declined over the past 3 decades. Surprisingly, we find that, conditional on firm characteristics, net payout yields have been increasing over time.

We find direct evidence that institutions increase round-trip stock trades, increase average commissions per share, and pay unusually high commissions on some trades in order to send abnormally high commissions to the lead underwriters of profitable initial public offerings (IPOs). These excess commission payments are a particularly effective way for transient investors to receive lucrative IPO allocations. Our results suggest that the underwriter’s concern for their long-term client relationships limits the payment-for-IPO practice. We estimate that abnormal commission payments are large for the most profitable issues, and that an additional $1 excess commission payment to the lead underwriter results in $2.21 in investor profits from allocated shares.

We investigate the firm characteristics associated with innovation in over 19,000 firms across 47 developing economies. While existing finance literature on innovation is limited to large public firms in developed markets such as the United States, our database includes public and private firms, and small and medium-sized enterprises. We define innovation broadly to include introduction of new products and technologies, knowledge transfers, and new production processes. We find that access to external financing is associated with greater firm innovation. Further, having highly educated managers, ownership by families, individuals, or managers, and exposure to foreign competition is associated with greater firm innovation.

Neuroeconomics research shows that brain areas that generate emotional states also process information about risk, rewards, and punishments, suggesting that emotions influence financial decisions in a predictable and parsimonious way. We find that positive emotional states such as excitement induce people to take risks and to be confident in their ability to evaluate investment options, while negative emotions such as anxiety have the opposite effects. Beliefs are updated so as to maintain a positive emotional state by ignoring information that contradicts individuals’ prior choices. Marketplace features or outcomes of past choices may change emotions and thus influence future financial decisions.

Congress and activists recently proposed giving shareholders a say (vote) on executive pay. We find that when the House passed the Say-on-Pay Bill, the market reaction was significantly positive for firms with high abnormal chief executive officer (CEO) compensation, with low pay-for-performance sensitivity, and responsive to shareholder pressure. However, activist-sponsored say-on-pay proposals target large firms, not those with excessive CEO pay, poor governance, or poor performance. The market reacts negatively to labor-sponsored proposal announcements and positively when these proposals are defeated. Our findings suggest that say-on-pay creates value for companies with inefficient compensation but can destroy value for others.

Large shareholders may play an important role for firm performance and policies, but identifying this empirically presents a challenge due to the endogeneity of ownership structures. We develop and test an empirical framework that allows us to separate selection from treatment effects of large shareholders. Individual blockholders tend to hold blocks in public firms located close to where they reside. Using this empirical observation, we develop an instrument (the density of wealthy individuals near a firm’s headquarters) for the presence of large, nonmanagerial individual shareholders in firms. These shareholders have a large impact on firms, controlling for selection effects.

A major governance problem in closely held corporations is the majority shareholders’ expropriation of minority shareholders. As a solution, legal and finance research recommends that the main shareholder surrender some control to minority shareholders via ownership rights. We test this proposition on a large data set of closely held corporations. We find that shared-ownership firms report a substantially larger return on assets and lower expense-to-sales ratios. These findings are robust to institutionally motivated corrections for endogeneity of ownership structure. We provide evidence on the presence of governance problems and the effectiveness of shared ownership as a solution in settings characterized by illiquidity of ownership.

The recent credit crisis has highlighted the importance of market liquidity and its interaction with the price of credit risk. We investigate this interaction by relating the liquidity of corporate bonds to the basis between the credit default swap (CDS) spread of the issuer and the par-equivalent bond yield spread. The liquidity of a bond is measured using a recently developed measure called latent liquidity, which is defined as the weighted average turnover of funds holding the bond, where the weights are their fractional holdings of the bond. We find that bonds with higher latent liquidity are more expensive relative to their CDS contracts after controlling for other realized measures of liquidity. Analysis of interaction effects shows that highly illiquid bonds of firms with a greater degree of uncertainty are also expensive, consistent with limits to arbitrage between CDS and bond markets, due to the higher costs of “shorting” illiquid bonds. Additionally, we document the positive effects of liquidity in the CDS market on the CDS-bond basis. We also find that several firm- and bond-level variables related to credit risk affect the basis, indicating that the CDS spread does not fully capture the credit risk of the bond.

We study whether the constraints on firms’ operations imposed by laborunions affect firms’ costs of equity. The cost of equity issignificantly higher for firms in more unionized industries. This effect holdsafter controlling for several industry and firm characteristics, is robust toendogeneity concerns, and is not driven by omitted variables. Moreover, theunionization premium is stronger when unions face a more favorable bargainingenvironment and is highly countercyclical. Unionization is also positivelyrelated to various measures of operating leverage. Our findings suggest thatlabor unions increase firms’ costs of equity by decreasingfirms’ operating flexibility.

In this paper we show that selecting mutual funds using alpha computed from a fund’s holdings and security betas produces better future alphas than selecting funds using alpha computed from a time-series regression on fund returns. This is true whether future alphas are computed using holdings and security betas or a time-series regression on fund returns. Furthermore, we show that the more frequently the holdings data are available, the greater the benefit. This has major implications for the Securities and Exchange Commission’s recent ruling on the frequency of holdings disclosure and the information plan sponsors should collect from portfolio managers. We also explore the effect of conditioning betas on macroeconomic variables as suggested by Ferson and Schadt (1996) to identify superior-performing mutual funds as well as the alternative way of employing holdings data proposed by Grinblatt and Titman (1993).

Funding risk measures the extent to which a fund can borrow money by posting collateral. Using a novel measure of funding risk based on futures margins, we are able to empirically identify the mechanism by which changes in funding risk affect the likelihood of contagion. An increase in margins of the order of magnitude observed during the subprime crisis increases the probability of contagion among certain types of funds by up to 34%. Our analysis shows that some types of hedge funds are more vulnerable to contagion than others. Our results also suggest that policies that limit the magnitude of changes in margins over short periods of time may reduce the likelihood of contagion among hedge funds.

We investigate the effects of manager characteristics on capital structure in a structural model. We implement the manager’s optimal contracts through financial securities that lead to a dynamic capital structure, which reflects the effects of taxes, bankruptcy costs, and manager-shareholder agency conflicts. Long-term debt declines with the manager’s ability, inside equity stake, and the firm’s long-term risk, but increases with its short-term risk. Short-term debt declines with the manager’s ability, increases with her equity ownership, and declines with short-term risk. We show support for these implications in our empirical analysis.

Using a large sample of nonfinancial firms from 47 countries, we examine the effect of derivative use on firm risk and value. We control for endogeneity by matching users and nonusers on the basis of their propensity to use derivatives. We also use a new technique to estimate the effect of omitted variable bias on our inferences. We find strong evidence that the use of financial derivatives reduces both total risk and systematic risk. The effect of derivative use on firm value is positive but more sensitive to endogeneity and omitted variable concerns. However, using derivatives is associated with significantly higher value, abnormal returns, and larger profits during the economic downturn in 2001–2002, suggesting that firms are hedging downside risk.

Using a large sample of hedge fund manager characteristics, we provide one of the first comprehensive studies on the impact of manager characteristics, such as education and career concern, on hedge fund performances. We document differential ability among hedge fund managers in either generating risk-adjusted returns or running hedge funds as a business. In particular, we find that managers from higher-SAT (Scholastic Aptitude Test) undergraduate institutions tend to have higher raw and risk-adjusted returns, more inflows, and take fewer risks. Unlike mutual funds, we find a rather symmetric relation between hedge fund flows and past performance, and that hedge fund flows do not have a significant negative impact on future performance.

We examine the relation between chief executive officers’ equity incentives and their use of performance-sensitive debt contracts. These contracts require higher or lower interest payments when the borrower’s performance deteriorates or improves, thereby increasing expected costs of financial distress while making a firm riskier to the benefit of option holders. We find that managers whose compensation is more sensitive to stock volatility choose steeper and more convex performance pricing schedules, while those with high delta incentives choose flatter, less convex pricing schedules. Performance pricing contracts therefore seem to provide a channel for managers to increase firms’ financial risk to gain private benefits.

Staleness in measured prices imparts a positive statistical bias and a negative dilution effect on mutual fund performance. First, evaluating performance with nonsynchronous data generates a spurious component of alpha. Second, stale prices create arbitrage opportunities for high-frequency traders whose trades dilute the portfolio returns and hence fund performance. This paper introduces a model that evaluates fund performance while controlling directly for these biases. Empirical tests of the model show that alpha net of these biases is on average positive although not significant and about 40 basis points higher than alpha measured without controlling for the impacts of stale pricing. The difference between the net alpha and the measured alpha consists of 3 components: a statistical bias, the dilution effect of long-term fund flows, and the dilution effect of arbitrage flows. Whereas the former 2 components are small, the latter is large and widespread in the fund industry.

Practitioners increasingly use the enterprise multiple (EM) as a valuation measure. EM is (equity value + debt + preferred stock – cash) / (EBITDA). We document that EM is a strong determinant of stock returns. Following Fama and French (1993) and Chen, Novy-Marx, and Zhang (2010), we create an EM factor that generates a return premium of 5.28% per year. We interpret EM as a proxy for the discount rate. Firms with low EM values appear to have higher discount rates and higher subsequent stock returns than firms with high EM values.

This paper documents the short- and long-term balance sheet effect of cash flows. We show that cash savings in the short run and debt reduction in both the short and the long run account for a substantial fraction of cash flow use. Although, in the long run, investment exhibits substantial sensitivity to cash flows, investment does not absorb the entire cash flow shock. In fact, the tighter the financial constraints, the smaller the fraction of cash flow absorbed by investment and the more by leverage reduction. Firms stage their response to increases in cash flow, delaying investment while building up cash stocks and reducing leverage. These results suggest that much of the short-run economic effect of cash flow shocks to the corporate sector may be channeled into the corporate debt market rather than the capital goods market, especially when financing constraints tighten.

We examine the association of a venture capital (VC) firm’s reputation with the post-initial public offering (IPO) long-run performance of its portfolio firms. We find that VC reputation, measured by the past market share of VC-backed IPOs, has significant positive associations with long-run firm performance measures. While more reputable VCs initially select better-quality firms, more reputable VCs continue to be associated with superior long-run performance, even after controlling for VC selectivity. We find that more reputable VCs exhibit more active post-IPO involvement in the corporate governance of their portfolio firms, and this continued VC involvement positively influences post-IPO firm performance.

Some acquisitions can be viewed as the quickest means to obtain a scarce resource required for restructuring in response to an economic shock. Such acquisitions can give the acquirer a competitive edge and hurt its competitors. In this paper, I first show that if a firm will be adversely affected by a competitor’s acquisition, then it can rationally “overpay” for the target to avoid this outcome within a value-maximizing framework due to industry equilibrium effects. Next, I show that depending on the level of anticipation by the market, the magnitude of the cost of losing, and the competition between bidders, an acquirer can earn negative payoffs at the announcement of such an acquisition. Even though the merger is the best decision given the circumstances, negative returns incorporate the understanding that the target is a necessary resource to survive in this changing environment, losing it to a rival is costly, and there is a positive probability that the bidder may not win or win by paying more than the synergy value of the target. Finally, I extend the model to include 2 targets that become available sequentially to multiple bidders and show that when there are alternatives available for the target’s resources, overbidding subsides.