We find evidence that conflicts of interest arising from mergers and acquisitions (M&A) relations influence analysts' recommendations, corroborating regulators' and practitioners' suspicions in a setting, i.e., M&A relations, not previously examined in research on analyst conflicts. In addition, the M&A context allows us to disentangle the conflict of interest effect from selection bias. We find that analysts affiliated with acquirer advisors upgrade acquirer stocks around M&A deals, even around all-cash deals, in which selection bias is unlikely. Also consistent with conflict of interest but not selection bias, target-affiliated analysts publish optimistic reports about acquirers after, but not before, the exchange ratio of an all-stock deal is set.

The average firm going public or issuing new equity underperforms the market in the long run. This underperformance could be related to the endogeneity of the number of new issues if new issues cluster after periods of high abnormal returns on new issues. In such a case, ex post measures of new issue abnormal returns may be negative on average, despite the absence of ex ante abnormal returns. We evaluate this endogeneity problem in event studies of long-run performance. We argue that it is unlikely that the endogeneity of the number of new issues explains the long-run underperformance of equity issues.

A significant but unresolved question in the current debate about the role of intermediaries in financial markets is whether intermediaries behave as passive traders or whether they actively seek and trade on information. We address this issue by explicitly comparing the informational advantages of intermediaries with those of other investors in the market. We find that intermediaries account for greater price discovery than other institutional and individual investors in spite of initiating fewer trades and volume. Furthermore, intermediary information does not arise from inappropriate handling of customer orders by intermediaries. We propose that our findings are consistent with noisy rational expectations models, where agents extract valuable information from past prices. Intermediaries bear little or no opportunity cost of monitoring market conditions, which gives them an advantage in making profitable price-contingent trades. Lower trading costs may also enable intermediaries to trade more effectively and frequently on their information.

We show that if true returns are independently distributed and a manager fully reports gains but delays reporting losses, then reported returns will feature conditional serial correlation. We use conditional serial correlation as a measure of conditional return smoothing. We estimate conditional serial correlation in a large sample of hedge funds. We find that the probability of observing conditional serial correlation is related to the volatility and magnitude of investor cash flows, consistent with conditional return smoothing in response to the risk of capital flight. We also present evidence that conditional serial correlation is a leading indicator of fraud.

We examine the penalties imposed on the 585 firms targeted by SEC enforcement actions for financial misrepresentation from 1978–2002, which we track through November 15, 2005. The penalties imposed on firms through the legal system average only $23.5 million per firm. The penalties imposed by the market, in contrast, are huge. Our point estimate of the reputational penalty—which we define as the expected loss in the present value of future cash flows due to lower sales and higher contracting and financing costs—is over 7.5 times the sum of all penalties imposed through the legal and regulatory system. For each dollar that a firm misleadingly inflates its market value, on average, it loses this dollar when its misconduct is revealed, plus an additional $3.08. Of this additional loss, $0.36 is due to expected legal penalties and $2.71 is due to lost reputation. In firms that survive the enforcement process, lost reputation is even greater at $3.83. In the cross section, the reputation loss is positively related to measures of the firm's reliance on implicit contracts. This evidence belies a widespread belief that financial misrepresentation is disciplined lightly. To the contrary, reputation losses impose substantial penalties for cooking the books.

This paper examines the cross-sectional relation between idiosyncratic volatility and expected stock returns. The results indicate that i) the data frequency used to estimate idiosyncratic volatility, ii) the weighting scheme used to compute average portfolio returns, iii) the breakpoints utilized to sort stocks into quintile portfolios, and iv) using a screen for size, price, and liquidity play critical roles in determining the existence and significance of a relation between idiosyncratic risk and the cross section of expected returns. Portfoliolevel analyses based on two different measures of idiosyncratic volatility (estimated using daily and monthly data), three weighting schemes (value-weighted, equal-weighted, inverse volatility-weighted), three breakpoints (CRSP, NYSE, equal market share), and two different samples (NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ and NYSE) indicate that no robustly significant relation exists between idiosyncratic volatility and expected returns.

This article incorporates well-documented managerial traits into a tradeoff model of capital structure to study their impact on corporate financial policy and firm value. Optimistic and/or overconfident managers choose higher debt levels and issue new debt more often but need not follow a pecking order. The model also surprisingly uncovers that these managerial traits can play a positive role. Biased managers' higher debt levels restrain them from diverting funds, which increases firm value by reducing this manager-shareholder conflict. Although higher debt levels delay investment, mildly biased managers' investment decisions can increase firm value by reducing this bondholder-shareholder conflict.

This paper examines how industry structure affects corporate investment patterns. Real options theory shows that deferring irreversible investment in the face of uncertainty is valuable. Theory also shows that the value of waiting to invest falls if investment opportunities are contestable. Consistent with these theories, we find that firms in monopolistic industries exhibit lower investment-q; sensitivity and are slower to invest than firms in competitive industries. However, we find that investment-q; sensitivity and investment speed are highest in oligopolistic industries, suggesting that the value of investing strategically can outweigh the value of waiting. Indeed, oligopolistic industries experience less entry and more exit than other industries.

This paper studies the estimation of asset pricing model regressions with conditional alphas and betas, focusing on the joint effects of data snooping and spurious regression. We find that the regressions are reasonably well specified for conditional betas, even in settings where simple predictive regressions are severely biased. However, there are biases in estimates of the conditional alphas. When time-varying alphas are suppressed and only time-varying betas are considered, the betas become biased. Previous studies overstate the significance of time-varying alphas.

This paper tests whether information advantages help explain why some individual investors concentrate their stock portfolios in a few stocks. Stock investments made by households that choose to concentrate their brokerage accounts in a few stocks outperform those made by households with more diversified accounts (especially among those with large portfolios). Excess returns of concentrated relative to diversified portfolios are stronger for stocks not included in the S&P 500 index and local stocks, potentially reflecting concentracted investors' successful exploitation of information asymmetries. Controlling for households' average investment abilities, their trades and holdings perform better when their portfolios include fewer stocks.

This Paper explores the importance and price implications of style investing by institutional investors in the stock market. To analyze styles, we assign stocks to deciles or segments across three style dimensions: size, value/growth, and sector. we find strong evidence that institutional investors reallocate and sector. We find strong evidence that institutional investors reallocate across style groupings more intensively than across random stock groupings. In addition, we show that own segment style inflows and refurns positively forecast future stock returns, which distant segament style inflows and returns forecast negatively. We argue that behavioral theories play a role in explaining these results.

The paper investigates how firms operating in capital market-oriented economies (the U.K. and the U.S.) and bank-oriented economies (France, Germany, and Japan) determine their capital structure. Using panel data and a two-step system-GMM procedure, the paper finds that the leverage ratio is positively affected by the tangibility of assets and the size of the firm, but declines with an increase in firm profitability, growth opportunities, and share price performance in both types of economies. The leverage ratio is also affected by the market conditions in which the firm operates. The degree and effectiveness of these determinants are dependent on the country's legal and financial traditions. The results also confirm that firms have target leverage ratioswith French firms being the fastest in adjusting their capital structure toward their target level and Japanese firms the slowest. Overall, the capital structure of a firm is heavily influenced by the economic environment and its institutions, corporate governance practices, tax systems, the borrower-lender relation, exposure to capital markets, and the level of investor protection in the country in which the firm operates.

This paper provides an analysis of the predictability of stock returns using market-, industry-, and firm-level earnings. Contrary to Lamont (1998), we find that neither dividend payout ratio nor the level of aggregate earnings can forecast the excess market return. We show that these variables do not have robust predictive power across different stock portfolios and sample periods. In contrast to the aggregate-level findings, earnings yield has significant explanatory power for the time-series and cross-sectional variation in firmlevel stock returns and the 48 industry portfolio returns. The mean reversion of stock prices as well as the earnings' correlation with expected stock returns are responsible for the forecasting power of earnings yield. These results are robust after controlling for bookto-market, size, price momentum, and post-earnings announcement drift. At the aggregate level, the information content of firm-level earnings about future cash flows is diversified away and higher aggregate earnings do not forecast higher returns.

We apply an event-study methodology on over 10,000 Morningstar star rating changes and find that Morningstar has subsantial independent influence on the investment allocation decisions of retail mutual fund investors. It is the discrete change in the star rating itself and not the change in the underlying performance measures that drives frow. We document econnomically and statistically significant positive abnormal flow following rating upgrades, and negative abnormal flow following rating downgrades. In contrast to the cross-sectional flow performance literature, we find evidence of investor punishment of performance declines, some of which is evident immediately in the month of the rating change.

We show that the consolidation of orders is important for producing efficient prices, especially during times of high liquidity demand. The NYSE's centralized opening call market performs better than Nasdaq's decentralized opening process on typical trading days. The NYSE is much better than Nasdaq on witching days when index arbitrage activity subjects S&P 500 stocks to large, predictable, and mostly informationlessorder flow around quarterly futures contract expirations. Nasdaq opening price efficiency improves to NYSE levels once Nasdaq initiates a consolidated opening call in November 2004, but prices on the decentralized Nasdaq remain less efficient at other times of day.

This paper examines time-series forecast errors of expected returns from conditional and unconditional asset pricing models for portfolio and individual firm equity returns. A new result that increases predictive precision concerning model specification and forecasting is introduced. Conditional versions of the models generally produce higher mean squared errors than unconditional versions for step ahead prediction. This holds for individual firm data when the instruments are firm specific. Mean square forecast error decompositions indicate that the asset pricing models produce relatively unbiased predictions, but the variance is severe enough to ruin the step ahead predictive ability beyond that of a constant benchmark.

Agency problems in firms are prevalent because of a scarcity of wealthy principals with corporate governance ability, whom we call “restructuring specialists.” We investigate how this scarce resource, “agency cost-free capital,” is allocated. We show that the restructuring specialists may acquire blocks only in those states of the worls in which they can increase firm value the most, which corresponds to a takeover. Firms with dispersed ownership and firms with a financial intermediary as a blockholder can coexist, although they are otherwise identical. The moderl can explain differences in corporate ownership structures and restructuring mechanisms across economies.

We examine the effect of poison pill adoptions on firm value, controlling for the adopting firm's preexisting corporate governance structure. We find that only companies with the most democratic governance structures, defined as those with the fewest preexisting protective governance provisions, experience significantly positive abnormal stock returns and significantly positive abnormal revisions in five-year earnings growth rate forecasts. Moreover, regression results indicate that abnormal returns and forecast revisions are significantly related to governance structure and not to board composition or subsequent merger activity.

With the recent significant growth in the single-name credit default swap (CDS) market has come the need for accurate and computationally efficient models to value these instruments. While the model developed by Duffie, Pan, and Singleton (2000) can be used, the solution is numerical (solving a series of ordinary differential equations) rather than explicit. In this paper, we provide an explicit solution to the valuation of a credit default swap when the interest rate and the hazard rate are correlated by using the “change of measure” approach and solving a bivariate Riccati equation. CDS transaction data for the period 2/15/2000 through 4/8/2003 for 60 firms are used to test both the goodness of fit of the model and provide estimates of the influence of economic variables in the market for credit-risky bonds.

We find that local analyst recommendations are systematically more optimistic than foreign analyst recommendations in emerging markets. The effects of this novel “home bias” among local analysts overwhelm any information asymmetry between foreign and local analysts. Consequently, local analyst upgrades underperform foreign analyst upgrades, while local analyst downgrades outperform foreign analyst downgrades. Neither foreign investors, local institutions, nor retail investors appear to be fully cognizant of this bias. Trade reactions suggest that foreign investors overestimate the bias in foreign analyst recommendations while local institutions underestimate the bias in local analyst recommendations. These results are pervasive across countries, time periods, and stock groupings, and can be traced to investment banking pressure.