Several existing studies have documented a negative relationship between firm financial constraint and export activities but do not attempt to examine factors that could attenuate this relationship in Africa. In this paper, we examine the effect of financial constraint on exports in Africa and explore how the level of trust in countries where firms are located shapes this relationship. We combine the World Bank Enterprise Surveys with different measures of country-level personal and interpersonal trust computed from the Afrobarometer surveys of 19 African countries. Our results show that financial constraints negatively affect export activities. However, this negative effect is attenuated for firms that are located in trust-intensive societies. These findings are robust to different specifications. Interestingly, we find that small and medium-sized enterprises in Africa are more likely to be affected by financial constraints but also more likely to benefit from a higher level of both personal and interpersonal trust, while for larger firms only interpersonal trust matters.

Entrepreneurial action takes place in a context of Knightian uncertainty. In order to overcome this uncertainty, entrepreneurs engage in a process of judgment resulting in a decision about the course of action. Institutions arise mainly to reduce economic friction by providing structure to human interaction and thus reducing uncertainty. However, institutions may also introduce further uncertainty and thus disrupt the judgment process preceding entrepreneurial action. The present paper builds upon recent efforts to integrate the concepts of uncertainty and institutions within the entrepreneurial context. Drawing on Frank H. Knight's seminal insight, the judgment-based view of entrepreneurship, and relevant concepts of entrepreneurial outcomes, the main contribution of the paper lies in the development of a model offering a coherent description of the way institutions affect uncertainty and the entrepreneurial process.

In multilevel marketing companies (MLMs), member-distributors earn income from selling products and recruiting new members. Successful MLMs require a social capital structure where members can access and mobilize both strong and weak social ties. Utah has a disproportionate share of MLM companies located in the state and a disproportionate number of MLM participants. We argue that Utah's dominant religious institutions have led to the emergence of a social capital structure, making MLMs particularly viable. Utah is the most religiously homogeneous state; roughly half its population identifies as members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS Church). The LDS Church's institutions foster a social capital structure where (almost all) members have access to and can leverage social capital in all its forms. LDS institutions encourage members to make meaningful social connections characterized by trust and reciprocity with other church members in local neighborhoods and across the world.

Does inequality affect outcomes? To answer, we use the microcosm of Olympic competitions by asking whether a country's level of inequality diminishes its performance. If it does, is it conditional on institutional factors? We argue that the ability of economically free societies to win medals will not be affected by inequality. In these societies, institutions generate incentives to invest in the talents of individuals at the bottom of the income distribution (potential athletes otherwise constrained in the ability to expend resources on training). These effects mitigate those of inequality. The incentives that promote investments in skills across the income distribution are weaker in unfree societies and they cannot mitigate the effects of inequality. Using the Olympics of 2016 in combination with the Economic Freedom data, we find that inequality only matters in determining medal numbers for unfree countries. We link these results to inequality and its effects on economic outcomes.

In Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (RUP), Knight (1921) develops a theory of the firm that stresses the important role of entrepreneurial judgment for a firm's success. For Knight, entrepreneurial judgment is first and foremost the selection of ‘proxy entrepreneurs’ who are capable of making good judgments under uncertainty. In this sense, entrepreneurial judgment is essentially ‘judgment of judgment’. An overlooked implication of Knight's position is the fact that it leads to an endorsement of distributed entrepreneurship and responsibility. We deem this a very modern idea that challenges a completely hierarchical understanding of the firm. Knight himself does not thoroughly examine the institutional implications of the analytical framework he sets up in RUP. In this paper, we summarize the ‘philosophical vision’ of Knight's framework and illustrate his rationale behind the distribution of entrepreneurship. We conclude the paper with a discussion of potential institutional implications by referring to the danger of monocultures, the additional value created by cognitively diverse teams, and the effectiveness of venture capitalists.

This paper builds on the Ostroms' oeuvre to suggest that the binary Samuelsonian taxonomy of goods – or the ‘sterile dichotomy’, as Elinor Ostrom calls it – cannot serve as a reliable guide for public policy. Using the Ostroms' insights on co-production, institutional matching, and polycentricity, we argue that the ‘inherent’ nature of goods and their specific taxonomy are not static and definitive concepts but are instead contestable and dynamic features that are institutionally contingent. We explore four crucial mechanisms and/or contexts, not altogether unrelated, whereby the nature of goods becomes contestable and malleable: namely, (1) technological and geographical factors, (2) coproduction and entrepreneurial ingenuity, (3) bundling and unbundling of services, and (4) ideologies and regime shifts. This exercise has twofold purposes. First, we generalize the notion that there is nothing ‘inherent’ in the nature of goods and services and that they are fluid, heterogeneous, and malleable concepts. Second, we contribute to the debate on the provision of public goods and the role of civil society by highlighting the need for institutional malleability and diversity adaptive to changing technology, contexts, and institutional conditions.

This scoping paper addresses the role of financial institutions in empowering the British Industrial Revolution. Prominent economic historians have argued that investment was largely funded out of savings or profits, or by borrowing from family or friends: hence financial institutions played a minor role. But this claim sits uneasily with later evidence from other countries that effective financial institutions have mattered a great deal for economic development. How can this mismatch be explained? Despite numerous technological innovations, from 1760 to 1820 industrial growth was surprisingly low. Could the underdevelopment of financial institutions have held back growth? There is relatively little data to help evaluate this hypothesis. More research is required on the historical development of institutions that enabled finance to be raised. This would include the use of property as collateral. This paper sketches the evolution of British financial institutions before 1820 and makes suggestions for further empirical research. Research in this direction should enhance our understanding of the British Industrial Revolution and of the preconditions of economic development in other countries.

This paper investigates the views on competition theory and policy of the American institutional economists during the first half of the 20th century. These perspectives contrasted with those of contemporary neoclassical and later mainstream economic approaches. We identify three distinct dimensions to an institutionalist perspective on competition. First, institutionalist approaches focused on describing industry details, so as to bring theory into closer contact with reality. Second, institutionalists emphasized that while competition was sometimes beneficial, it could also be disruptive. Third, institutionalists had a broad view of the objectives of competition policy that extended beyond effects on consumer welfare. Consequently, institutionalists advocated for a wide range of policies to enhance competition, including industrial self-regulation, broad stakeholder representation within corporations, and direct governmental regulations. Their experimental attitude implied that policy would always be evolving, and antitrust enforcement might be only one stage in the development toward a regime of industrial regulation.

In this study, we investigate the mediating effect of institutional networking on the relationship between perceived corruption and the growth of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). We also examine the moderating impact of financial slack on the relationship between perceived corruption and institutional networking. We test our moderated mediation model using data from 212 SMEs operating in Ghana. The findings from the study show that perceived corruption is positively related to institutional networking and this relationship is amplified when levels of financial slack are greater. The findings also show that institutional networking positively mediates the relationship between perceived corruption and SME growth. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.

Corruption is widely believed to have an adverse effect on the economic performance of a country. However, many East-and-Southeast-Asian countries either achieved or currently are achieving impressively rapid economic growth despite widespread corruption – the so-called East-Asian-Paradox. A common feature of these countries was that they were autocracies. We re-examine the corruption-growth relationship, in light of the East-Asian-Paradox. We examine the role of political regimes, in mediating corruption–growth relationship using panel data over 100 countries for the period 1984–2016. We find clear evidence that corruption–growth relationship differs by the type of political regime, and the growth-enhancing effect of corruption is more likely in autocracies than in democracies. The marginal effect analysis shows that in strongly autocratic countries, higher corruption may lead to significantly higher growth, while this is not the case in democracies. Alternatively, democracy is not good for growth if there is a high level of perceived corruption. We provide suggestive evidence that the mechanism by which corruption is growth-enhancing in autocracies is through the perceived credibility of the commitment of ruling political elites to economic freedom, thereby providing confidence to the firms to invest, leading to long-term growth.

In all legal systems, possession and property are inextricably linked. Game theory captures this relationship in the Hawk–Dove game: players competing for an asset are better off when the possessor plays Hawk and the intruder plays Dove (the bourgeois strategy) so that property can emerge as a spontaneous convention. This theory has been supported by large experimental evidence with animals. This paper presents a lab experiment where possession is manipulated to study the emergence of the property convention with human subjects. We show that the highest coordination emerges when possession is achieved meritoriously and that possession induces only bourgeois coordination (never antibourgeois).

France relies on unionized judges to assess labor cases in court. The economic literature advocates that judges pertaining to the more belligerent unions alter judicial equilibrium, foster lower settlements, avoid trials, and intensify a professional judge's interventions. This paper intends to test whether such speculations are accurate. The empirical evidence provided here suggests that such fears are not grounded. Using a database on French employment courts, between 2012 and 2016, we show that judges from the most adversarial trade unions foster conciliation and reduce the number of dropped legal cases. The lack of statistically significant impact of unions on the judicial institution's dysfunctions is evident: the labor judiciary's alleged polarization does not drive the rate of appeals and the number of professional judges' intervention. Finally, the judicial malfunctions appear to be driven by institutional distortions and local socio-economic conditions.

Orthodox economic theorising on ancient societies emphasises the absence of market institutions, in contrast to advanced contemporary economies. However, this may downplay the influence of non-economic interests in the generation of wealth. Consequently, this paper examines an ancient civilisation identified as economically successful namely, the Mauryan Empire (322 to 85 BCE) centred on the Indo-Gangetic plains. Drawing on translations of books collectively known as the Arthasastra (lit. the science of wealth) as well as contemporaneous Greek and Roman texts, this paper examines the role of institutions in generating wealth within societal norms of income distribution and the preservation of social order. Given the importance of trade to this society, comparisons are made with medieval European institutions in terms of market coordination and the maintenance of generalised trust in trading markets. As a consequence, the role of institutions in addressing social and economic uncertainty affecting an ancient society is highlighted.

Formal economic models of entrepreneurship have two characteristics: they model entrepreneurship as an allocation of resources, and they identify common factors affecting this allocation. These common factors are represented as parameters of optimization models, and they are evaluated at the market level. We argue that although these models are useful, they are incomplete because certain aspects of entrepreneurial behavior, such as judgment, alertness, or innovativeness, cannot be easily transformed into allocative problems. Moreover, entrepreneurial acts involve idiosyncratic elements, which limit the applicability of the market-level analysis to individual cases. Thus, the traditional economic methods have to be complemented by approaches highlighting the role of individual and historical specificity. The study of entrepreneurship, therefore, requires a synthesis of both general theory and historicist approaches, as envisioned a century ago by Frank Knight.

Habraken's Structure of the Ordinary (SOTO), Jacobs' view of cities, and Ostrom's Design Principles and Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework focus on essential elements and relationships for the effective governance of the environment. However, they have different perspectives about what is necessary for successful governance. This article compares and contrasts Habraken's, Jacobs', and Ostrom's views and applies them to Common Interest Developments (CIDs). Habraken, Jacobs, and Habraken discuss the importance of public territory. Habraken views public territory as relative: a territory in a built environment can be private relative to a larger, or higher level, territory, and public relative to an included, lower level, territory. Jacobs discusses the importance of connections and accommodating strangers without sacrificing safety. Ostrom views common-pool resources as goods whose use causes less to be available to others. For their part, CIDs represent a particular governance vehicle for defining what is public and private in large residential developments. For both Habraken and Ostrom, the transformation of the physical environment reflects agents' common values constrained by material, technical, cultural, and economic conditions. Rather than one mutual understanding, Jacobs wrote that balancing the commercial and the guardian values is crucial for society's health and survival.

The paper focuses on a previously unexamined aspect of Marx's discussion on the 19th century English Factory Acts, and highlights its broader relevance for contemporary discussions about the role of institutions in a market economy. The capitalists' enlightened self-interest was to better husband their work force by limiting the workday and curtailing child labor, but market competition put them in a Prisoner's Dilemma creating an opportunism hazard. The ‘Factory Acts’ addressed the problem, but the state lacked the capacity to enforce them effectively. Marx held that the organized power of workers played an essential role in how the Factory Laws could gain traction at a time when state enforcement was unreliable. Organized labor's threats of sanction were credible enough to lower the expected benefit of non-compliance, enabling capitalists to commit to acting in their long-term, collective self-interest.

Regardless of the historical evolution of money, some passages of Aristotle's works shed light on its meaning and nature. This paper will attentively consider these passages. The first section presents Aristotle's thoughts on money. While the second section analyses money as a unit of measurement, the third section deals with its conventional nature, and the fourth draws from the theories of signs elaborated by John Poinsot and Charles Peirce to expand the explanation of the nature of money as a sign. The conclusion considers three levels of consideration of money based on Aristotle's thoughts: (1) universal abstract money, (2) instantiated in specific currencies, and (3) the actualization of their properties and potentialities in actual economic dealings.

We examine how variation in antisemitism across countries can be explained by economic freedom. We propose two mechanisms. First, the more economic freedom, the greater the scope of market activities. If people perceive Jews as particularly skilful at doing business at the expense of others, a greater reliance on markets can increase antisemitism. Second, a key type of institution undergirding the market is an effective and fair legal system, or the rule of law. The stronger the rule of law, the smaller the risk for exploitative behaviour, and the less hostile people will be towards groups seen as exploiters. If Jews are seen as such, more economic freedom reduces antisemitism. We use the ADL Global 100 survey of antisemitic attitudes and relate them, for up to 106 countries, to the Economic Freedom of the World index and its five areas. Our empirical findings confirm the two predictions: The more economic openness, the more antisemitism; and the stronger the rule of law, the less antisemitism. These findings indicate a complex relationship between markets and attitudes towards Jews.

This paper explores the interaction of informal constraints on human behaviour by examining the evolution of English football jerseys. The jersey provides an excellent setting to demonstrate how informal constraints emerge from formal rules and shape human behaviour. Customs, approved norms and habits are all observed in this setting. The commercialisation of football in recent decades has resulted in these informal constraints, in many cases dating back over a century, co-existing with branding, goodwill and identity effects. Combined, these motivate clubs to maintain the status quo. As a result, club colours have remained remarkably resilient within a frequently changing landscape.

This paper revisits and fine-tunes a spin-off from Knight's (1921, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit) influential distinction between risk (‘probability of unknown events’) and uncertainty (‘unquantifiable randomness’): the contrast between actuarial institutions and entrepreneurship. It contends that this opposition is not exclusive and argues that the act of insurance does not automatically reduce entrepreneurial profits. To maintain this claim, the paper emphasizes hedging and, more specifically, draws on an innovative actuarial scheme – parametric (or index-based) insurance – which, unlike indemnity-based insurance, does not rely on a damage assessment but indemnifies the policyholder according to the variation of an index. This argument sheds new light on the function habitually assigned to actuarial institutions, amends the theory of entrepreneurial profits, and integrates hedging within entrepreneurial judgment.