It is well known that German utterance-initial lenis stops are voiceless but that German intervocalic (or intersonorant) lenis stops are sometimes produced with voicing. This variable voicing can be understood as passive voicing, voicing that results because of the voiced context, rather than from active voicing gestures by speakers. Thus, speakers are not actively aiming to voice intervocalic stops, just as they are not actively aiming to voice utterance-initial stops (Jessen & Ringen 2002, Jessen 2004). If this is correct, the variable voicing that occurs in aspirating languages should be different from the voicing that occurs in true voice languages (such as Russian), in which speakers are actively aiming to voice both initial and intervocalic lenis stops. Since there is little data on the relative amount of intervocalic voicing in true voice languages, however, it has been difficult to evaluate this prediction. The purpose of this paper is to compare data on the voicing of intervocalic stops in German and English with data on the voicing of intervocalic stops in true voice languages. We find that the differences are substantial, supporting the claim that aspirating languages are not like true voice languages, in which the feature of contrast is [voice].

A nonrestrictive relative clause (henceforth NRR) is shown in (I) and a restrictive relative clause (henceforth RR) in (2).

(1) The swans, which are white, are in that part of the lake.

(2) The swans which are white are in that part of the lake.

Example (1) implies that all the swans under discussion are white. Example (2) implies that the white swans are being distinguished from some other not white swans which are also under discussion. There are many superficial differences between restrictive and nonrestrictive relative clauses; in this paper I show that there is no need for construction-specific stipulations which distinguish between them. The differences arise from the fact that the RR is a modifier, while the NRR is not, and in fact has no syntactic relation to its host/antecedent. Co-indexing (involving a referential index) between the relative clause and its antecedent is central to this account. I examine the requirement that a relative pronoun must have an antecedent, which in the case of a NRR is the sole manifestation of the relationship between the relative clause and its host), and suggest that this holds at a level of discourse structure.

In this paper we propose an analysis of the semantic structure of modal sentences in English. Central to this analysis is the notion of ‘speech act’. The notion of speech act derives principally from the work of J. L. Austin (cf. especially Austin, 1962). Austin is particularly concerned with the use of sentences like I promise to go, I bet you sixpence and I name this ship ‘Queen Elizabeth’. One of his main purposes is to show that it is a mistake to class these sentences with sentences like John is running as statements. To utter the sentence I promise to go is not to make a statement about or to report some inner condition of mind or consciousness. It is to perform the act of promising, just as to say I bet you sixpence is to perform the act of betting. Indeed, in the case of these kinds of acts (promising, betting, naming, etc.) it is difficult to see how one could engage in them without using sentences of this kind. Austin calls verbs like promise, bet and name ‘performative’ verbs. It follows from this account that verbs like say, state and assert are also performative verbs. So that the mistake involved in classing I promise to go with John is running is not that in uttering the first sentence one is performing an act and in uttering the second one is not (ignoring the uninteresting fact that the act of vocalizing is common to both), but that the speaker is performing a different act in each case—in the one case promising and in the other stating. The fact that in the case of the utterance John is running the performative verb state does not occur, so that what Austin terms its ‘illocutionary force’ is not explicitly marked in the way in which the utterance I promise to go is explicitly marked as having the illocutionary force of a promise by the words I promise, while giving rise to certain difficult problems,2 does not affect Austin's main point, which is that a complete account of the meaning of a sentence cannot be restricted to semantic analyses as these are usually understood and that they must be extended to include information about the kind of speech act involved in uttering the sentence – that is, its illocutionary force.

In morphology, as in other branches of scientific endeavour, apparent disorder and irregularity tend to be re-analysed as underlying order. Asymmetries between form and meaning, such as allomorphy, tend accordingly to be factored into basic invariance,2 sames of meaning being interpreted, where possible, as sames of form. Alternatively, as in some of Bybee's (1985) analyses of fusional allomorphy, differences in form may be viewed as diagrammatic of differences in meaning. Allomorphic variants which cannot be made to yield to such re-analyses are commonly relegated to a kind of marginal synchronie ‘junkpile’, and are assumed to be a synchronically ‘inert’ residue of historical (usually phonological) changes. That such an approach to allomorphy can often be illuminating is not in question, but it bespeaks an essentially negative view of morphological irregularity. I wish to propose that there is room for a complementary perspective, in which the ‘irregularity’ inherent in allomorphy can be appreciated not as basically ‘inert’ deviation from a natural isomorphic relationship between meaning and form, but as an active, abstract structural property of morphological systems.

In this paper we use an extensive archive of early New Zealand speakers, together with comparisons with the other Southern Hemisphere varieties of English, to argue that dialect mixture and new-dialect formation are not haphazard processes. We demonstrate that, given sufficient linguistic information about the dialects which contribute to a mixture, and sufficient demographic information about the proportions of speakers of the different dialects, it is possible to make predictions about what the outcome of the mixture will be. We also argue that we have arrived at a probabilistic solution to the problem of randomness in the transmission of dialect features from one generation to another in such situations.

The history of the verb like has attracted a good deal of interest among linguists and students of the history of English, from Van der Gaaf (1904) and Jespersen (1927) up to Elmer (1981), Lightfoot (1981), and Fischer and Van der Leek (1983). The interest in this verb is caused by the fact that it presents a clear case of a verb changing its assignment of semantic to syntactic roles. In Modern English (ModE), this verb subcategorizes for a cause, which takes the grammatical role of object, and an experiencer, which plays the role of subject. But in Old English (OE), the semantic roles were assigned to the opposite grammatical roles:

It is generally assumed (with an exception to be discussed below), that this change is an instance of syntactic reanalysis. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that no reanalysis of a structure has taken place; rather, a new subcategorization frame has been introduced and gradually ousted the old one.

A common view in theoretical syntax and computational linguistics holds that there are no grammatical restrictions on multiple center-embedding of clauses. Syntax would thus be characterized by unbounded recursion. An analysis of 119 genuine multiple clausal center-embeddings from seven ‘Standard Average European’ languages (English, Finnish, French, German, Latin, Swedish, Danish) uncovers usage-based regularities, constraints, that run counter to these and several other widely held views, such as that any type of multiple self-embedding (of the same clause type) would be possible, or that self-embedding would be more complex than multiple center-embedding of different clause types. The maximal degree of center-embedding in written language is three. In spoken language, multiple center-embedding is practically absent. Typical center-embeddings of any degree involve relative clauses specifying the referent of the subject NP of the superordinate clause. Only postmodifying clauses, especially relative clauses and that-clauses acting as noun complements, allow central self-embedding. Double relativization of objects (The rat the cat the dog chased killed ate the malt) does not occur. These corpus-based ‘soft constraints’ suggest that full-blown recursion creating multiple clausal center-embedding is not a central design feature of language in use. Multiple center-embedding emerged with the advent of written language, with Aristotle, Cicero, and Livy in the Greek and Latin stylistic tradition of ‘periodic’ sentence composition.

Smith (1973) presents a detailed analysis of his son's phonological development between the ages of two and four.1 The book is impressive, not only for the care with which the analysis was done but also, and more importantly, for the clarity with which central acquisition issues were stated. The analysis of the child's productions was done in two ways: first as a mapping from the adult system and second as a self-contained system. In his introduction, Smith raises seven issues that any theory of language acquisition must address; one of these concerns the nature of phonological change. Smith states that when changes occur in the child's output, they do so in an ‘across-the-board’ fashion. On the basis of this (and other) evidence, Smith concludes that the child must have the adult surface form as his underlying lexical representation. The implication is clear: the child must thus perceive in an adult-like fashion and the deviance of his/her output is due to the articulatory difficulty of certain sounds and sound sequences (and in some cases to certain formal properties of his mapping system).

Singapore English is a contact language with a constant linguistic substratum and superstratum. It lends itself to an interesting case study on how linguistic neologisms emerge out of a pool of competing features from the typologically distinct languages active in the contact ecology. This paper investigates the aspectual system of Singapore English and that of Chinese, the main substrate language, and of English, the lexical-source language. Despite the presence of competing aspectual categories from the two languages, the aspectual system of Singapore English is essentially the Chinese system filtered through the morphosyntax of English. Substrate influence is systemic, and the competing grammatical subsystems do not mix.

We propose, and provide corpus-based support for, a usage-based explanation for cross-linguistic trends in the coding of causal–noncausal verb pairs, such as raise/rise, break (tr.)/break (intr.). While English mostly uses the same verb form both for the causal and the noncausal sense (labile coding), most languages have extra coding for the causal verb (causative coding) and/or for the noncausal verb (anticausative coding). Causative and anticausative coding is not randomly distributed (Haspelmath 1993): Some verb meanings, such as ‘freeze’, ‘dry’ and ‘melt’, tend to be coded as causatives, while others, such as ‘break’, ‘open’ and ‘split’, tend to be coded as anticausatives. We propose an explanation of these coding tendencies on the basis of the form–frequency correspondence principle, which is a general efficiency principle that is responsible for many grammatical asymmetries, ultimately grounded in predictability of frequently expressed meanings. In corpus data from seven languages, we find that verb pairs for which the noncausal member is more frequent tend to be coded as anticausatives, while verb pairs for which the causal member is more frequent tend to be coded as causatives. Our approach implies that linguists should not rely on form–meaning parallelism when trying to explain cross-linguistic or language-particular patterns in this domain.

In Prosodic Phonology, domains for the application of phonological patterns are commonly modeled as a Prosodic Hierarchy. The theory predicts, among other things, that (i) prosodic domains cluster on a single universal set of domains (‘Clustering’), and (ii) no level of prosodic structure is skipped in the building of prosodic structure unless this is required by independently motivated higher ranking principles or constraints (‘Strict Succession’). In this paper, we demonstrate that if, as is standardly done, evidence is limited to lexically general phonological processes, some languages systematically violate the Strict Succession Prediction, evidencing no prosodic word domain, and some languages systematically violate the Clustering Prediction, evidencing more than one domain between the phonological phrase and the foot. We substantiate these claims by in-depth studies of phonological rule domains in Vietnamese (Austroasiatic) and Limbu (Sino-Tibetan). As an alternative to the Prosodic Hierarchy framework, we advocate a heuristic for cross-linguistic comparison in which prosodic domains are conceived of as language-particular, intrinsic and highly specific properties of individual phonological rules or constraints. This allows us to explore empirically the actual degree of variation to be encountered across prosodic systems. It turns out that the ‘word’ has no privileged or universal status in phonology, but only emerges through frequent reference of sound patterns to a given construction type in a given language.

The paper aims to clarify the Relevance theoretic notion of procedural meaning (cf. Blakemore 1987, Wilson & Sperber 1993) through the analysis of but and nevertheless. I show, first, that a procedural analysis is able to account for differences between these expressions that cannot be explained in terms of the speech-act theoretic notion of non-truth conditional indicators, and, second, that these differences show that the conception of procedural meaning as a constraint on contextual effects (cf. Blakemore 1987) is too narrow and must be extended to include all information about the inferential processes involved in utterance interpretation, including context selection.

Arguments about constituency in syntax can often be settled by such methods as testing whether conjoining is possible, or whether a particular string can be moved as a single constituent by a transformational rule. In view of the isomorphism which has been noted between syntactic structures and phonological structures (cf. Clements & Keyser, 1983:25–26; the notion of ‘structural analogy’ in Anderson & Durand, 1986:3; and most notably the isomorphism pointed out between Sentence and Syllable by Kurylowicz, 1949), one might wonder whether such means are available for settling analogous arguments in phonology. It appears that they are not: in this area conjoining does not occur, while movement rules are either not recognized at all, or restricted to those accounting for processes of metathesis, which would normally be taken to be local transformations operating on single segments (cf. Vincent, 1986:318, fn. 3). What types of arguments, then, ARE available for settling questions of phonological constituency? This article attempts to explore some aspects of this question.

The expression is part of can be used in a number of different senses. One might cite as examples:A sheep is part of a flock. A priest is part of the clergy. Changing nappies is part of being a mother.A petal is part of a flower. But one does not ask What are the parts of the clergy? or What are the parts of being a mother? as one might ask What are the parts of a flower? or What are the parts of the human body? I shall refer to the latter as ‘structural parts’, to distinguish them from the rest; it is with the relation between structural parts and their wholes that the present paper will be concerned. This relation can also be expressed by sentences of the form A flower has petals, The human body has arms, etc. (The verb have can, of course, also be used in senses irrelevant to the present discussion.) The part-whole relation, thus conceived, is generally recognized as being one of the fundamental sense-relations structuring the vocabulary of a language.

In the first half of the twentieth century, English grammar disappeared from the curriculum of most schools in England, but since the 1960s it has gradually been reconceptualised, under the influence of linguistics, and now once again has a central place in the official curriculum. Our aim is not only to document these changes, but also to explain them. We suggest that the decline of grammar in schools was linked to a similar gap in English universities, where there was virtually no serious research or teaching on English grammar. Conversely, the upsurge of academic research since the 1960s has provided a healthy foundation for school-level work and has prevented a simple return to old-fashioned grammar-teaching now that grammar is once again fashionable. We argue that linguists should be more aware of the links between their research and the school curriculum.

Recent research has shown that homophonous lexemes show systematic phonetic differences (e.g. Gahl 2008, Drager 2011), with important consequences for models of speech production such as Levelt et al. (1999). These findings also pose the question of whether similar differences hold for allegedly homophonous affixes (instead of free lexemes). Earlier experimental research found some evidence that morphemic and non-morphemic sounds may differ acoustically (Walsh & Parker 1983, Losiewicz 1992). This paper investigates this question by analyzing the phonetic realization of non-morphemic /s/ and /z/, and of six different English /s/ and /z/ morphemes (plural, genitive, genitive-plural and 3rd person singular, as well as cliticized forms of has and is). The analysis is based on more than 600 tokens extracted from conversational speech (Buckeye Corpus, Pitt et al. 2007). Two important results emerge. First, there are significant differences in acoustic duration between some morphemic /s/’s and /z/’s and non-morphemic /s/ and /z/, respectively. Second, there are significant differences in duration between some of the morphemes. These findings challenge standard assumptions in morphological theory, lexical phonology and models of speech production.

Focus is regularly treated as a cross-linguistically stable category that is merely manifested by different structural means in different languages, such that a common focus feature may be realised through, for example, a morpheme in one language and syntactic movement in another. We demonstrate this conception of focus to be unsustainable on both theoretical and empirical grounds, invoking fundamental argumentation regarding the notions of focus and linguistic category, alongside data from a wide range of languages. Attempts to salvage a cross-linguistic notion of focus through parameterisation, the introduction of additional information-structural primitives such as contrast, or reduction to a single common factor are shown to be equally problematic. We identify the causes of repeated misconceptions about the nature of focus in a number of interrelated theoretical and methodological tendencies in linguistic analysis. We propose to see focus as a heuristic tool and to employ it as a means of identifying structural patterns that languages use to generate a certain number of related pragmatic effects, potentially through quite diverse mechanisms.

Mainstream linguists have now begun to take an interest in the way the formal resources of language are put to use by people in communicative situations. A powerful impulse for this awakening interest came from Grice's paper ‘The logic of conversation’; (1975). Grice's work has begun to he examined, criticized, and developed (see, for example, Wilson, 1975; Kempson, 5975), and prospects are now emerging of a much more satisfying and comprehensive picture of language at work in a communicative setting. The present paper is intended as a contribution to this developing field.