Since 1990 the age of the average OECD median voter has increased three times faster than in the preceding 30 years. We use panel data from 1980–2002 to investigate the effects of population aging on both the program size and the benefit generosity of public pensions in 18 OECD countries. Population aging is accompanied by cutting smaller slices out of larger cakes: it increases aggregate spending on pensions but freezes or decreases the generosity of individual benefits. Controlling for political, institutional and time-period effects, we find that public pension efforts are significantly mediated by welfare regime type. Moreover, since the late 1980s pension effort has more fully adopted a retrenchment logic. It is the politics of fiscal and electoral straitjackets, not gerontocracy, which shape public pension spending today. While population aging is accelerating, contrary to alarmist political economy predictions democracies are not yet dominated by a new distributive politics of elderly power.

Studies of policy change have advanced to the point where the basic contours and factors driving policy sequences are now reasonably well identified and understood with a great deal of empirical evidence pointing to the prevalence of punctuated equilibrium processes in many policy fields. However the reasons why such processes occur is less well understood. Most attention to date has focused upon homeostatic models in which exogenously-driven shocks undermine institutionally entrenched policy equilibria. This article addresses the difficulties this account faces and the conceptual challenges which must be overcome to provide a solid grounding for the understanding and analysis of long-term policy dynamics. It focuses on the merits and demerits of alternative explanations featuring either random junctures and ‘positive-return’ sequences – path dependency – or embedded junctures and ‘reactive’ sequences – process sequencing. Models of policy-making over time using the latter two concepts, it is argued, are more likely to account for the large majority of policy dynamic than the former.

This paper explores the impact of internationalization on the financial services policy subsystem in Canada. It uses subsystem adjustment as a concept to bring some analytical clarity to how exogenous factors like globalisation and international crises may impact existing policy regimes. Based on examination of globalisation-induced banking deregulation (1987–1991) and the current crisis of securitized banking, the paper argues that the strength of this approach is that it integrates endogenous effects of the existing subsystem in explaining policy changes in response to what are normally treated as exogenous shocks. Careful effort needs to be made to differentiate the processes of external systemic perturbations from subsystem spillovers as these two processes of adjustment and policy change can lead to different policymaking dynamics over the long term.

While there is broad scholarly agreement that policy-making in the European Union (EU) involves a multitude of public and private actors at different levels of government, there is less agreement whether the EU should be conceptualized as a form of governance by networks or governance in networks. This article first examines different concepts of networks. It then sets out multiple functions of networks within the EU policy process. Particular attention is paid to the extent to which networks may provide added value to European integration and improve the quality of governance by effectively solving common problems and helping to address the democratic deficit or whether, by acting as mechanisms of exclusion rather than inclusion, they actually contribute to the EU's legitimacy deficit. Since networks can enhance governance quality as well as undermine its democratic credentials, a balance sheet shows both positive and negative consequences.

Policymaking and policy outcomes are not necessarily the result of a carefully designed process but can result from intertwined political and institutional dynamics that are often difficult to predict from the outset. This article examines such a policy process, the dramatic rise in the uptake of private health insurance (PHI) in Denmark. In a comprehensive welfare state, founded on the principle of universalism, its success is puzzling. The explanation suggested here is that the rise in PHI is an example of policymaking without policy choice. The article reviews the intended and unintended effects concerning equality in health care and public finance. It also notes that the introduction of a private alternative to the universal health care system has not weakened the support for the public services.

This article utilizes a quantitative network approach to analyze complex interaction patterns of public and private actors in EU multi-level governance, concerning the common agricultural policy. It demonstrates, in particular, that the theoretically founded policy network approach provides a powerful tool for comparative politics allowing a quantitative analysis of complex governmental systems. At the micro level, lobbying strategies of different groups can be identified and compared, while at the macro level the classical Corporatism-Pluralism typology could be generalized using this network approach. Further, due to its explicit integration with a legislative decision-making model the suggested approach is a valuable tool in comparative politics as it allows testing to what extent observed lobbying structures are systematically related with specific policy outcomes. In this article the policy network approach is applied to the lobbying system of the Common European Agricultural policy of the EU-15 and EU-27.

In mainstream welfare state theory the new institutional approach has explained incremental changes as institutions gradually adjust at the margin. However, big and sudden changes remain outside the scope of this theory. The article uses the theory of punctuated equilibrium to argue that politics is characterized by long periods of stability followed by dramatic bursts of change. The theory is tested on policy data from 18 Western countries, 1971–2002. It confirms that the degree of non-incrementalism depends partly on the institutional friction in a country and partly on the type of welfare programme in question.

In the early 1990s the Danish Ministry of Finance initiated an experiment where a few ministerial departments negotiated performance agreements with their agencies. Since then internal contracting has spread and is now nearly universally used in central government. However, a close study demonstrates that in this process contract content has changed dramatically. The early contracts were quid-pro-quo agreements. Agencies committed themselves to improve efficiency but contracts at the same time admitted them increased managerial discretion. The mature contracts are quite different. Departmental ministries have exploited their considerable autonomy to set demands that are related to policy and service levels rather than internal management. Here ministries have adapted to the characteristics of their policy tasks and to the presumed concerns of the target groups dominating their political environment. Building on an analysis of all contracts in force in 1995, 2000, and 2005 the paper sees this change as a transformation of an ideal type NPM-instrument into a managerial tool adapted to a system where highly autonomous ministers act as unquestioned political executives.

The ongoing financial turmoil has brought into sharp relief the importance of financial services regulation. Yet, we still know relatively little about how financial regulation is negotiated within the EU, in particular which policy actors are most influential and what are the mechanisms that allow them to exercise influence. This paper addresses these questions using Social Network Analysis (SNA), focusing on the banking regulation network and one core piece of legislation: the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD). Of particular interest is the flow of influence among the key actors. Triangulating an in-depth case study with qualitative interview data and social network analysis, this work investigates a number of hypotheses, associating brokerage roles and extroversion with relative influence in the policy making process. We find that influential actors are those that hold key structural positions in this network and by implication appear to have a better understanding of network topography.

Most studies of tobacco control policy focus on the central level of national governments. Yet within the European Union, three levels of government have responsibilities for tobacco control: the EU; the central governments of member states; and provinces or devolved levels of government. This article examines the role of each in the formation of tobacco policy in the United Kingdom. It compares the theory of regulatory federalism with multilevel governance as explanations for tobacco regulatory policy within the EU. While executive-legislative fusion in the United Kingdom leads to the practice of discretionary federalism, the EU provides mixed support for the theory of regulatory federalism. There is significant policy innovation in the UK and its devolved territories as well as limited policy authority for tobacco control in the EU. Overall, multi-level governance (MLG) may be a superior, albeit incomplete, explanation of tobacco control within the EU and the UK.

Why do countries move from public to private financing of healthcare? This paper explores this issue by looking at the divergent reform trajectories of three postcommunist countries – the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. While existing accounts emphasize veto points to explain changes in healthcare systems, the present analysis finds that moves towards private financing can be better explained by differences in access to the policymaking arm of the state. Specifically, a penetrable single-party government and weak bureaucratic capacities allow physicians to capture the reform process and implement their preferred policies. The results suggest that scholars of health policy should focus more attention on the actors seeking change and their access to policy makers.

Comparative analysis shows that while policy windows and policy entrepreneurs are important, they are insufficient to account for policy change. An understanding of the institutional setting is key to explaining the speed and the magnitude of policy dynamics. In both food safety and pharmaceutical policy in Spain, a redefinition of policy image has involved a transformation of the policy subsystem. In the case of food safety such a paradigm shift has represented a dramatic change, in the case of pharmaceuticals it has meant a gradual process that has developed over a decade. Periods of stability in the pharmaceutical sector reflect the ability of a closed policy community to control problem framing. By contrast, rapid changes in food safety policies are the result of crisis situations governed by a relatively loose policy network. The European Union has been a key policy venue that can transform an institutional framework towards one that is more pluralistic and expert oriented.

The inauguration of Germany's grand coalition of Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the Social Democrats (SPD) raises questions about the public policy performance of a coalition of ideological opposite. This paper turns attention to influence of coalition governments on the size of government in the German Laender from 1992 to 2005. We investigate whether grand coalitions at the sub-national level in Germany systematically affect government spending for education (including cultural affairs) and internal security. The article argues that the effects of grand coalitions on the size of the public sector are moderated by partisan politics but sometimes in unexpected ways. For example, government spending in the field of education is reduced when leftist parties are powerful in the Laender.

The European Commission has taken significant steps towards the recognition of political party foundations at EU level. Firstly, it has agreed to recognize them as actors of European development policies. Secondly, it has proposed the creation of political foundations at EU level, linked to the European political parties. This article analyses the reasons, modalities and potential impact of this process, which signifies a breakthrough in comparison with the Commission's previous attitude towards party affiliated organisations. For the foundations, network-building turns out to have been a crucial means to attain legitimacy and access to the European institutions: firstly, through the mobilisation of political entrepreneurs in the European Parliament lobbying the Commission and Council representatives; and secondly, by linking the future role of non-state actors such as political foundations to the reconsideration of the EU's communication policy.

This article provides empirical evidence on ex ante and ex post indicators of regulatory quality and the relationship between those indicators and market performance in liberalised EU-15 network industries. It finds a low level of regulatory independence and competence, a high level of cross-country variations in regulatory quality, and widespread absence of correlation between ex ante regulatory quality and ex post performance indicators. On the basis of these findings, it suggests that the design of national regulatory agencies (NRAs) in Europe is not optimal and may be conducive to regulatory ineffectiveness or outright regulatory failure. Nevertheless, the existence and strengthening of EU-level regulators could enable EU member states to reduce the risk of regulatory failure by encouraging coordination and adoption of best practice.

This article discusses the results of recent historical research on the governance of networks and their impact on policy-making in the formative period of the EU. It concludes that historically aware research on networks in EU governance has great potential. In particular, in can contribute to enhancing our knowledge about the formation and dynamics of networks; conceptualising the role of supranational institutions such as the Commission in instigating network formation and steering new networks; and improving our understanding of change over time in the governance of networks and their policy impact in the EU.