All notions of mathematical logic, as measured e.g. by Principia mathematica, can be constructed from a basis which embraces variables and just two further primitives: the familiar notions of inclusion and abstraction. Inclusion will be expressed by the usual form of notation “(x⊂y)”, which may be read “x is included in y.” Abstraction will be expressed by the form of notation “x3 …” as with Peano, the blank being filled by any formula (statement or statement form); the whole may be read “the class of all objects x such that ….”

A system of logic based on these primitives will be presented in this paper. The system involves the familiar theory of class types, which, for metamathematical convenience, will be recorded in the system by use of distinctive styles of variables; thus the variables “x”, “y”, and “z”, also with subscripts when further variety is needed, will take individuals as values; the variables “x′”, “y′”, and “z′”, also with subscripts, will take classes of individuals as values; the variables “x″”, “y″”, and “z″”, also with subscripts, will take classes of classes of individuals as values; and so on. The metamathematical notion of term, covering all variables and also all expressions of abstraction, is now describable recursively thus: a variable is a term, and the number of accents which it bears is called its rank; and if terms of equal rank are put for “ζ” and “η” and a variable of rank n is put for “α” in “α3(ζ ⊂ η)”, the result is a term of rank n+1. A formula finally, is any result of putting terms of equal rank for “ζ” and “η” in “(ζ ⊂ η)”.

Several definitions have been given to express an exact meaning corresponding to the intuitive idea of ‘effective calculability’ as applied for instance to functions of positive integers. The purpose of the present paper is to show that the computable functions introduced by the author are identical with the λ-definable functions of Church and the general recursive functions due to Herbrand and Gödel and developed by Kleene. It is shown that every λ-definable function is computable and that every computable function is general recursive. There is a modified form of λ-definability, known as λ-K-definability, and it turns out to be natural to put the proof that every λ-definable function is computable in the form of a proof that every λ-K-definable function is computable; that every λ-definable function is λ-K-definable is trivial. If these results are taken in conjunction with an already available proof that every general recursive function is λ-definable we shall have the required equivalence of computability with λ-definability and incidentally a new proof of the equivalence of λ-definability and λ-K-definability.

A definition of what is meant by a computable function cannot be given satisfactorily in a short space. I therefore refer the reader to Computable pp. 230–235 and p. 254. The proof that computability implies recursiveness requires no more knowledge of computable functions than the ideas underlying the definition: the technical details are recalled in §5.

In the theory of conversion it is important to have a formally defined function which assigns to any positive integer n the least integer not less than n which has a given property. The definition of such a formula is somewhat involved: I propose to give the corresponding formula in λ-K-conversion, which will (naturally) be much simpler. I shall in fact find a formula þ such that if T be a formula for which T(n) is convertible to a formula representing a natural number, whenever n represents a natural number, then þ(T, r) is convertible to the formula q representing the least natural number q, not less than r, for which T(q) conv 0.2 The method depends on finding a formula Θ with the property that Θ conv λu·u(Θ(u)), and consequently if M→Θ(V) then M conv V(M). A formula with this property is,

The formula þ will have the required property if þ(T, r) conv r when T(r) conv 0, and þ(T, r) conv þ(T, S(r)) otherwise. These conditions will be satisfied if þ(T, r) conv T(r, λx·þ(T, S(r)), r), i.e. if þ conv {λptr·t(r, λx·p(t, S(r)), r)}(þ). We therefore put,

This enables us to define also a formula,

such that (T, n) is convertible to the formula representing the nth positive integer q for which T(q) conv 0.

The object of this note is to close a slight gap, hitherto seemingly over-looked, in Nicod's derivation from his postulates of the primitives of Principia mathematica. The gap consists in this: Nicod's propositions corresponding to *1·1−*1·6 of the Principia, though they bear the same names and have the same symbol-forms as the Principia propositions, are not precisely *1·1−1·6. Indeed, if we denote Nicod's “p ⊃ q” and “p · q” by “p < q” and “pq” respectively, and if we write p′ for p∣p and p″ for (p′)′ then in terms of the “stroke,” we have

But p ⊃ q and p · q of the Principia are

Accordingly, the Nicod-Principia propositions are not *1·1−*1·6. They are *1·1−*1·6 in which < takes the place of ⊃, and Nicod has not shown us explicitly how to pass from < to ⊃.

It is true that Nicod also proves the following:

i.e.,

This yields: If ⊢· p < q then ⊢· p ⊃ q, and conversely. This would seem to allow passing from < to ⊃ throughout a proposition. But, it is clear, T1 permits this change only in the case of the principal <. The change in the case of a minor < still has to be justified.