We lean upon the usual variant of the logic of quantum mechanics [1]. Here the propositions correspond to the results of the quantum experiments. A beautiful essay [2] may be connected with a conservation of semantics. But we try to broaden the semantics, admitting propositions about the possibility of results of experiments. Doing so, we fulfil the old wish of W. A. Fock, who attracts our attention to the importance of the modal categories for the interpretation of the quantum theory [3].

We begin with the formal description of the modal system Br+. The alphabet contains the signs ~, ∨ and Ↄ (negation, alternative and the sign of necessity), the set V of the prepositional variables and parentheses. The rules of formation are: if A ∈ V, then A is a proposition; if X and Y are propositions, then ~ X, X ∨ Y and Ↄ X are propositions also; there are no other propositions. ℬ will design the set of all propositions.

The rules of transformation are the following:

.

Here X, Y ∈ ℬ. The sign ⊨ denotes the derivability in Br+ (in one step here).

We formalise the notion of those infinite binary sequences z that admit a single program P which expresses the entire algorithmical structure of z. Such a program P minimizes the information which must be used in a relative computation for z. We propose two concepts with different strength for this notion, the learnable and the super-learnable sequences. We establish three different equivalent characterizations of learnable (super-learnable, resp.) sequences. In particular, we prove that a sequence z is learnable (super-learnable, resp.) if and only if there is a computable probability measure p such that p is Schnorr (Martin-Löf, resp.) p-random. There is a recursively enumerable sequence which is not learnable. The learnable sequences are invariant with respect to all total and effective transformations of infinite binary sequences.

Let L be a countable first-order language and L(Q) be obtained by adjoining an additional quantifier Q. Q is a generalization of the quantifier “there exists uncountably many x such that…” which was introduced by Mostowski in [4]. The logic of this latter quantifier was formalized by Keisler in [2]. Krivine and McAloon [3] considered quantifiers satisfying some but not all of Keisler's axioms. They called a formula φ(x) countable-like if

for every ψ. In Keisler's logic, φ(x) being countable-like is the same as ℳ⊨┐Qxφ(x). The main theorem of [3] states that any countable model ℳ of L[Q] has an elementary extension N, which preserves countable-like formulas but no others, such that the only sets definable in both N and M are those defined by formulas countable-like in M. Suppose C(x) in M is linearly ordered and noncountable-like but with countable-like proper segments. Then in N, C will have new elements greater than all “old” elements but no least new element — otherwise it will be definable in both models. The natural question is whether it is possible to use generalized quantifiers to extend models elementarily in such a way that a noncountable-like formula C will have a minimal new element. There are models and formulas for which it is not possible. For example let M be obtained from a minimal transitive model of ZFC by letting Qxφ(x) mean “there are arbitrarily large ordinals satisfying φ”.

We shall prove the following theorem:

Theorem. For any finite lattice there is a model of ZF in which the partial ordering of the degrees of constructibility is isomorphic with the given lattice.

Let M be a standard countable model of ZF satisfying V = L. Let K be the given finite lattice. We shall extend M by forcing.

The paper is divided into two parts. The first part concerns the definition of the set of forcing conditions and some properties of this set expressible without the use of generic filters.

We define first a representation of a lattice and then the set of conditions. In Lemmas 1, 2 we show that there are some canonical isomorphisms between some conditions and that a single condition has some canonical automorphisms.

In Lemma 3 and Definition 7 we show some methods of defining conditions. We shall use those methods in the second part to define certain conditions with special properties.

Lemma 4 gives a connection between the sets P and Pk (see Definitions 4 and 5). It is next employed in the second part in Lemma 10 in an essential way.

Indeed, Lemma 10 is necessary for Lemma 13, which is the crucial point of the whole construction. Lemma 5 is also employed in Lemma 13 (exactly in its Corollary).

The second part of the paper is devoted to the examination of the structure of degrees of constructibility in a generic model. First, we show that degrees of some “sections” of a generic real (Definition 9) form a lattice isomorphic with K. Secondly, we show that there are no other degrees in the generic model; this is the most difficult property to obtain by forcing. We prove, in two stages, that it holds in our generic models. We first show, by using special properties of the forcing conditions, that sets of ordinal numbers have no other degrees. Then we show that the degrees of sets of ordinals already determine the degrees of other sets.

Any two models of arithmetic can be jointly embedded in a third with any prescribed isomorphic submodels as intersection and any prescribed relative ordering of the skies above the intersection. Corollaries include some known and some new theorems about ultrafilters on the natural numbers, for example that every ultrafilter with the “4 to 3” weak Ramsey partition property is a P-point. We also give examples showing that ultrafilters with the “5 to 4” partition property need not be P-points and that the main theorem cannot be improved to allow a prescribed ordering of lower skies.

Ramsey's theorem [5] asserts that every infinite set X has the following partition property (RP): For every partition of the set [X]2 of two-element subsets of X into two pieces, there is an infinite subset Y of X such that [Y]2 is included in one of the pieces. Ramsey explicitly indicated that his proof of this theorem used the axiom of choice. Kleinberg [3] showed that every proof of Ramsey's theorem must use the axiom of choice, although rather weak forms of this axiom suffice. J. Dawson has raised the question of the position of Ramsey's theorem in the hierarchy of weak axioms of choice.

In this paper, we prove or refute the provability of each of the possible implications between Ramsey's theorem and the weak axioms of choice mentioned in Appendix A.3 of Jech's book [2]. Our results, along with some known facts which we include for completeness, may be summarized as follows (the notation being as in [2]):

A. The following principles do not (even jointly) imply Ramsey's theorem, nor does Ramsey's theorem imply any of them:

the Boolean prime ideal theorem,

the selection principle,

the order extension principle,

the ordering principle,

choice from wellordered sets (ACW),

choice from finite sets,

choice from pairs (C2).

B. Each of the following principles implies Ramsey's theorem, but none of them follows from Ramsey's theorem:

the axiom of choice,

wellordered choice (∀kACk),

dependent choice of any infinite length k (DCk),

countable choice (ACN0),

nonexistence of infinite Dedekind-finite sets (WN0).

In the Kripke semantics for propositional modal logic, a frame W = (W, ≺) represents a set of “possible worlds” and a relation of “accessibility” between possible worlds. With respect to a fixed frame W, a proposition is represented by a subset of W (regarded as the set of worlds in which the proposition is true), and an n-ary connective (i.e. a way of forming a new proposition from an ordered n-tuple of given propositions) is represented by a function fw: (P(W))n → P(W). Finally a state of affairs (i.e. a consistent specification whether or not each proposition obtains) is represented by an ultrafilter over W. {To avoid possible confusion, the reader should forget that some people prefer the term “states of affairs” for our “possible worlds”.}

In a broader sense, an n-ary connective is represented by an n-ary operatorf = {fw∣ W ∈ Fr}, where Fr is the class of all frames and each fw: (P(W))n → P(W). A connective is modal if it corresponds to a formula of propositional modal logic. A connective C is coherent if whether C(P1,…, Pn) is true in a possible world depends only upon which modal combinations of P1,…,Pn are true in that world. (A modal combination of P1,…,Pn is the result of applying a modal connective to P1,…, Pn.) A connective C is strongly coherent if whether C(P1, …, Pn) obtains in a state of affairs depends only upon which modal combinations of P1,…, Pn obtain in that state of affairs.

Let N denote the natural numbers. If A ⊆ N, we write Ā for the complement of A in N. A set A ⊆ N is cohesive if (i) A is infinite and (ii) for any recursively enumerable set W either W ∩ A or ∩ A is finite. A r.e. set M ⊆ N is maximal if is cohesive.

A recursively presented vector space (r.p.v.s.) U over a recursive field F consists of a recursive set U ⊆ N and operations of vector addition and scalar multiplication which are partial recursive and under which U becomes a vector space. A r.p.v.s. U has a dependence algorithm if there is a uniform effective procedure which applied to any n-tuple ν0, ν1, …, νn−1 of elements of U determines whether or not ν0, ν1 …, νn−1 are linearly dependent. Throughout this paper we assume that if U is a r.p.v.s. over a recursive field F then U is infinite dimensional and U = N. If W ⊆ U, then we say W is recursive (r.e., etc.) iff W is a recursive (r.e., etc.) subset of N. If S ⊆ U, we write (S)* for the subspace generated by S. If V1 and V2 are subspaces of U such that V1 ∩ V2 ={} (where is the zero vector of U), then we write V1 ⊕ V2 for (V1 ∪ V2)*. If V1 ⊆ V2⊆U are subspaces, we write V2/V1 for the quotient space.