We define a class of productiveσ-ideals of subsets of the Cantor space 2ω and observe that both σ-ideals of meagre sets and of null sets are in this class. From every productive σ-ideal we produce a σ-ideal of subsets of the generalized Cantor space 2κ. In particular, starting from meagre sets and null sets in 2ω we obtain meagre sets and null sets in 2ω, respectively. Then we investigate additivity, covering number, uniformity and cofinality of . For example, we show that

Our results generalizes those from [5].

We present a number of results involving almost disjoint sets and Martin's axiom. Included is an example, due to K. Kunen, of a c.c.c. partial order without property K whose product with every c.c.c. partial order is c.c.c.

We investigate theories of initial segments of the standard models for arithmetics. It is easy to see that if the ordering relation is definable in the standard model then the decidability results can be transferred from the infinite model into the finite models. On the contrary we show that the Σ2–theory of multiplication is undecidable in finite models. We show that this result is optimal by proving that the Σ1–theory of multiplication and order is decidable in finite models as well as in the standard model. We show also that the exponentiation function is definable in finite models by a formula of arithmetic with multiplication and that one can define in finite models the arithmetic of addition and multiplication with the concatenation operation.

We consider also the spectrum problem. We show that the spectrum of arithmetic with multiplication and arithmetic with exponentiation is strictly contained in the spectrum of arithmetic with addition and multiplication.

Theorem A. Suppose that T is superstable and p is a nontrivial type of U-rank 1. Then R(p, L, ∞)= 1.

Theorem B. Suppose that T is totally transcendental and p is a nontrivial type of U-rank 1. Then p has Morley rank 1.

The theory of large cardinals in the absence of the axiom of choice (AC) has been examined extensively by set theorists. A particular motivation has been the study of large cardinals and their interrelationships with the axiom of determinacy (AD). Many important and beautiful theorems have been proven in this area, especially by Woodin, who has shown how to obtain, from hypermeasurability, models for the theories “ZF + DC + ∀α < ℵ1(ℵ1 → (ℵ1)α)” and . Thus, consequences of AD whose consistency strength appeared to be beyond that of the more standard large cardinal hypotheses were shown to have suprisingly weak consistency strength.

In this paper, we continue the study of large cardinals in the absence of AC and their interrelationships with AD by examining what large cardinal structures are possible on cardinals below ℵω in the absence of AC. Specifically, we prove the following theorems.

Theorem 1. Con(ZFC + κ1 < κ2are supercompact cardinals) ⇒ Con(ZF + DC + The club filter on ℵ1is a normal measure + ℵ1and ℵ2are supercompact cardinals).

Theorem 2. Con(ZF + AD) ⇒ Con(ZF + ℵ1, ℵ2and ℵ3are measurable cardinals which carry normal measures + μωis not a measure on any of these cardinals).

Problems of computing probabilities of statements about large, finite structures have become an important subject area of finite combinatorics. Within the last two decades many researchers have turned their attention to such problems and have developed a variety of methods for dealing with them. Applications of these ideas include nonconstructive existence proofs for graphs with certain properties by showing the properties occur with nonzero probabilities (for examples see Erdös and Spencer [ES] and Bollobás [Bo]), and determination of average running times for sorting algorithms by computing asymptotic probabilities of statements about permutations (see Knuth [Kn]). Two types of techniques recur in solutions to such problems: probabilistic techniques, such as those used by Erdös and Spencer [ES], and classical assymptotic techniques, such as those surveyed by Bender [Be] and de Bruijn [Br]. Studying this body of techniques, one notices that characteristics of these problems suggest certain methods of solution, in much the same way that the form of an integrand may suggest certain substitutions. The question arises, then, as to whether there is a systematic way to approach these problems: is there an algorithm for computing asymptotic probabilities? I will show that the answer is “no”—for any reasonable formulation, the problem of computing asymptotic probabilities is undecidable.

The main theorem of the paper is Theorem 1.6, which says that there is a finitely axiomatizable class in which every first order sentence has an asymptotic probability of 0 or 1—i.e., is almost always true or almost always false in finite structures—but for which the problem of deciding whether a sentence has asymptotic probability 0 or 1 is undecidable. Heretofore, classes known to have such a 0-1 law have had decidable asymptotic probability problems (see Lynch [Ly] for examples and a discussion of previous work in the area).

We prove in particular that, in a large class of dp-minimal theories including the p-adics, definable types are dense amongst nonforking types.

We prove that the determinacy of Gale-Stewart games whose winning sets are accepted by realtime 1-counter Büchi automata is equivalent to the determinacy of (effective) analytic Gale-Stewart games which is known to be a large cardinal assumption. We show also that the determinacy of Wadge games between two players in charge of ω-languages accepted by 1-counter Büchi automata is equivalent to the (effective) analytic Wadge determinacy. Using some results of set theory we prove that one can effectively construct a 1-counter Büchi automaton and a Büchi automaton such that: (1) There exists a model of ZFC in which Player 2 has a winning strategy in the Wadge game W(L(), L()); (2) There exists a model of ZFC in which the Wadge game W(L(), L()) is not determined. Moreover these are the only two possibilities, i.e. there are no models of ZFC in which Player 1 has a winning strategy in the Wadge game W(L(), L()).

No natural principle is currently known to be strictly between the arithmetic comprehension axiom (ACA0) and Ramsey’s theorem for pairs ( $RT_2^2$ ) in reverse mathematics. The tree theorem for pairs ( $TT_2^2$ ) is however a good candidate. The tree theorem states that for every finite coloring over tuples of comparable nodes in the full binary tree, there is a monochromatic subtree isomorphic to the full tree. The principle $TT_2^2$ is known to lie between ACA0 and $RT_2^2$ over RCA0, but its exact strength remains open. In this paper, we prove that $RT_2^2$ together with weak König’s lemma (WKL0) does not imply $TT_2^2$ , thereby answering a question of Montálban. This separation is a case in point of the method of Lerman, Solomon and Towsner for designing a computability-theoretic property which discriminates between two statements in reverse mathematics. We therefore put the emphasis on the different steps leading to this separation in order to serve as a tutorial for separating principles in reverse mathematics.

This paper presents a unified framework that explains and extends the already successful applications of the Leibniz operator, the Suszko operator, and the Tarski operator in recent developments in abstract algebraic logic. To this end, we refine Czelakowski’s notion of an S-compatibility operator, and introduce the notion of coherent family of S-compatibility operators, for a sentential logic S. The notion of coherence is a restricted property of commutativity with inverse images by surjective homomorphisms, which is satisfied by both the Leibniz and the Suszko operators. We generalize several constructions and results already existing for the mentioned operators; in particular, the well-known classes of algebras associated with a logic through each of them, and the notions of full generalized model of a logic and a special kind of S-filters (which generalizes the less-known notion of Leibniz filter). We obtain a General Correspondence Theorem, extending the well-known one from the theory of protoalgebraic logics to arbitrary logics and to more general operators, and strengthening its formulation. We apply the general results to the Leibniz and the Suszko operators, and obtain several characterizations of the main classes of logics in the Leibniz hierarchy by the form of their full generalized models, by old and new properties of the Leibniz operator, and by the behaviour of the Suszko operator. Some of these characterizations complete or extend known ones, for some classes in the hierarchy, thus offering an integrated approach to the Leibniz hierarchy that uncovers some new, nice symmetries.

The aim of this paper is to study tag systems as defined by Post [Post 1943, pp. 203–205 and Post, 1965, pp. 370–373]. The existence of a tag system with unsolvable halting problem was proved by Minsky by constructing a universal tag system [Minsky 1961, see also Cocke and Minsky 1964, Wang 1963, and Minsky 1967, pp. 267–273]. Hence the halting problem of a tag system can be of the complete degree 0′. We shall prove that the halting problem for a tag system can have an arbitrary (recursively enumerable) degree of undecidability (Corollary III).

A related problem arises when we ask if there exists a uniform procedure for determining, given a tag system, whether or not there is any word on which the tag system does not halt, an “immortal” word in the system. The alternative, of course, being that the system eventually halts on every (finite) word. It is shown here that this problem, the immortality problem for tag systems, is recursively unsolvable of degree 0″ (Corollary II).

In this paper we show that it is consistent with ZFC that the cardinality of every maximal cofinitary group of Sym(ω) is strictly greater than the cardinal numbers and .

We consider the Turing degrees of prime models of complete decidable theories. In particular we show that every complete decidable atomic theory has a prime model whose elementary diagram is low. We combine the construction used in the proof with other constructions to show that complete decidable atomic theories have low prime models with added properties.

If we have a complete decidable atomic theory with all types of the theory computable, we show that for every degree d with 0 < d < 0', there is a prime model with elementary diagram of degree d. Indeed, this is a corollary of the fact that if T is a complete decidable theory and L is a computable set of c.e. partial types of T, then for any degree d > 0, T has a d-decidable model omitting the nonprincipal types listed by L.

A demonstrably consistent theory of real numbers has been outlined by the writer in An extension of basic logic1 (hereafter referred to as EBL). This theory deals with non-negative real numbers, but it could be easily modified to deal with negative real numbers also. It was shown that the theory was adequate for proving a form of the fundamental theorem on least upper bounds and greatest lower bounds. More precisely, the following results were obtained in the terminology of EBL: If С is a class of U-reals and is completely represented in Κ′ and if some U-real is an upper bound of С, then there is a U-real which is a least upper bound of С. If D is a class of (U-reals and is completely represented in Κ′, then there is a U-real which is a greatest lower bound of D.

We study large cardinal properties associated with Ramseyness in which homogeneous sets are demanded to satisfy various transfinite degrees of indescribability. Sharpe and Welch [25], and independently Bagaria [1], extended the notion of $\Pi ^1_n$ -indescribability where $n<\omega $ to that of $\Pi ^1_\xi $ -indescribability where $\xi \geq \omega $ . By iterating Feng’s Ramsey operator [12] on the various $\Pi ^1_\xi $ -indescribability ideals, we obtain new large cardinal hierarchies and corresponding nonlinear increasing hierarchies of normal ideals. We provide a complete account of the containment relationships between the resulting ideals and show that the corresponding large cardinal properties yield a strict linear refinement of Feng’s original Ramsey hierarchy. We isolate Ramsey properties which provide strictly increasing hierarchies between Feng’s $\Pi _\alpha $ -Ramsey and $\Pi _{\alpha +1}$ -Ramsey cardinals for all odd $\alpha <\omega $ and for all $\omega \leq \alpha <\kappa $ . We also show that, given any ordinals $\beta _0,\beta _1<\kappa $ the increasing chains of ideals obtained by iterating the Ramsey operator on the $\Pi ^1_{\beta _0}$ -indescribability ideal and the $\Pi ^1_{\beta _1}$ -indescribability ideal respectively, are eventually equal; moreover, we identify the least degree of Ramseyness at which this equality occurs. As an application of our results we show that one can characterize our new large cardinal notions and the corresponding ideals in terms of generic elementary embeddings; as a special case this yields generic embedding characterizations of $\Pi ^1_\xi $ -indescribability and Ramseyness.

This paper is concerned with the determination of the proof-strength of the power set axiom relative to axiom systems for Feferman's explicit mathematics. As conjectured by Feferman, we obtain that the presence of the power set axiom does not increase proof-strength.

Results are achieved by reducing the systems including the power set axiom to subsystems of classical analysis. In those cases where only the induction axiom is available, we make use of the technique of asymmetrical interpretations.

wtt-reducibility has become of some importance in the last years through the works of Ladner and Sasso [1975], Stob [1983] and Ambos-Spies [1984]. It differs from Turing reducibility by a recursive bound on the use of the reduction. This makes some proofs easier in the wtt degrees than in the Turing degrees. Certain proofs carry over directly from the Turing to the wtt degrees, especially those based on permitting. But the converse is also possible. There are some r.e. Turing degrees which consist of a single r.e. wtt degree (the so-called contiguous degrees; see Ladner and Sasso [1975]). Thus it suffices to prove a result about contiguous wtt degrees using an easier construction, and it carries over to the corresponding Turing degrees.

In this work we prove some results on pairs of r.e. wtt degrees which have no infimum. The existence of such a pair has been shown by Ladner and Sasso. Here we use a different technique of Jockusch [1981] to prove this result (Theorem 1) together with some stronger ones. We show that a pair without infimum exists above a given incomplete wtt degree (Theorem 5) and below any promptly simple wtt degree (Theorem 12). In Theorem 17 we prove, however, that there are r.e. wtt degrees such that any pair below them has an infimum. This shows that certain initial segments of the wtt degrees are lattices. Thus there is a structural difference between the wtt and Turing degrees where the pairs without infimum are dense (Ambos-Spies [1984]).

Many phrases have been used to express what are sometimes called anti-realist conceptions of truth: ‘verifiability’, ‘knowability’, ‘rational acceptability’, ‘warranted assertability’. In spite of their obvious differences, all four of these phrases have a common form; each is a cognitive attitude modified by ‘-ability’. They speak of the possibility of verification, knowledge, rational acceptance or warranted assertion. Schematically, it seems to be claimed that it is true that A if and only if it is possible that it is E'd that A, where ‘E’ is to be replaced by some cognitive verb and ‘A’ by any indicative sentence of the class to which the anti-realist conception is being claimed to apply. Since truth is redundant as a sentential operator, this boils down to the following thesis, where ‘p’ is a propositional variable and ‘M’ expresses the appropriate kind of possibility:

(*) also formalizes views such as Putnam's: ‘To claim a statement is true is to claim it could be justified’ [11, p. 56]. It is no doubt a crude model for anti-realism, but one has to start somewhere; by seeing how and why more sophisticated versions of anti-realism differ from (*) one should be able to understand them better too. Moreover, if an anti-realist rejects the equation of truth with, say, warranted assertibility, arguing that truth is rather to be identified with the possibility of getting into a position in which one's warrant to assert somehow cannot be overturned, the form of (*) is preserved, for truth is still being identified with the possibility of something.