Buddhism and Marxism may seem unlikely bedfellows, since they come from such different times and places, and appear to address such different concerns. But the two have at least this much in common: both say that life, as we find it, is unsatisfactory; both have a diagnosis of why this is; and both offer the hope of making it better. In this paper, I argue that aspects of each complement aspects of the other. In particular, Buddhism provides a stable ethical base that Marxism always lacked; and Marxism provides a sophisticated political philosophy, which Buddhism never had. I will explain those aspects of each of the two on which I wish to draw, and then explain how they are complementary.

Within the philosophy of time there has been a growing interest in positions that deny the reality of time. Those positions, whether motivated by arguments from physics or metaphysics, have a shared conclusion: time is not real. What has not been made clear, however, is exactly what it entails to deny the reality of time. Time is unreal, sure. But what does that mean?

There has (within the recent literature) been only one sustained attempt to spell out what it would mean to endorse a (so-called) temporal error theory, a theory that denies the reality of time: Baron and Miller's (2015) ‘What Is Temporal Error Theory?’ Despite the fact that their paper makes significant strides in spelling out what would be required, my claim in this paper is that their position must be rejected and replaced. In addition to rejecting Baron and Miller's position, I also offer that replacement.

We take ourselves to be able to omit to perform certain actions and to be at times responsible for these omissions. Moreover, omissions seem to have effects and to be manifestations of our agency. So, it is natural to think that omissions must be events. However, very few people writing on this topic have been willing to argue that omissions are events. Such a view is taken to face three significant challenges: (i) omissions are thought to be somehow problematically negative, (ii) it is unclear where the event of an omission would be located, and (iii) if we accept any omissions as events, it seems like there would be far too much causation involving them. In this paper, I develop a novel view of omissions as events and as actions that provides answers to these challenges.

I explore what Bernard Williams means by regarding one's action ‘purely externally, as one might regard anyone else's action’, and how it links to regret and agent-regret. I suggest some ways that we might understand the external view: as a failure to recognize what one has done, in terms of Williams's distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic luck, and as akin to Thomas Nagel's distinction between an internal and external view. I argue that none of these captures what Williams was getting at because they do not allow one to take a view on one's action. I offer two alternative accounts. One turns around what we identify with, the other concerns what we care about. Both accounts capture how I might regret, rather than agent-regret, my own action. I demonstrate that these accounts can explain the relationship between an insurance payout and the external view, and they can explain the agent-relativity of agent-regret.

Does Kantian moral agency require phenomenal consciousness? More to the point, can firms (and other highly organized collectives) be Kantian moral agents—bound by Kantian obligations—in the absence of consciousness? After sketching the mechanics of my account of corporate agents, I consider three increasingly demanding accounts of Kantian moral agency, concluding that corporate agents can meet each successively higher threshold. They can (1) act on universalizable principles and treat humanity as an end in itself; (2) give such principles to themselves, treat their own ‘humanity’ as an end itself, and act out of respect for the law; and (3) to the extent necessary, draw on empathically generated information and insights to inflect their performance, all in the absence of phenomenal consciousness. I close by rejecting two further arguments that phenomenal consciousness is nonetheless conceptually or practically necessary for Kantian moral agency.

‘Heritage’ is a concept that often carries significant normative weight in moral and political argument. In this article, I present and critique a prevalent conception according to which heritage must have a positive valence. I argue that this view of heritage leads to two moral problems: disowning injustice and embracing injustice. In response, I argue for an alternative conception of heritage that promises superior moral and political consequences. In particular, this alternative jettisons the traditional focus on heritage as a primarily positive relationship to the past and thus offers resources for coming to terms with histories of injustice.

Moritz Schlick's work shaped logical empiricism and thereby an important part of philosophy in the first half of the twentieth century. A continuous thread that runs through his work is a philosophical diagnosis of the ‘great errors in philosophy’: philosophers assume that there is intuitive knowledge or knowledge by acquaintance. Yet, acquaintance is not knowledge, but an evaluative attitude. In this paper I will reconstruct Schlick's arguments for this conclusion in the light of his early practical philosophy and his reading of Schopenhauer's The World as Will and Idea. Having the historical roots of Schlick's dichotomy between acquaintance (intuition) and knowledge in view will put us in a position to explore and question its presuppositions.