This paper analyzes the causes of the rise and the fall of the Algerian wine industry. It is hard to imagine in the twenty-first century global wine economy, but until about 50 years ago Algeria was the largest exporter of wine in the world—and by a wide margin. Between 1880 and 1930 Algerian wine production grew dramatically. Equally spectacular was the decline of Algerian wine production: today, Algeria produces and exports little wine. There was an important bidirectional impact between developments in the Algerian wine sector and French regulations. French regulations had a major impact on the Algerian wine industry, and the growth of the Algerian wine industry triggered the introduction of important wine regulations in France at the beginning of the twentieth century and during the 1930s. Important elements of these regulations are still present in European wine policy today. (JEL Classifications: K23, L51, N44, N54, Q13)

This paper explores empirically the causes of extreme fluctuations in commodity prices from January 1990 to June 2010 and seeks to identify the relative contribution of advanced and emerging market economies to the changes in commodity prices. Our assumption is that analyzing two very distinct goods—crude oil and fine wine—helps to identify common determinants of commodity prices. We find that the growth rate of global aggregate demand is the key macroeconomic determinant of the fluctuations in both crude oil and fine wine prices over the sample period. While advanced economies account for more than half of global consumption, emerging market and developing economies make up the bulk of the incremental change in demand, thereby having a greater weight in commodity price formation. The coefficient of emerging market industrial output growth is about three times as high as that of advanced economies in oil price regressions and almost five times as powerful in fine wine price regressions. The results also show that the shift in the composition of aggregate commodity demand is a recent phenomenon. (JEL Classifications: Q11, Q39, Q41, Q43)

In this paper, we use three different goodness-of-fit tests for log-normality in conjunction with kernel nonparametric density estimation methods to examine both the size distribution of California North Coast wineries over time and by age. Our kernel density estimates indicate that the size distribution of wineries has changed from positively skewed to bimodal. These results are inconsistent with those in other industries, but are consistent with recent empirical research in the wine industry, which finds that smaller firms are comprising a larger component of market share. In terms of the distribution of firm size by age, our results indicate that as wineries age, the size distribution of firms becomes less skewed and more bimodal, which is also inconsistent with the research on other industries which finds that as firms age, the size distribution becomes more normal. Our results indicate that unlike other industries, where entry is very difficult, small firms can enter the wine industry and survive. (JEL Classifications: L11, L22, L25)

A test for evaluating wine judge performance is developed. The test is based on the premise that an expert wine judge will award similar scores to an identical wine. The definition of “similar” is parameterized to include varying numbers of adjacent awards on an ordinal scale, from No Award to Gold. For each index of similarity, a probability distribution is developed to determine the likelihood that a judge might pass the test by chance alone. When the test is applied to the results from a major wine competition, few judges pass the test. Of greater interest is that many judges who fail the test have vast professional experience in the wine industry. This leads to us to question the basic premise that experts are able to provide consistent evaluations in wine competitions and, hence, that wine competitions do not provide reliable recommendations of wine quality. (JEL Classifications: C02, C12, D81)

This article examines the determinants of chemical consumption by French winegrowers on an individual basis. We introduce criteria relating to the structure of vineyards and the financial situation of the winegrowers. Using data from the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN-RICA) for the period 2002–2007 from an annual sample of 607 winegrowers, we study the different factors that encourage winegrowers to use chemical inputs to protect or increase the yield of their vines. Drawing on transversal and longitudinal analyses, we illustrate the benefits derived from differentiating the demand for inputs according to their classification: pesticides or fertilizers. Climatic variables, physical size, and turnover all act as driving forces in the decision to use chemical inputs. We show that taking out crop insurance functions as a substitute for inputs and observe a double moral hazard effect: Winegrowers who increase their insurance coverage reduce their consumption of inputs the most and receive greater compensation; among insured winegrowers, those who use the most inputs make the most claims. As wine grape growing is a consistent activity conducted over a long period, we observe permanence in patterns of use of chemical inputs. (JEL Classifications: Q12, Q13, Q14)